Reproductive rights and citizenship: Family planning in Zimbabwe. by Ferguson, Clare
University o f London
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP: 
FAMILY PLANNING IN ZIMBABWE
Clare Ferguson
A thesis submitted to the Department of Anthropology, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 
for the Degree of PhD., February 1999
UMI Number: U123025
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U123025
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 





List of Tables iii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Methodology 6
1.2 Fieldwork Methods 15
Chapter 2 Theoretical Issues:Human Rights, Reproductive Rights
And Citizenship 26
2.1 Entitlements 29
2.2 Human Rights and Social Policy 30
2.3 Liberal Theories of Human Rights 32
2.4 Marxist Post-structuralist critiques of Human Rights 37
2.5 Political Tools: Rights, Needs and Interests 41
2.6 Rights in Practice 44
2.7 Reproductive Rights 45
2.8 Unmet Needs and the Right to Family Planning 46
2.9 Feminist Concepts of Reproductive Rights 49
2.10 Feminist Critiques of Reproductive Rights 51
2.11 Citizenship 52
Chapter 2 The Rhodesian State and the Gendered Construction of Citizenship 61
3.1 Introduction 61
3.2 African Citizenship 62
3.3 Pre-colonial Shona 67
3.4 Colonialism 74
3.5 Free Labour and Modernity 75
3.6 Customary Law 83
3.7 Community Development 90
3.8 Conclusion 96
Chapter 4 Gender and Citizenship in Contemporary Zimbabwe 98
4.1 The War of Liberation:Nationalist Expectations 99
4.2 Women and War in Mabika 105
4.3 Political Participation 108
4.4 Political Institutions and Women’s Participation in Mabika 114
4.5 Civil Rights 118
4.6 Mabika 122
4.7 Social and Economic Citizenship 126
4.8 Conclusion 139
Chapter 5 Household Gender Relations: The ‘Conjugal Contract’
And Reproductive Strategies 141
5.1 Demographic Theories: From Costs and Benefits to Rights and
Responsibilities 143
5.2 Mabika: The Terms Of The ‘Conjugal Contract’ 148
5.3 Lobola 149
5.4 Fertility and Rights Over Children 152
5.5 Sexuality 155
5.6 Labour 158
5.7 Household Authority 160
5.8 Negotiating Strategies:Words and Actions 163
5.9 Fertility as a Negotiating Tool 167
5.10 Economic Crisis: Conflict and Competition for Resources 171
5.11 Economic Changes and Numbers of Children 174
5.12 Conclusion 180
Chapter 6 Family Planning Services:The Politics of Reproductive Rights
In Zimbabwe 182
6.1 Introduction 182
6.2 Gender, Policy and Bureaucracy 183
6.3 FPA: Official Policy 187
6.4 Organisational Structure 193
6.5 Programmes and Practice 196
6.6 Government Take Over The FPA 200
6.7 ZNFPC : Policies and Programmes 203
6.8 ZNFPC Programmes 209
6.9 Organisational Structures and Participatory Mechanisms 212
6.10 Conclusion 216
Chapter 7 The Practice of Family Planning Service Provision in Mabika 218
7.1 Introduction 218
7.2 Street Level Bureaucrats 220
7.3 Service and Workers 223
7.4 Recognition of Male Authority 226
7.5 The Subversion of Male Reproductive Authority 231
7.6 Client Rights: CBD Programme 233
7.7 Client Rights: the Clinic 239
7.8 Reproductive Health Issues 244
7.9 Participation and Identification of Needs 246
7.10 Participation and Accountability 251
7.11 Conclusion 252
Chapter 8 Contraceptive Use and Reproductive Strategies 254
8.1 Introduction 254
8.2 Resistance and Adaptation 256
8.3 Fertility Regulation Practices: Traditional Versus Modern 260
8.4 Patterns of Contraceptive Use 269
8.5 Reproductive Strategies 271
8.5.1 Traditional Strategies 271
8.5.2 New Strategies? 283
8.6 Conclusion 289
Chapter 9 Conclusion 292
BIBLIOGRAPHY 300
Appendices:
I: Map of field site 317
II: Photographs 319
Abstract
In this thesis, the relevance and practical value of discourses about reproductive rights to 
women living in a rural area of Zimbabwe are examined. Policy documents indicate that the 
Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council’s (ZNFPC’s) community based distribution 
service is based on principles of respect for particular definitions of reproductive rights and, 
concomitantly, a degree of women’s reproductive self determination. In contrast, recent 
analyses of post Independence government action suggest that, as citizens of Zimbabwe, 
women are generally defined as dependants of men. This raises questions about the impact of 
the context of women’s citizenship on the interpretation and realisation of reproductive rights 
through the family planning programme. Field work data focuses on the interpretation of 
policy and the consequent practices of local level health workers as well as women’s 
interactions with health workers and their implications for reproductive self determination 
within household relations. It is suggested that health workers’ actions result in the 
differential realisation of reproductive rights for particular social groups. Health worker 
relations with clients, in turn, reinforce differences between women in terms of the extent to 
which they are able to exercise reproductive self-determination within household relations. 
State employed health workers, in effect, act as policemen of private reproductive decision 
making. The use of an analytical framework of rights and citizenship highlights the relatively 
neglected issue of the political system in which family planning programmes are embedded.
It is argued that health worker accountability to village populations is as important as the 
content of policy in determining the realisation and practical value of discourses about 
reproductive rights to rural women.
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In this thesis I examine the relevance and practical value of discourses about reproductive rights 
to women living in a rural area of Zimbabwe1. Policy documents indicate that the Zimbabwe 
National Family Planning Council’s (ZNFPC’s) community based distribution service is built on 
principles of respect for a particular definition of reproductive rights and, concomitantly, a degree 
of women’s reproductive self-determination. The concepts of reproductive rights contained in the 
ZNFPC’s policies draw upon international definitions set out in UN human rights conventions and 
global conferences. However, analyses of post Independence government action suggest that, as 
citizens of Zimbabwe, women are generally defined as the dependants of men. In this thesis, I 
explore the contrast between women’s identification as dependant citizens and the recognition 
of their greater autonomy in the policies of the ZNFPC. In particular, I examine how the context 
of gendered citizenship impacts upon the interpretation and implementation of reproductive 
rights. I further discuss whether and how the ZNFPC’s discourse of reproductive rights enables 
women to address their identification as the dependants of men. In contrast to much demographic 
work, then, this thesis does not examine the relations between family planning programmes and 
fertility levels, but rather addresses the question of the relationship between state provision of 
family planning services and women’s reproductive self-determination.
Discussion of the family planning programme within a framework of human rights and citizenship
11 define discourse as including non-discursive practices and institutions as well as groups of statements 
(Grillo, 1998). As Scott suggests, discourse is ‘a historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of 
statements, terms, categories and beliefs...Discourse is thus contained or expressed in organizations and institutions 
as well as in words’ (Scott, 1988:35).
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highlights the relatively neglected issue of the political systems in which policies and programmes 
are buried and the impact of that context on population processes (Greenhalgh 1990b). I highlight 
the role of local level health workers in policy interpretation and implementation. This focus, in 
turn, leads to discussion of the importance of local level accountability of public service workers 
for the realisation of rights. I examine these issues through the utilisation of sociological and 
anthropological analyses of policy and household relations. Fieldwork methods included the 
collection of policy documents in addition to interviews with service users, health workers and 
managers. All interviews with rural health service users, and non-users, were conducted among 
the Ndau, one of the groups making up the majority Shona. This thesis, however, is not a 
conventional ethnography. The main field work site was an Ndau village called Mabika2. The 
thesis provides an ethnography of a set of policies, practices, relations between health workers 
and citizens and their impact upon the women of Mabika and the gender relations which shape 
their lives.
The questions raised in this thesis are particularly relevant to current debates about the value and 
meaning of human rights for development policy and practice. The Department for International 
Development of the UK Government, for example, has made respect for human rights a 
cornerstone of its policies aimed at the elimination of poverty. The development view focuses 
on the incorporation of concepts and values of human rights into government social and economic 
policies as well as national laws. The human rights defined by the United Nations and 
International Labour Organisation over the last decade have been identified as the basis for a 
global social policy. Such a policy could, it is argued, define the baseline standards by which all
2 The name of the village and the identities of all people interviewed have been changed.
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citizens can judge state performance and provision of services (Eyben 1998).
The idea of a social policy founded upon human rights, however, also has its critics. It has been 
argued that human rights instruments are ineffectual as a means of redressing social and 
economic, rather than civil and political, inequalities (Mishra 1998). Some feminist analyses 
suggest that human rights are not an effective tool for the transformation of gender relations. 
Human rights, it is argued, are based on western ideas of individualism and reinforce essentialist 
notions of humanity (Pringle and Watson 1996). Feminist critics further point to the lack of 
systematic attention in human rights discourses to abuses in the ‘private’ sphere (Peters and 
Wolper 1995). Yet, whatever the deficiencies of the concept of human rights, there is wide 
agreement among feminist theorists that the political strength of human rights claims makes it a 
discourse which is difficult to ignore (Dixon-Mueller 1993; Petchesky and Judd 1998; Sen and 
others 1994).
The issue of reproductive rights provides a useful case study for analysis of the value of human 
rights as a tool for transforming gender relations, as family planning services are one of the few 
areas of state social provision which have been fought out through reference to principles of 
women’s human rights. Discussions about reproductive rights revolve around two central 
concerns. The first of these is the identification of who should have authority over reproductive 
decision making. The second issue is the provision of technologies for fertility control. Feminist 
activists, religious leaders, government representatives of north and south as well as international 
population organisations, have formed shifting, and sometimes surprising, alliances in the struggle 
around these questions (Dixon-Mueller 1993; Jeffery and others 1994).
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Feminist understandings of women’s reproductive freedom are grounded in the principle of bodily 
self-determination (Petchesky 1980). Debates concerning this concept draw attention to the 
central tension between biological sex and socially defined gender that has fuelled feminist social 
theory and action over the recent decades. Feminist analyses have highlighted the fact that gender 
relations are socially constructed relations of power, and therefore open to transformation (Moore 
1988). The concept of reproductive rights, however, draws analyses back to the fact of a shared 
biology. While reproduction takes place within a social context, their reproductive organs define 
women as a sex. As Petchesky argues, no matter how gender relations are realised and 
transformedfwomen, as biological child-bearers, should have ultimate authority over their bodies 
and reproductive decision making (Petchesky 1980). As Correa argues, ‘the decision making self 
must remain at the core of reproductive rights’ (Correa and Petchesky 1994:77).
While feminist analyses start from the principle of women’s reproductive self-determination, there 
has been disagreement about the role of contraceptives in fertility decision making. Documented 
cases of abuse through state provision of contraceptives have fuelled arguments that 
contraceptive technology is, in itself, a tool of patriarchal subordination (Hartmann 1987; 
Wajcman 1994). However, a general consensus among feminist commentators that contraceptive 
provision is a necessary prerequisite for the fulfilment of women’s reproductive self-determination 
can currently be identified. Feminist analyses, however, highlight the importance of two aspects 
of the context of service provision. First, ‘quality of care’ standards, necessary to ensure that 
women’s self determination in relation to health workers, have been identified. A second approach 
has concentrated upon the socio-economic ‘enabling conditions’ which are necessary if women 
are to realise particular choices concerning contraceptive use (Berer 1993; Hardon and Hayes 
1997; Sen and others 1994; Smyth 1995).
Feminist concerns have recently been formally recognised in international debates about 
reproductive rights. As I discuss in the theoretical chapter, the development of concepts of 
reproductive rights in international documents can be traced from the Teheran declaration of 1968 
and the Plan of Action adopted by the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974, 
through to the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 
1995 Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Teheran and 
Bucharest set out the right of parents to contraceptive information and the concomitant obligation 
of the state to provide family planning services. These declarations were presented as enhancing 
the means by which couples could carry out their reproductive decision making. The political 
context of the times, however, and subsequent implementation of family planning programmes 
suggest that the early declarations can be interpreted as an assertion of the state’s right to have 
some say in reproductive decision making (Freedman and Isaacs 1993; Kabeer 1992). As a result 
of feminist action, in the last decade international concepts" of reproductive rights have been 
revised and redefined. The Cairo conference outlined particular standards of reproductive health 
care designed to ensure clients’ rights in relation to health workers. Beijing defined women’s right 
to reproductive sexual self determination in all relations, including those in the ‘private’ sphere 
and linked this right to broader socio-economic conditions (Petchesky and Judd 1998).
Some feminist critics, however, remain dubious about the extent to which the content of these 
declarations will be implemented in favour of women’s increased autonomy. Moreover, there is 
continuing discomfort with the use of a concept which is based upon the universal biologism 
which feminism has fought to disarm. There is little room, it is argued, in the international 
discourse of reproductive rights for considerations of cultural and social difference (Smyth 1995).
In this thesis, I take the position that women should have ultimate authority over reproductive 
decision making. I argue in the theoretical chapter, however, that the interpretation of this 
principle, and conclusions about the best means of realisation, can only be addressed through 
attention to the use and value of discourses about reproductive rights at the local level (Petchesky 
and Judd 1998). The effectiveness of human rights as a tool for the transformation of gender 
relations has to be assessed through analysis of local level empirical evidence. A focus on the local 
level takes feminist debate beyond abstract questions of universalism and highlights the 
importance of concrete issues of the impact of policy and practice on the lives of village women.
1.1 Methodology
This thesis is not, as already indicated, a conventional ethnography. It is, instead, an analysis of 
a set of family planning policies and practices and their impact on the women and gender relations 
in the Nadau village of Mabika. It is a ‘multi sited ethnography’ (Shore and Wright 1997). My 
objective is to provide a vertical and historical, slice of the links between a set of internationally 
defined concepts of reproductive rights and the lives of women living in a Zimbabwean village. 
The obvious drawback of taking this approach is that there may be losses in horizontal coverage. 
I have, wherever possible, drawn directly on my own field notes for details of dominant 
understandings of Ndau customs and ways of life. The description of the terms and conditions of 
Ndau marriage agreements, for example, is distilled from my discussions and interviews with key 
informants. As one male informant explained, ‘I am more like an Ndebele than I am like you. The 
Ndau are a Shona people. But I am Ndau’. However, I have also drawn upon conventional 
ethnographies of the Shona, particularly the works of Lan and Boudillon, for supporting 
information (Bourdillon 1991; Bourdillon 1993; Lan 1985). The historical chapter draws upon
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existing detailed accounts of gender relations in colonial Rhodesia. Much of this work, including 
that of Barnes, Schmidt and Jeater, addresses the lives of Shona women (Barnes 1992; Jeater 
1993; Schmidt 1990; Schmidt 1992; Schmidt 1996). The political history provided by Alexander 
is based upon research among the Ndau (Alexander 1994; Alexander 1995).
The policies I examine are those of the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council (ZNFPC), 
a para-statal attached to the Ministry of Health. The ZNFPC acts as an advisory body to the 
Ministry of Health on family planning issues. Nurses providing family planning in Ministry of 
Health run clinics are trained by the ZNFPC and governed by their standards of service provision. 
The ZNFPC also manages the community based distribution programme which is one of the most 
widespread in Sub Saharan Africa. The present day government supported family planning 
programme, comprising twenty eight family planning clinics, two hundred other clinics which 
supply family planning and four hundred community based distributors, supplies three quarters 
of all ‘acceptors’ with contraceptives. The community based distribution programme covers 
approximately thirty per cent of the rural population, but supplies forty two per cent of all users 
with their contraceptives (Gregson and others 1996; Mazur and Mhloyi 1994; Zinanga 1992).
My requirements for the main field work site were that it should be in a communal area3, as the 
majority of rural Zimbabweans live in these designated lands, and that it should be covered by the 
ZNFPC’s community based distribution service. Mabika met these requirements. Mabika is 
classified as being in natural region IV; hot, low-lying land subject to seasonal drought, marginal 
for rain fed cultivation (Campbell and others 1989). It is an area of dust, shrub lands, baobab trees
3 The creation of Tribal Trust Lands under colonial rule, the predecessors of the communal areas, is 
discussed in chapter three.
and clouds which hang low but never burst. In contrast to the surrounding cool, green, white 
owned plantations of the Eastern Highlands, cultivation in this area is precarious. There was, 
however, an irrigation scheme operating in the village which supplied water to the fields of 
approximately one third of all inhabitants. In the non irrigated areas, people grew maize for 
subsistence purposes. This provided the staple diet of sadza. In the irrigated areas, farmers grew 
wheat and maize in the summer season and beans and tomatoes in the winter. When there was 
a surplus, the produce was either sold at local markets or to a commercial dealer who negotiated 
a set price for produce from the village with local leaders and officials from Agritex, the 
government’s agricultural extension programme.
The composition of the village population conformed to a pattern of wealth differentiation 
identified in socio-economic analyses of other communal areas in Zimbabwe (Cousins and others 
1992; Pankhurst and Jacobs 1988; Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). Mabika straggles along a four 
kilometre stretch of track which ran from the main road and small township. The irrigated land 
lay to one side of this track. Households with access to irrigated fields tended to be located along 
the main thoroughfare. Other households, often with restricted access to land and off farm 
income, could be found in the dry shrublands to the right up to two kilometres from the track. 
The main exceptions to the geographical divide were the homesteads of soldiers and their wives, 
most of which were located in the drylands. These families were new to the area and, as I discuss 
in chapter four, did not have customary access to irrigated land. As recipients of a regular, 
relatively high income, however, they were one of the richest groups in the village. These 
differences in off farm income and cash from agricultural produce were reflected in type and 
condition of dwelling. A homestead, ideally, consisted of a rectangular sleeping quarters and a 
separate circular kitchen. In polygamous households, each wife had her own kitchen. The land
belonging to the homestead was defined by a branch constructed fence. Households along the 
main track, and those belonging to soldiers, were more likely to be built of sun baked mud bricks. 
Those in the dry lands were generally made of mud and thatch and were of varying standards of 
construction, some being little more than a precarious lean-to. Possession of livestock could also 
be seen as indicative of amount and security of income. Some homesteads had pens for oxen and 
goats within their boundaries. Others kept a few hens while some homesteads had no livestock 
at all. I used these ostensible measures of income as a means of gauging relative poverty, in 
addition to information obtained during interviews about income from remittances and 
agricultural produce.
In this thesis, as I have indicated above, I analyse the policies of the ZNFPC, the practices of local 
level health workers and their impact on the reproductive self-determination of women living in 
Mabika. The central empirical issue which this thesis addresses is the contrast between the 
ZNFPC’s policy recognition of women as independent individuals with particular rights and the 
general socio-political context in which women are identified as dependants of their male kin.
The contrasting values that this thesis explores can be conceptualised through reference to 
political science debates about social contract theory. As Lemarchand and Werbner suggest, a 
distinction can be made between the Lockean version of the social contract and the Burkean 
notion of moral partnerships. While in the former, relations between states and individuals are 
defined in terms of citizen’s rights, in the latter those relations are regarded as being rooted in an 
enduring partnership between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are yet to 
be bom (Lemarchand 1992; Werbner 1995). As I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, it is the 
Lockean notion of contract which has, historically, informed definitions of human rights as well
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as western ideals of citizenship (Pateman 1991). As Lemarchand suggests, however, it is Burke’s 
notion of moral partnership which more nearly represents the ideals embodied in many African 
socio-political institutions (Lemarchand 1992). Such observations have been used to deny the 
relevance of discourses of human rights to African societies (Cobbah 1987). Yet, discourses of 
individual rights have long played a part in relations between people and governments in sub 
Saharan Africa (Chanock 1985; Comaroff 1997; Cooper 1989). In contemporary Zimbabwe, 
discussions about human rights are increasingly to be heard in the public sphere. The debates 
which have received the most attention, however, have focused on issues of ethnic and racial 
violence and exclusion (Mamdani 1996; Moyo 1992; Werbner 1995). In this thesis, I utilise 
debates about human rights and citizenship to analyse gendered relations in contemporary 
Zimbabwe. Such analysis has to move beyond the consideration of abstract ideals and values and 
examine the reality of the constraints which shape women’s strategies and lives.
As I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, feminist analyses of rights and western citizenship have 
highlighted the reality of hierarchical gendered relations behind the ideal of individual equality and 
freedom. As Pateman argues, the western ideal of equal male citizenship in the ‘public’ sphere is 
predicated upon women’s subordination in the ‘private’ sphere (Pateman 1992). Equally, 
however, the cross generational ‘moral partnership’ that Lemarchand identifies as representing 
the ideal model informing African social relations, masks different forms of gendered hierarchy 
(Lemarchand 1992). As I will discuss in chapters three, four and five, the ideal of state-society 
relations based on enduring bonds between the living, the dead and the yet to be bom is 
dependent upon the ‘private’ sphere transfer of rights in women’s sexuality, fertility and labour 
through marriage. Both the Lockean and Burkean models of state society relations obscure the 
gendered hierarchies upon which their realisation is predicated. Yet, in the concrete realisation
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of both western and African values through different social and political institutions, there is 
generally a pay-off for women. Historically, women have gained some small degree of security 
and support in return for the acceptance of their subordinate position within household relations 
(Kandiyoti 1988; Petchesky and Judd 1998). Thus, consideration of the relevance and practical 
value of discourses of rights for women in rural Zimbabwe has to be based upon assessment of 
women’s own survival strategies. What reproductive rights, in reality, can women claim and what 
is their value to women? What are the gains and losses, in terms of security and well-being, that 
women are making if they claim rights to greater self-determination? If women claim their rights, 
are they merely reaching for the chimera of autonomy and liberty at the cost of security and 
economic support?
Questions about the constraints on women’s capacity to claim particular rights highlight the 
importance of the analysis of citizenship in Zimbabwe. As I will discuss in the theoretical chapter, 
the concept of citizenship can be used as a framework for consideration of relations between 
citizens and state at two interrelated levels. The first of these levels incorporates the institutions 
of citizenship, including the civil, social and political rights which pertain to membership of a 
particular state. The second level focuses on the practical realisation of citizenship through 
everyday interactions with state officials or ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980; van Gunsteren 
1978). The gendered construction of citizenship can thus be seen to have a dual impact on the 
value and realisation of women’s reproductive rights. First, the context of the broader social and 
economic rights which women are able to claim shape the ‘enabling conditions’ that underpin the 
reality of women’s choices about their fertility. These issues, as I set out below, will be discussed 
in the first half of the thesis. Second, as I discuss in the latter half of the thesis, the nature of 
women’s participation in political processes shapes the practices of local level health workers and,
consequently, the realisation of rights defined in ZNFPC documents. Thus, the value and 
relevance of discourses about reproductive rights to rural Zimbabwean cannot be considered 
separately from the context of the gendered construction of citizenship institutions which 
influence the provision of, and women’s access to, family planning services. The central focus of 
this thesis, as already indicated, is whether concepts of reproductive rights, recognised in ZNFPC 
policies, are valued by women and enable them to address the constraints resulting from the 
gendered construction of citizenship in Zimbabwe.
In chapter three I discuss the historical construction of citizenship institutions upon divisions of 
race and gender under the colonial regime. I examine the official identification of women as 
dependant mothers and wives through the codification of customary law. I suggest, however, that 
this process was never total or complete. Women were able to use colonial discourses of 
individual rights and justice to negotiate a stronger position for themselves within customary 
structures and organisations. In chapter four I examine the years of the Liberation War and the 
subsequent policies of the Independent government. Recent analyses have suggested that feminist 
aspirations for gender equality under the new Zimbabwean government have not been realised. 
Critics argue that the present day government has failed to dismantle the institutions of the 
colonial regime and women remain defined by state policies and institutions as dependant mothers 
and wives. Women’s exclusion from social, political and economic processes has been reinforced 
by memories of the violence suffered by rural women at the hands of the nationalist guerrillas. The 
war years have left a legacy of distrust between villagers and state organisations.
In chapter five, I examine how the context of state policies and institutions shapes women’s 
position in intra-household negotiations including reproductive decision making. I suggest that
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in rural Zimbabwe a woman must trade rights in her fertility through marriage in exchange for 
some degree of economic support from her husband’s family. Within marriage, women negotiate 
for more resources through reference to the terms of the conjugal contract and manipulation of 
their fertility. I suggest, then, that the links between socio-economic resources and reproductive 
self-determination are two way. Women require some degree of control over reproductive 
decision making in order to gain access to other resources. As Whitehead long ago argued, 
women’s ability to control material resources is related to their identification and construction 
through institutions of kinship and local law as lesser subjects than men (Whitehead 1984). As 
women have few opportunities for gaining economic resources outside customary kinship 
structures, most aim to juggle reproductive self determination and economic security within the 
confines of the customary terms of the conjugal contract. I further argue, however, that women’s 
strategies of claiming resources through marriage are being undermined by economic factors. The 
evidence suggests that the reality of changing economic conditions in Zimbabwe, as in other Sub 
Saharan African countries, has meant that men are increasingly reluctant to meet their ‘customary’ 
obligations to provide support and security for women (Guyer 1994; Lockwood 1997; Potts and 
Mutambirwa 1998).
In chapter six I discuss the historical development of concepts of reproductive rights from the 
policies of Rhodesian Family Planning Association (FPA) to those of its present day successor, 
the ZNFPC. I suggest that the FPA used concepts of human rights and the obligation of the state 
to provide family planning services to, in practice, claim greater authority over the reproductive 
decision making processes of African couples. Despite wartime nationalist objections to the 
programme, the Independent government took on the organisation rather than disbanding it. I 
argue that ZNFPC policies and programmes indicate two conflicting concepts of reproductive
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rights. The ZNFPC recognises women’s right to reproductive self-determination in relation to 
health workers. ZNFPC policies include a number of client rights which correspond to the quality 
of care standards set out in Cairo. Analysis of ZNFPC programmes, however, indicates that men 
are defined as having ultimate authority over reproductive decision making in the private sphere.
In chapter seven I discuss how local level health workers interpret these conflicting concepts in 
their daily practices. I argue that the practices of the Community Based Distributors (CBDs) 
result in the differential realisation of clients’ rights for particular groups. CBDs thus act as 
policemen of reproductive decision making in the private sphere though their control over the 
provision of family planning services. CBDs only provide contraceptives to women who have 
already had a child. Women who are married, however, can obtain services with or without their 
husband’s consent. Some women are also excluded from use of the CBDs services because 
contraceptive payment exemptions are not systematically applied. The groups of women who 
cannot obtain contraceptives from the CBD have to visit the local Ministry of Health clinic for 
supplies. At the clinic, realisation of client rights is linked to the socio-economic status of 
individuals. Younger women and others of lower socio-economic standing are less likely to be 
able to obtain the information and services which are theirs by right. The lack of a credible system 
of local government worker accountability means that villagers are unable to collectively ensure 
that client rights are always observed.
In chapter eight, I discuss how women utilise the entitlements which they are able to claim from 
the family planning services in their reproductive strategies. Within marriage, I suggest that those 
women who are less able to claim services have more difficulty in negotiating a degree of 
reproductive self-determination within the household. They are, consequently, less likely to
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successfully claim a greater share of household resources. Those women who are unable to obtain 
adequate family planning information and services may use contraceptives intermittently and 
ineffectively. They are, consequently, less able to manage their fertility. Those women who 
successfully obtain services often use contraceptives as a straightforward replacement for kinship 
controlled means of fertility regulation. Switching from kinship regulated to state supplied means 
of contraception allows these women a marginal degree of reproductive self-determination within 
the household. Some of these women use contraceptives secretly to ensure that the timing of 
childbirth is geared to their greatest possible material advantage and well being. As discussed in 
chapter five, however, changing economic circumstances mean that, for some women, customary 
reproductive strategies are no longer an option. Some women within the village had given up all 
hope of gaining any economic support from their husbands. There were also number of young 
unmarried women in the village who, learning from the mistakes of their single mother peers, did 
not want to risk pregnancy as a means of entering into marriage. These women were searching 
for greater reproductive self determination, as there was no longer any point of trying to trade 
rights over fertility for economic support. The strategies of these women highlight the 
shortcomings of the ZNFPC’s dual definition of reproductive rights.
1.2 Field work methods
The collection of data to address the issues set out above involved searching for ZNFPC 
documentation, interviewing health managers and workers, carrying out participant observation 
exercises with community based distributors and conducting interviews in Mabika village. Data 
collection was based entirely on the use of qualitative methods. I had originally planned to carry 
out a larger socio-economic household survey in the area of research. Time and resources,
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however, precluded any such exercise. When it came to analysis of the data, this was the principal 
area where I felt that the thesis would have benefited from more systematic evidence. All semi­
structured interviews started with a list of questions about household size and composition, 
sources of income and resources owned. These questions, however, were not always asked using 
the same format and anomalies in response were not always clarified. I have used the 
socio-economic information gathered from these questions, then, for descriptive purposes rather 
than statistical analysis. I have drawn upon census statistics and other secondary sources to fill 
the gap in my own data.
Moving up and down the hierarchy of the health service, and between service providers and users, 
highlighted the complexities of power relations in the research process. As a female student I was 
not always in a position of authority, despite my race and education. When interacting with health 
service managers, I was obviously in a subordinate position. Women in the village often wanted 
to ascribe a greater authority to me than I felt I possessed. I was of more use to them as a figure 
of some standing than the poor and vulnerable researcher I sometimes considered myself to be. 
Feminist epistemological and methodological debates have struggled with the impact of such 
power relations on the production of knowledge and claims to ‘truth’. These debates have tended 
to lead to fairly strong prescriptions about appropriate field work methods for feminist research. 
Feminist empiricist and standpoint methodological arguments have led to a preference for 
reflexivity, qualitative and, particularly, participatory research methods as a means of addressing 
power inequalities between researcher and researched (Maynard 1994). Reflexivity, it has been 
argued, provides a means of eliminating androcentric biases in research through stricter adherence 
to the existing methodological norms of scientific enquiry. This is achieved by placing the enquirer
!
j ‘in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the results of the entire
16
research process for scrutiny in the results of the research’(Harding 1987:9). Qualitative 
techniques require the development of interpersonal communication and involvement between 
researcher and researched and, it has been argued, are more egalitarian and less exploitative than 
other methods (McDowell 1992; Oakley 1981). Participatory research methods which call for the 
active involvement of the interviewees in the research process, their contribution to defining the 
research agenda and product, are seen as encouraging the reversal of those hierarchies of power 
in which the researched are generally at the bottom (Mosse 1994).
Feminist empiricist and standpoint methodological approaches have been challenged by the 
epistemological issues raised by feminist postmodernists. This, along with other variants of 
postmodernism, is critical of universal grand theories and rejects the existence of an authentic self. 
Its’ focus instead is on fragmentation, multiple subjectivities, pluralities and flux (Maynard 1994). 
While feminist postmodernism stands, in principle, against the notion of any kind of science and, 
consequently, has little to offer in terms of practically applicable approaches to empirical 
fieldwork, the notion of difference does at least highlight some of the problems with the 
approaches generated by feminist empiricism and standpoint theories. The idea that some 
methods allow for a more egalitarian relationship between researcher and researched can be 
criticized for being based on the assumption of an essentialist notion of woman. In many cases, 
researcher and researched are differentiated by class and race, if not gender. These differences in 
status and power cannot be obliterated by any kind of research method. McDowell comments, 
‘Is it a realistic aim to endeavour to empower the subjects of our research or does this in itself 
reveal contestable notions of domination?...It is becoming increasingly clear that the notion of 
Jnon-exploitative research relations is a utopian ideal that is receding from our grasp’ (McDowell 
1992). This being the case, as Lawson argues in contrast to earlier feminist criticisms of the
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scientific approach, there is no necessary connection between a particular set of methods and the 
dominance of masculinist ideas in social science - it is a coupling that has been historically 
produced. Quantitative methods are no less intrinsically appropriate to feminist research than 
qualitative techniques. As Lawson points out, quantitative techniques can be used to highlight 
differences between groups and do not necessarily have to be used to show regularity and norms 
(Lawson 1995).
While epistemological issues remain unresolved, scepticism about the notion of gender as an 
analytical category has led to an approach to practical issues which is perhaps less ambitious but 
more broad minded than earlier proscriptions. Whatever methods are used, the recognition of 
difference indicates that all views are situated and limited requiring ‘knowledges that are explicit 
about their positioning, sensitive to the structures of power that construct these multiple 
positions,’ (McDowell 1992). This argument, rather than suggesting a particular blueprint for 
research, implies the need to be critical about how the process of research and the results of that 
inquiiy are limited by the framework of hierarchical social relations within which academic work 
takes place. The demand for critical reflexivity derived from the development of feminist 
epistemology meets with growing requirements from academic bodies to be as explicit about the 
production of research as about the results themselves. As Maynard argues, academic rigour 
requires researchers to be clear about the nature of the research process, so that it is available for 
scrutiny and comment as part of the process through which standards are evaluated (Maynard 
1994).
My own experience of field work confirms the view that research methods alone cannot rectify 
the multiple hierarchies of power which govern social relations. In Zimbabwe, race, class and
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gender observably shape all actions and conversations. Social hierarchies are mapped out in the 
geography of the country, with gate-keepers at every boundary. A white, unaccompanied female 
studying gender issues in a communal area of Zimbabwe is a geographical, and hence social, 
aberration. While I enjoyed my stay and the company of health workers and informants alike, I 
always felt that I was fighting to occupy a difficult to maintain space to carry out the research and 
was never entirely at one with any part of Zimbabwean society. The fact that most of my 
informants were women at times seemed to be a basis for overcoming my alien presence and at 
others served to highlight my position as an anomaly.
The most important relationship while I was in the field was that between myself and Wilder, my 
research assistant. I needed a research assistant to act as translator, as my Shona was not good 
enough to conduct interviews, as well as to be my guide to Ndau life. Our relationship captured 
the complexities of finding a level meeting ground on which to build relationships among so many 
social differences. At times I thought we were friends; at others I felt that my wish to be so was 
a self-deceiving means of coping with our patently unequal relationship. I wanted to be friends. 
Wilder had to get on with me whether she liked it or. not because I was paying her wage and 
potentially offered, as a white westerner, a path up and out of her assigned place. Sometimes it 
was easier for her if I assumed my role and responsibilities as her employee rather than trying to 
operate as if we had equal status. Wilder was 21, educated to 'O' level and came from an Ndau 
village right on the Mozambiquan border. Wilder was also a single mother with a two month old 
baby son. Wilder was keen to work and I was happy to employ her because she was obviously 
very bright and we made each other laugh. So we shared the one room I was able to rent in 
Mabika and took it in turns to carry the baby around the village while we were interviewing. 
Villagers found it hard to comprehend our relationship and would often ask me trick questions
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about who did the cleaning just to see whether, after all, I was employing her as my maid. Later, 
villagers would joke and ask Wilder where she found such a good maid who was willing to carry 
her heavy baby everywhere. By the end of the period of fieldwork, however, rumours were flying 
around the village about Wilder’s marital status. We were warned that people were jealous of her 
relationship with me and might try to put poison in her food. There is no easy place for any form 
of cross racial relationship in Zimbabwe.
I considered employing more than one research assistant in order to gain the advantage of 
different perspectives. In the end, however, I stuck with Wilder because the relationship appeared 
to work. Together, we seemed to create a combination of respectability and acceptability which 
enabled women of all age groups to talk to us. While the baby was not a deliberate attempt to try 
to create a sense of trust, his presence undoubtedly helped ease any suspicions about the object 
of the research. Men also appeared to be generally open and willing to be interviewed. It was only 
with younger, single men of my own age group that there was some uneasiness. Unmarried men 
appeared to be worried about impressing me and asserting their status. I had been warned, 
principally by Europeans who had worked in Zimbabwe, that the Shona were a very private 
people and would be loathe to talk about such personal issues as sexuality and contraception. This 
was not, in my experience, the case. As I will discuss in chapter five, the Ndau have strict rules 
about when and with whom it is appropriate to talk about what. I found, however, that it was 
usually me who was embarrassed by the explicit nature of our conversations.
According to conventional wisdom, qualitative methods, prolonged stays in the field and 
familiarity lead to the build-up of relationships in which greater confidences are revealed over 
time. In Mabika, I felt that it was our relative strangeness which enabled people to talk, knowing
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that we were not part of the village gossip networks. As time progressed people began to point 
out that I was seeing some people more than others and Wilder’s kinship relations with some 
villagers were unearthed. I sensed that interviewing was becoming harder as women suspected 
our impartiality in village matters. I felt the ambiguity of my own position as someone who moved 
between different levels of society, living in Mabika and yet developing relationships with health 
workers and other government officials. Had we stayed much longer in the village, I wonder 
whether we would have been able to contain these conflicts.
I was very much aware that my research would have far greater benefits for me than it would for 
my informants. I often felt completely inadequate if women talked about the problems of their 
lives. If women thought that in some way, I might be able to help, then they were bound to be 
disappointed. I gave every individual I interviewed a photograph of themselves and family as a 
thank you present. These ‘cards’ were something that everyone seemed to enjoy looking at. I 
gave money and goods to people in desperate situations. But I was very much aware that this was 
often a totally inadequate gesture in the face of death, insecurity and violence. One evening when 
we were walking home we heard a terrible howling coming from a nearby household. A 
neighbour digging her garden called us over and told us not to walk any further. She said that it 
was a woman being beaten with a cow stick by her husband. I said we should go and help. But 
the neighbour said no, even if I could stop the beating then, when I left it would be worse.
The spread of HIV among the village women was another problem to which there seemed to be 
no solution. While recorded HIV rates in the region were around 20 per cent, death rates had only 
just started increasing (Gregson and others 1996). In Mabika, however, deaths of young men and 
babies, known to be suffering from AIDs, were fairly regular. Women were open with me about
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their fears and understanding of AIDs. The main reaction was one of despair knowing that there 
was nothing they could do to protect themselves from the virus which their husband might be 
carrying. I soon gave up trying to make obviously unworkable suggestions, when asked for 
advice, and could offer only sympathy. The body of the thesis does not focus on the issue of HIV, 
but accounts of women’s reproductive strategies illustrate why women are so vulnerable to 
infection.
The geographical boundaries of the research were set by the list of 113 households given in the 
1992 census. I did not cover the whole area defined by the census map as it ran into the nearby 
township and the settlement of local government workers. I initially made attempts to match up 
interviews with names given in the census. I quickly gave this up, however, as a hopeless task. 
In total, I conducted semi-structured interviews in ninety four households over the six month 
period spent visiting and in residence in the village. Ninety of these interviews were with women 
who defined themselves as the female head of the household. Three women identified themselves 
as divorced. I was told that the one woman, who refused to be interviewed, was also divorced. 
Eighteen women were widowed. Of these women, five were under the age of fifty. In four 
households there was no female head and so I interviewed the male household head. Two of these 
men defined themselves as divorced, one as ‘separated’ and one whose wife was ‘away in South 
Africa on business’. I conducted a further ten semi-structured interviews with the daughters or 
daughters in law of female headed households, making a total of one hundred semi-structured 
interviews with women. I supplemented these interviews with informal, in depth discussions with 
a few key women informants and informal group discussions with the younger, not yet married 
women who tended to congregate at our base in the mission. I conducted a further seven semi- 
structured interviews with men, six of whom were husbands of women interviewed and one son.
22
I further relied on a couple of key male informants from among this group to provide insights 
into male perspectives. We usually interviewed individuals but group discussions sometimes 
evolved naturally as other women would turn up and join in the conversation. Similarly, if a 
woman's husband was around, we would talk to the couple together and then come back later to 
interview the woman on her own.
Prior to settling in Mabika, we had carried out a number of trial interviews in another Ndau 
village4. So I had, to a certain extent, refined the list of subjects that I wanted to talk about. As 
we progressed, however, new issues were raised and I found different means of discussing the 
topics in which I was interested. I initially wanted to ask broad questions in order to avoid 
pre-defining the answers to my questions. I found, however, that general questions merely got 
vague answers and it was much easier to ask people to recount precise details of events or 
practices. So, for example, I initially asked women whether they had any problems with the 
services when they went to get contraception from the clinic. Women would usually say that they 
had no problems. When the visit, however, was broken down into its particularities; what time 
did you go? Why? How many people were waiting? Where were you seen? Was there anybody 
else in the room? etc. Women seemed to find it much easier to give a critical evaluation of each 
of the component parts of the service. If we hit upon what seemed like a particularly good way 
of asking a question we would write it down and repeat it word for word in other interviews. If 
someone brought up a new topic, or had something interesting to say about a particular issue, we 
would pursue this at the expense of other subjects. We asked everyone for their personal details; 
age, marriage, number of children, composition of household, access to land, education, religion.
4 I have used some information from these interviews for supplementary data on Ndau customs.
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As I have already indicated, however, the format of these questions evolved as my understanding 
of the complexities of social and economic issues developed.
Semi-structured interviews were recorded in a note-book and, later that day, transferred onto my 
lap-top. Wilder would first ask the set questions in Shona and I would write down the 
answers. I would then ask questions in English, Wilder translated the questions into Shona, I 
asked another question and wrote down the previous response. I also wrote the wording of a 
question down when I thought it was important to have an exact transcript of a particular 
interview. Sometimes I queried a particular word or an issue that I thought Wider had missed out 
in her translation. Sometimes Wilder would throw in a question of her own or pursue a topic 
without my prompting if the conversation required. While the process of translation, discussion 
and writing down was time consuming, it also seemed to fit in with an informal stop/start rhythm 
of women’s daily lives. The women interviewed invariably had to attend to cooking or children, 
just as Wilder’s son required constant attention. When we tired of interviewing, we would revisit 
women just to say hello or to informally discuss subjects on which I wanted more information. 
On these occasions, I would often just sit and listen, picking up the gist of the conversation, as 
Wilder pursued the issues which I had previously identified. I made notes on these conversations 
when we left the homestead after discussion or clarification with Wilder.
Records of these interviews with the people of Mabika form the bulk of the material on which the 
thesis is constructed. If discussions of methodology oversimplify the complexities of power 
relations in the field, they often overlook altogether the power that the researcher has through 
analysis and presentation of data. I collated information from the semi-structured interviews in
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the form of tables for descriptive purposes. The remainder of the data from interviews with 
villagers was sorted under a number of different headings. I did not use a computer programme 
for this purpose, preferring to carry out the exercise through reading, re reading and cataloguing 
of information. I hope that as the writing up progressed, I learned to refine my arguments through 
inclusion of all relevant cases rather than trying to ignore the evidence which didn’t fit my 
arguments. It was from this process that I gained a greater appreciation of the differences 
between women, their situations and strategies, which were evident in the information collected. 
Quotes in the text from field notes are either my transcripts of interviews conducted in English 
or translations of interviews in Shona as given by Wilder. While, I hope, I have allowed the voices 
of the women I interviewed to be heard, the thesis is my interpretation of events and attempts to 
answer questions which are important to me.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Issues: Human Rights, Reproductive Rights And Citizenship
The principal issue which this thesis explores, as discussed in the introduction, is the relevance 
and practical value of discourses about reproductive rights to women living in a rural area of 
Zimbabwe. The thesis provides an ethnography of a set of policies, practices, relations between 
health workers and citizens and their impact upon the women of Mabika and the gender relations 
which shape their lives. Consideration of these issues highlights an apparent contradiction 
between the values embodied in the ZNFPC’s policies and the general context of Zimbabwean 
gender relations. The ZNFPC’s community based distribution programme is presented as being 
built upon respect for particular concepts of reproductive rights which draw upon internationally 
defined standards. In contrast, in general analyses, Zimbabwean state and society have been 
consistently identified as ‘patriarchal’. Assessments of Zimbabwe’s post Independence policies 
indicate that the government has failed to systematically dismantle colonial gender bias in legal, 
political, social and economic institutions. Women-are identified in national legislation and, 
concomitantly, in customary rules and norms governing household relations as the dependants 
of men. Women are excluded from equal participation in social, economic and political processes 
(Folbre 1988; Gaidzanwa 1992; Jirira 1995; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 1997). As set out in the 
Introduction, the contradiction between the values promoted by the family planning programme 
and the general context of gender relations in Zimbabwean society raises a number of empirical 
questions and issues. The first set of questions relates to the nature of relations between 
Zimbabwean women and the state. The second set addresses issues of how reproductive rights
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have been interpreted and implemented in practice. The third issue to be examined is whether and 
how women have been able to utilise the policies and practices of the family planning programme 
to change their position within the household. In this chapter I set out the concepts I will use to 
examine these issues.
The primary concepts I employ are entitlement, human rights, reproductive rights and citizenship. 
I use the concept of entitlement in this thesis to describe the totality of rights, or legitimised 
claims, that are inscribed in legal, political, economic and social structures. Human rights 
constitute one set of claims legitimised by the international community under the auspices of the 
United Nations (UN). I use the term ‘reproductive rights’ to refer to rights relating to the areas 
of procreative and sexual life. The concept of citizenship is used, in this thesis, to examine the 
relations between the state and the individual and the mechanisms through which rights are 
realised. These concepts, then, allow analysis of whether the discourse of reproductive rights has 
increased the .entitlements available to rural women in Zimbabwe. This, in turn, enables discussion 
of whether women want to, and are able, to use those entitlements to positive advantage.
It has been argued that concepts of human rights and, concomitantly, reproductive rights have 
limited use as a tool for transforming gender relations (Pringle and Watson 1996). Critics have 
suggested that human rights are based on western ideas of individualism and do not have universal 
applicability. It has further been argued that human rights do not adequately address social and 
economic issues or gender relations in the private sphere (Mishra 1998; Peters and Wolper 1995). 
These critiques have been applied to concepts of reproductive rights defined in international 
human rights documents. Critics suggest that these concepts of reproductive rights reinforce
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biologically essentialist notions of women and fail to deal with central issues of women’s 
reproductive autonomy within household relations (Heise 1995; Smyth 1995). I argue in this 
chapter that the value of human rights can only be judged on the basis of their meaning and use 
at the local level.
In order to examine the ways in which rights are operationalised in social relations, it is necessary 
to examine not only definitions of rights, but also how they are interpreted and satisfied (Fraser 
1989; Moore 1994). While human rights discourse is global, these rights are interpreted and 
realised through national institutions and organisations (Wilson 1997). Analysis of the value of 
human rights at local level, then, requires examination of the relations between citizens and state. 
Feminist analyses of citizenship have focused on abstract ideals or the formal institutions of 
citizenship. These accounts have indicated that citizenship is gendered (Vogel and Moran 1991). 
Following van Gunsteren, I argue that analysis of different forms of citizenship further requires 
understanding of the everyday interactions between people and state. State bureaucracies form 
a key site where this relationship can be examined (van Gunsteren 1978). I suggest that in order 
to analyse this relationship, it is necessary to examine first the way rights are interpreted in policy 
and then how these interpretations are implemented through the actions o f street level 
bureaucrats’ (Fraser 1989; Lipsky 1980). I suggest that one of the key factors determining the 
actions of local level workers, and consequently the implementation of rights, is the degree of 
accountability of state workers to village populations. This, in turn, is dependent upon the nature 
of citizen participation in local level political processes (Lonsdale 1986; Paul 1991; Sen 1992). 
I argue, then, that there are two factors which need to be examined in assessing the local level 
value of discourses about reproductive rights. The first is the definition and interpretation of the
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rights themselves. The second is the system of accountability which guarantees the enforcement 
of any given right.
2.1 Entitlements
I use the concept of entitlements in this thesis as a term for defining the totality of rights that are 
inscribed in legal, political, economic and social structures of a given country. Sen first used the 
concept of entitlements to describe the more formal rights given by state institutions in order to 
examine inter-household relations (Sen 1981). Sen later developed the idea to allow for analysis 
of intra household distribution. The concept of ‘extended entitlements’ refers to socially 
sanctioned notions of legitimacy beyond the system of state enforced laws (Sen 1990). Claims 
made within the private sphere are based upon customarily or socially legitimised rules and norms 
which, although not formally codified, may have greater force and acceptance than state defined 
regulations. As will be discussed in chapter five, for example, dominant understandings of the 
terms and conditions of the ‘conjugal contract’ underpin the gendered division of resources within 
the household (Whitehead 1981). I use the term entitlements to refer to the extended version of 
the concept.
Following Petchesky and Judd, I suggest that the concept of entitlements should be reconfigured 
through several normative levels (Petchesky and Judd 1998). In contrast to Petchesky and Judd, 
Hausermann makes a distinction between human rights and entitlements. Hausermann argues that 
human rights describe what ought to be, whereas Sen uses the concept of entitlement to describe 
what is (Petchesky and Judd 1998; Hausermann 1998). For the purposes of clarity, I use the term
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entitlements to refer to claims to goods rather than realised resources. In contrast to Petchesky 
and Judd I make a distinction between such accepted or legitimized rights and women’s own 
subjective claims (Petchesky and Judd 1998). While, in reality, this is obviously a difficult line to 
draw, for the purposes of analytical clarity I retain the distinction between legitimised and 
unofficial claims. Different sets of entitlement may be conflicting rather than complementary. 
Drawing upon Armstrong’s definitions of the different legal systems operating in Sub Sahran 
Africa, I suggest that the universe of legitimized claims or entitlements can be defined as follows:
1 codified international human rights
2 national policies and codified laws
3 customary law (‘traditional’ law, codified during the colonial era covering family
relations)
4 living law (traditions, customs and norms as commonly understood)
(Armstrong 1997).
2.2 Human rights and social policy
The term ‘human rights’ is generally used in connection with those rights which have been 
recognised by the global community, under the auspices of the UN, and protected by international 
legal instruments. Human rights constitute one particular set of rights claims. The operation of 
human rights has, to date, largely been addressed as a legal issue with primaiy concern for the de 
jure recognition of human rights by national governments. A more recent perspective, and the one 
taken in this thesis, addresses human rights in relation to development and social policies 
(Hausermann 1998). It has been recognised that the de facto  realisation of human rights requires 
more than ratification of UN treaties and the establishment of appropriate judicial bodies to deal
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with human rights claims. In order to be effective, the norms and values of human rights have to 
be incorporated into all areas of government policy and action (The Human Rights Council of 
Australia 1995). It is now widely accepted that states have an obligation not only to respect, but 
also to protect, promote and fulfil human rights. These obligations require the state to take 
positive action through social policy measures to ensure that there is de facto  realisation of 
internationally defined human rights (Gooneskere 1998). In this thesis, then, I examine social 
policy, rather than judicial institutions, as a means of promoting human rights.
Table 1: Theoretical Approaches to Human Rights
Mainstream approaches Feminist approaches
Liberal Human rights based on abstract concept of 
humanity. Existing human rights framework 
serves as a means of protecting individuals 
against state abuses.
Existing human rights framework needs to be 
redefined to incorporate feminist concerns about 
abuses in the private sphere.
Marxist Human rights are an instrument of class based 
state domination. They are meaningless 
without the redistribution of economic 
resources.
Gender subordination based in socio-economic 
inequalities. Substantive ‘enabling’ conditions 
are required to allow women to realise their 
rights.
Post-structuralist Human rights discourse serves as a means of 
extending coercive forms of bureaucratic 
power.
Human rights reinforce essentialist concepts of 
‘woman’ and can only reinforce existing power 
inequalities
Human rights can be examined from a number of different theoretical approaches. These can be 
categorised as Liberal, Marxist and post structuralist. Feminist approaches cut across the different 
perspectives. As set out in the introduction, for the purposes of analysis in this thesis I take a 
‘pragmatic’ approach to human rights, informed by Marxist and post structuralist, feminist 
perspectives. I argue that the usefulness of human rights as a transformative feminist tool depends 
upon the extent to which women have been able to use concepts of human rights, in practice, as 
a means of claiming political, symbolic or economic resources (Kiss 1997; Petchesky and Judd
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1998). In order to justify this position, I discuss the different theoretical approaches to human 
rights and feminist critiques of those perspectives outlined above.
2.3 Liberal theories of human rights
Rights can broadly be defined as claims which are supported by some objective standards or 
general theories. Legal rights are those claims recognized in a system of law. Human rights are 
now commonly defined as those rights recognised in UN treaties and conventions (Hausermann 
1998; Semler and others 1998). Concepts of human rights, however, predate the UN and are 
rooted in the political philosophy of Liberalism. In philosophical terms, human rights can be 
defined as ‘those claims made by men (sic), for themselves or on behalf of other men, supported 
by some theory which concentrates on the humanity of man, on man as a human being, a member 
of human kind.’ (Dowrick 1997:12). The liberal theory of human rights thus rests on a concept 
of an abstract notion of humanity from which, a priori, a set of universal rights can be derived. 
The complexities of the abstract debate in political philosophy about human nature remain 
unresolved and will not be discussed here5.
Mainstream historical critiques of liberal theories trace the origins of the concept of human rights 
to seventeenth century English political philosophy. The development of ideas about human rights 
was historically associated with the growth of the market economy and concomitant concepts
5 Wilson suggests that such arguments offer little insight into the operation of human rights 'on the 
ground'. ‘In defending conceptions of human nature, and arguing that universal rights must be designated through an 
over-arching super-perspective, rationalist social philosophy and natural law lift die discussion of rights out of any 
particular context and raise it to the level of categorical imperative...In particular, the influence of the neo-Kantian 
tradition in human rights theory has led to too great an emphasis on securing a priori foundations and continues to 
obstruct empirical attempts to understand rights ‘ (Wilson, 1997:8)
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of individualism. The evolution of the concept of human rights marked the early development of 
liberal opposition to traditional authority based on divine wisdom (Cobbah 1987). Hobbes 
introduced the idea of rights as a part of human nature. This was followed by Locke’s argument, 
in ‘Two Treatises of Government’, that all human beings are bom with natural rights or human 
rights to freedom and equality. As these rights are insecure in the state of nature, society and the 
state are required to guarantee a more secure enjoyment of human rights. A government is only 
legitimate to the extent that it actually protects human rights through positive law and practice 
(Donnelly 1989).
Feminist critiques, largely following on from the work of Carole Pateman, have examined 
the notions of gender embedded in the historical development of liberal concepts of human rights. 
This work focuses, in particular, on the writing of Locke and the construction of the 
public/private dichotomy which underpins contemporary concepts of human rights 6. In the Two 
Treatises, Locke sought to deny the legitimacy of the traditional authority of kings without 
challenging patriarchal family structure. In order to dispute the analogy employed by royalty 
between their authority over society and the father’s authority over the family, Locke argued that 
the two spheres were separate and distinct (Binion 1995). As Pateman argues, ‘In theory, 
liberalism and patriarchalism stand irrevocably opposed to each other. Liberalism is an 
individualist, egalitarian, conventionalist doctrine; patriarchalism claims that hierarchical relations
6The concepts of public and private A not straightforward. Within western political science there is 
ambiguity about the definition of the terms. The public/private dichotomy is used to refer both to the distinction 
between state and society and to the division between non-domestic and domestic life. The crucial difference 
between the two is that die intermediate socio-economic realm is included in the category of the 'public' in the first 
definition and the 'private' in the second. In both cases, however, the state is (paradigmatically) public and the 
family, domestic life are seen as private (Okin, 1991). Whatever the definition used in western political science, it 
does not necessarily have universal applicability. The construction of the "public' and 'private' realms is historically 
and socially specific, in terms of both the place and significance given to the boundary (Moore, 1988).
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of subordination necessarily follow from the natural characteristics of men and women. In fact 
the two doctrines were successfully reconciled through the answer given by the contract theorists 
in the seventeenth centuiy to the subversive question of who counted as free and equal 
individuals. The conflict with the patriarchalists did not extend to women or conjugal relations; 
the latter were excluded from individualist arguments and the battle was fought over the relation 
of adult sons to their fathers..’ (Pateman, 1995:120). Thus, the rights of men to be free from 
intrusion by the state, were also these individuals' rights not to be interfered with as they 
controlled the other members of their private sphere (Okin 1991).
Thus Locke's theory of natural rights was ostensibly predicated upon the ideas of individualism 
and equality (Cobbah 1987). The overt universalism of the notion of human rights, however, 
masked the conceptual exclusion of women. Men, associated with the public sphere, were defined 
as having equal rights while women, seen as confined to the private domain, were considered to 
be the subordinate gender in a naturally defined hierarchical relation.
The further evolution of the idea of human rights, constructed upon the supposed equality of 
individuals, is embodied in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the American Bill of Rights of 1789 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen adopted by the French National 
Assembly in 1789. These documents outlined a concept of individual liberty in which the primary 
role of the state was to ensure freedom of the citizenry from abuses of power. The newly defined 
rights included rights to own property and to compete freely in a market economy as well as other 
civil and political rights such as freedom of assembly, religion and speech (Dixon-Mueller 1993). 
The notion of individual liberty was embodied in the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945 and
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The latter affirmed the right of all people to 
life, liberty and security of the person; to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; to property 
ownership and free choice of employment. The treaties, however, also included ideas of social 
entitlement. They thus broadened the concept of human rights to include the responsibility of the 
state to guarantee achievement of results, as well as freedom of opportunity, to all its citizens. 
The Declaration set out the entitlements, or economic rights, that were to be guaranteed to all 
people regardless of race, sex, language or religion. These included the right to an adequate 
standard of living, to education, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection 
against unemployment. In 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted two instruments designed to 
implement the human rights provisions of the Charter and the Declaration; the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Dixon-Mueller 1993; Boland and others 1994). In UN terminology, the rights 
embodied in the first of these covenants have become known as first generation rights while those 
in the latter are identified as second generation indicating the earlier historical development of 
political and civil rights. There are continuing debates about whether economic and social rights 
are justiciable, and therefore of equal status to civil and political rights (Mishra 1998)7.
While these labels are intended to indicate historical development, feminists have argued that they 
also reveal the primacy accorded to civil and political rights and, hence, the public domain. Civil 
and political rights are seen as having developed as a means of protecting men within public life 
in their relationship with government (Charlesworth 1995). Human rights law has, moreover, not
7Plant provides a clear and concise rebuttal of arguments that economic and social rights should be 
differentiated from civil and political rights (Plant, 1998).
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only focused on state abuses in the 'public' sphere but has enshrined in international documents, 
such as the African Charter of Human Rights, the right of privacy in the institution of the family 
without challenging the concept of the male head of the household. Such declarations are, in 
effect, a reiteration of the right of male rule in the private domain.
As Charlesworth argues, the distinction between private and public spheres has had a defining 
influence on international law. ‘The UN charter makes the (public) province of international law 
distinct from the (private) sphere of domestic jurisdiction. The law of state responsibility sorts out 
(public) actions for which the state is accountable from those “private” ones for which it does not 
have to answer internationally ‘ (Charlesworth and others 1991:10). This failing has, to some 
extent, been rectified by the UN’s adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Gooneskere 1998). CEDAW sets out state 
obligations to address gender equality in both the private and public spheres and, in particular, 
to take action against discriminatory customary and religious norms. A number of the countries 
which have signed up to CEDAW, however, have placed reservations against central articles of 
the convention (Tomasevski 1998). Such action illustrates the lack of acceptance by national 
governments of the principle that human rights should govern private as well as public relations.
As feminist scholars have consistently argued, the distinction between public and private is an 
ideological construct (Okin 1991). The state regulates life in the private domain both directly 
through, for example, legislation on marriage and indirectly through broader socio-economic 
policies. As Bunch argues, the assumption that states are not responsible for violations of 
women's rights in the private sphere ignores the fact that such abuses are often condoned or even
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sanctioned by states, even when the immediate perpetrator is a private citizen (Bunch 1995). The 
myth that state power is not exercised in the private realm thus masks its control (Charlesworth 
and others 1991). Scholars, however, differ on the value of the public/private divide. 
Charlesworth argues that feminists should aim for ‘the eradication of the cultural distinction 
which underpins women's exclusion from power: the gendered public/private dichotomy’ 
(Charlesworth 1993:11). Engle, in contrast, argues that the critique of the private/public 
distinction in international law often fails to recognize that the private is a place which might 
ultimately afford some protection to women (Engle 1993). This view is supported by Allen, who 
argues that the private domain potentially provides women with the opportunity for 
self-development, a prerequisite for continued progress toward social equality (Allen 1987). 
While feminists writing from a liberal perspective, then, argue for the further redefinition of 
international human rights, questions remain concerning where the boundary should be drawn 
between public and private domains.
2.4 Marxist and Post-structuralist critiques of human rights
A second set of critiques of human rights draws more directly on the work of Marx. In Marx's 
account of capitalist civil society, human rights serve as a facade to mask fundamental economic 
and social inequalities (van Gunsteren 1978; Turner 1993). Marx argued that the Rights of Man, 
the rights to liberty, equality, property and security, proclaimed during the French Revolution, 
were the rights of man as bourgeois illegitimately elevated to human status. Marx argued that 
political rights were meaningless without the redistribution of economic resources (Kiss 1997). 
He thus highlighted the means by which constructions of human rights mask underlying structural
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inequalities. Feminist critiques which draw on these arguments start from the supposition that 
gender subordination is rooted in socio-economic inequalities. Critics question the extent to which 
human rights legislation can transform the socio-economic conditions which are assumed to 
underpin gender subordination. From this point of view, substantive socio-economic 'enabling 
conditions' are a prerequisite to the realization of rights (Sen and others 1994). While the 
Universal Declaration might proclaim the formal rights to life and liberty, these statements are 
empty if people do not have the material means to survive. As already noted, in the international 
legal system the primary emphasis is on political and civil rights. Furthermore, Charlesworth 
argues that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not touch 
on the contexts in which most women live. The focus of the document is on state action in the 
public sphere rather than the gender relations which underpin women's socio-economic well being 
(Charlesworth 1995). As already discussed, while CEDAW does address women’s subordination 
in the private sphere, in practice this convention is largely ignored by the majority of nations 
(Tomasevski 1998). Even if nation states were prepared to recognise human rights law 
concerning the socio-economic inequalities underpinning gender relations, however, the question 
remains as to the effect such legislation could have. As Charlesworth et al argue, ‘the formal 
acquisition of a right is often assumed to have solved an imbalance of power. In practice, 
however, the promise of rights is thwarted by the inequalities of power: the economic and social 
dependence of women on men may discourage the invocation of legal rights that are premised on 
an adversarial relationship between the rights holder and the infringer ‘ (Charlesworth and others 
1991:635). Marxist based critiques thus question the extent to which, in practice, even a feminist 
defined set of human rights could be used as a tool to transform gender relations. From the 
Marxist perspective, rights, whether formalized in national regulation or international human
38
rights documents, disguise rather than transform structural socio-economic inequalities.
Post structuralist arguments are based upon critiques of notions of universality. These critiques 
can be broadly categorised as drawing upon either Foucauldian or relativist theories. Foucault 
criticized the ideal philosophical approach which seeks to define an abstract concept of'human 
nature' and derive from this a set of universal needs and rights. This approach, he argued, would 
always be doomed by its own unacknowledged contingency. The idea of human rights, Foucault 
suggests, involves the universalization of specific norms and ideals from particular societies and 
cultures (Kiss 1997). The discourse of human rights was viewed by Foucault as a state technique 
of surveillance and discipline. Foucault argued that, ‘rights talk functions in contemporary society 
as a language of mystification, obscuring the actual processes of social domination and helping 
to produce the subjects of those processes’ (Fraser 1989:57). The discourse of human rights 
encourages individuals to make claims on the state and thus integrates people into governmental 
structures of regulation. Human rights discourse consequently operates as a means of extending 
bureaucratised, coercive forms of power (Kiss 1997). Some feminist authors, writing from a post 
structuralist perspective, reject the use of human rights as a feminist strategy. Pringle and 
Watson, for example, take a self proclaimed post structuralist stance and reject any idea of rights 
on the grounds that the concept remains necessarily tied to the Enlightenment project and 
assumes a universal human subject. The use of universal notions such as ‘woman’, it is argued, 
can only serve to mask the power relations that the use of such categories, in reality, perpetuates 
(Pringle and Watson 1996).
The largest block of opposition to human rights is formed by those drawing upon the relativist
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arguments that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents a charter of European 
rather than universal values (Renteln 1985). Human rights instruments are seen as a tool for 
enforcing those values (Wilson 1997). Southern governments have, for example, objected to the 
primacy given to civil and political over social and economic rights. These claims are supported 
by the use of donor aid sanctions against governments which are perceived to have violated 
particular standards of democratic process (Tomasevski 1997). The same donors, however, have 
failed to systematically analyse how their own aid policies might be undermining the realisation 
of social and economic rights. These objections, then, can be seen as a fair complaint against the 
way in which northern governments use human rights rather than a repudiation of the notion of 
human rights itself.
Cultural relativists also generally argue for a redefinition of human rights according to particular 
'traditional' values rather than an abandonment of the discourse. Cobbah, for example, states that 
the ‘Western natural rights perspective denies the existence of the needy's right to economic 
sustenance and society's obligation to satisfy that right ‘ (Cobbah 1987:311). Cobbah argues that 
it is the individualistic postulate of natural rights theory which presents the most insurmountable 
barrier to cross cultural agreement on human rights. While Western social contract theorists 
emphasize individual competition, the African worldview is tempered by a sense of cooperation 
and the general guiding principle of the survival of the entire community. In contrast to Western 
philosophy, it is the family rather than the individual which constitutes the basic unit of society. 
Cobbah argues that Western individualism is not compatible with the recognition of 
socio-economic rights which require acknowledgement of social responsibility, rather than 
individual liberty, for their fulfilment (Cobbah 1987).
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Feminist scholars have criticised the relativist use of culture as an argument against the universal 
validity of human rights. It has been observed that, in practice, 'culture' is frequently used as a 
defence in regard to governmental denials of fundamental rights to women (Binion 1995). As 
Butegwa argues in relation to Africa, governments commonly use African culture and traditions 
as an excuse for not amending national laws to recognize women's rights (Butegwa 1993). Calls 
for recognition of women's reproductive rights, for example, are often opposed in terms of 
conflict with traditional norms and values. The relativist definition of culture, then, in many cases, 
is one which reinforces ideas of female subordination. As Wilson argues, such definitions are 
based on a reified notion of 'culture' as a static, unified, entity rather than a changing process 
linked to societal relations (Wilson 1997). Feminist critics agree that human rights discourse fails 
to incorporate differences of race, class and culture as well as gender. Correa and Petchesky 
argue, however, that ‘it is important to distinguish between the feminist principle of respect for 
difference and the tendency of male dominated governments and fundamentalist groups to use 
'diversity' and 'culture' as reasons to deny the universal validity of women's human rights. 
Women's assertions of their particular needs and values should be used to clarify what those rights 
mean in specific settings rather than denying the universal application of rights’ (Correa and 
Petchesky 1994:118).
2.5 Political tools: Rights, needs and interests
Feminists writing from different theoretical perspectives agree that the concept of human rights 
used in UN in legislation is the product of a western historical discourse. As such, it undoubtedly
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embodies, to a large extent, androcentric western values in the name of abstract individualism and 
universality. The issues raised by critiques, feminist, Marxist as well as Foucauldian in origin, 
remain unresolved. Yet many feminist scholars support the continued pursuit of women’s human 
rights on the grounds of practical politics. Claims to the political usefulness of human rights are 
justified in terms of the globalization of the discourse. Arguments about the globalization of 
human rights take two forms. First it is argued that human rights in the contemporary world have 
become universal in the sense that they are almost universally accepted, a fact witnessed by the 
expansion of the UN system of human rights legislation and the growth in non governmental 
human rights organizations (Donnelly 1989; Wilson 1997). Secondly it is argued that ‘cultural 
relativists' arguments are increasingly undermined by the globalisation of cultural, economic and 
political processes’ (Wilson 1997:10). Such changes in virtually all areas of the world, it is 
suggested, have given human rights a near universal contemporary applicability despite their 
obvious historical contingency (Donnelly 1989). Moreover, whatever the historical values 
embodied in human rights concepts, as the adoption of CEDAW illustrates, new concepts and 
definitions can be introduced (Gooneskere 1998). The development of ideas about reproductive 
rights in international fora, discussed below, provide a further example of the continuing evolution 
of human rights concepts.
Competing concepts in the lexicon of political tools include ‘interests’ and ‘needs’. Pringle and 
Watson argue that the term ‘interests’ constitutes a theoretically superior term for representing 
the different claims of women, as it does rest on universal concepts (Pringle and Watson 1996). 
Its connotations of self concern, however, make it an unlikely hook for political action. The 
concept o f‘needs’ has been much used in the formulation of social policy. While rights claims,
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however, evoke the obligations of the state, needs convey ‘a sense of lack and marginality’ 
(Pringle and Watson 1996). Needs claims remain a useful bureaucratic planning tool. The concept 
of rights, however, rooted in understandings of legitimised claims, endorses the notion of state 
accountability which is lacking from discourses of needs.
Given the contemporary strength of human rights discourses many feminists suggest that it would 
be strategically foolish to opt out of the debate, whatever the theoretical weaknesses of the 
concepts (Binion 1995; Charlesworth and others 1991; Bunch 1990). As Correa and Petchesky 
state, while criticisms are ‘theoretically compelling, they offer no alternative discourse for social 
movements to make collective political claims. Whatever its theoretical weaknesses, the polemical 
power of rights language cannot easily be dismissed’ (Correa and Petchesky 1994:109). Some 
feminist critics thus support the pursuit of a strategy of working within the framework of 
international human rights despite the questions raised by social theorists. This approach to 
human rights can be described as pragmatic. From this perspective, the value of rights must be 
justified by the particular relationships of power they set up and legitimate and by the quality of 
life they make possible, rather than by reference to a moral order derived from human nature (Kiss 
1997). The value of human rights as a feminist political tool, consequently, needs to be justified 
in relation to the operation of rights rather than the globalization of the human rights discourse. 
As the critiques of Marx and Foucault indicate, it cannot be taken for granted that, in practice 
human rights operate as tools of liberation rather than domination. These critiques suggest the 
need to move beyond abstract arguments and examine the concrete effects that the operation of 
human rights concepts has on relations of power.
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2.6 Rights in practice
As Moore argues, in order to examine the ways in which rights are operationalised in social 
relations, it is necessary to focus attention on discourses about rights and to look at the way 
issues about rights are framed (Moore 1994)8. One starting point for such analysis is the work of 
Nancy Fraser. Fraser's framework grows out of a critique of Foucault. Fraser argues that 
Foucault's analysis of the liberal use of rights itself relies on the assumption of humanitarian 
values as a standard by which to judge the effects of liberal discourses such as human rights. This 
is inevitably so, as no amount of reflexive self consciousness allows escape from contemporary 
values. Fraser suggests that Foucault's later work acknowledges this position. Two strands to 
Foucault's thought are thus discernible. The first strand transpires to transgress or transcend 
humanism. The second aspires to keep humanism honest rather than to overthrow it. This latter 
approach highlights the variety of ways in which humanist rhetoric has been and is liable to abuse. 
Fraser herself takes the later Foucauldian position and argues for the critically aware pursuit of 
human rights as a feminist strategy (Fraser 1989).
Fraser suggests that ‘rights talk’, as well as ‘needs talk’ constitute officially recognized idioms 
for the making and contesting of political claims. As Moore argues, rights and needs talk are inter 
related, with claims for needs being defined by established definitions of rights (Moore 1994). 
Fraser's framework for the analysis of needs and rights claims sets out three 'moments' that are 
analytically distinct, but interrelated in practice. First, the struggle to establish the political status
Here discourse is defined as ‘ a historically, socially, and institutionally specific structure of 
statements, terms, categories and beliefs....Discourse is thus contained or expressed in organizations and institutions 
as well as in words’ (Scott, 1988:35)
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of a given need (or right), that is to establish it as a matter of legitimate political concern. Second, 
the struggle over the implementation of the need, the struggle for the power to define it and, so, 
to determine what would satisfy it. Third the struggle over the satisfaction of the need, the 
struggle to secure or withhold provision (Fraser 1989). As Moore points out, Fraser's argument 
underlines the fact that interpretations of needs and rights are not merely representations, but also 
constitute practical acts and interventions. The politics of needs and rights interpretation mobilizes 
the distribution of political, economic and social resources (Moore 1988). The question remains 
as to whether the mobilisation of resources instituted by human rights discourses has reinforced 
or undermined relations of gender subordination.
2.7 Reproductive rights
The issue of reproductive rights provides a useful case study for analysis of the value of human 
rights as some feminist concerns about this issue have been incorporated into the international 
agenda. The development of concepts of reproductive rights in UN documents from Teheran in 
1968 to the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 can, thus, be analysed in terms of Fraser’s outline 
of struggles over the definitions and interpretation of rights and needs. Arguments concerning the 
issue of reproductive rights have developed along two parallel sets of ideas. In feminist theory, 
the idea of reproductive rights has grown out of concepts of human and women's rights. These 
centre around the ideas of women’s self-determination, autonomy and bodily integrity. As Correa 
argues, the decision-making self remains at the core of reproductive rights (Correa and Petchesky 
1994). A second set of arguments uses ideas about economic and population growth to justify 
population control through family planning (Dixon-Mueller 1993). Articles concerning access
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to family planning have appeared in UN declarations since the early sixties. Such articles have 
subsequently been seen as belonging to, and being interpreted in terms of, arguments for 
population control. The work of women activists, however, has ensured that the documents 
produced by the Cairo and Beijing Conferences of 1994 and 1995 respectively, contained feminist 
inspired definitions of reproductive rights (Cook and Fathalla 1996). There has, then, been a 
development of concepts concerning reproductive rights in international documents. While 
Teheran and Bucharest asserted the state’s obligation to provide contraceptives, Cairo set out the 
limits and standards of that provision and put it in the context of women’s reproductive health. 
Beijing established women’s right to reproductive self-determination in all relationships, both in 
the private sphere and in relation to public workers, and linked that right to sexual 
self-determination.
2.8 Unmet ‘need9 and the right to family planning
While the origins of the population control argument can be traced to the nineteenth century and 
Malthus, it was only in the 1960s that fertility became a concern at international level. 
Information, made available after a wave of censuses in a number of newly independent nations 
in 1960-61, indicating what were considered to be high levels of fertility, preceded a climate of 
'hysteria' in relation to population issues (Wajcman 1994). Robert McNamara, the then governor 
of the World Bank, promulgated the view that 'overpopulation' was the primary cause of poverty 
and political instability in the Third World (McNamara 1981). In neo-Malthusian arguments, a 
homogeneous womanhood, defined exclusively in terms of their reproductive capacities, were 
seen as both the cause and the solution of 'the population problem’ (Pearson 1994). The
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ideological climate, and the availability of US funding, made possible and legitimated work on the 
pill. ‘Populationist ideology, not scientific discovery was the catalyst for major financial 
investment in research on birth-prevention methods, and influenced specific techniques which 
have become available’ (Wajcman 1994:170). Having defined women as the cause of ‘the 
population problem’, and the pill as its solution, researchers identified women's ‘unmet need’ for 
reproductive technologies. Where field research showed that there was a gap between a woman's 
stated ideal and actual number of children, researchers concluded that the interviewee ‘needed’ 
contraception (Dixon-Mueller and Germain 1992). The concept of the ‘need’ for women to have 
contraception thus arose from demographic objectives rather than women's own perceived 
requirements.
In international legal documents, it was not until the late sixties that the 'need’ for contraception 
was redefined in terms of rights. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights failed to 
mention reproductive rights at all. But, in 1968 the Final Act of the Teheran conference included 
a provision stating: ‘Parents have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and a rights to adequate education and information in this 
respect’ (cited in Freedman and Isaacs 1993). Freedman and Isaacs suggest that, considered in 
its historical context, this enactment is best understood as ‘a statement of the international 
community designed to pressure less developed states that had resisted the spread of 
contraception within their borders’ (Freedman and Isaacs 1993:21). In terms of practice, the 
mobilisation of funds, the design and implementation of policy, the struggle over the 
interpretation of this rights and the means to satisfy it did indeed result in the support of top down 
family planning programmes in the Third World aimed at increasing women's contraceptive use.
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In a number of well documented cases, these programmes were often coercive, involving both 
direct pressure from health workers and the use of indirect persuasion through financial incentives 
and the use of demographic targets (Hartmann 1987; Kabeer 1992).
Northern enthusiasm for the technological fix of contraception was equalled by southern hostility. 
Third World governments perceived population programmes to be both racist and a means of 
avoiding the more pressing issue of the redistribution of resources. The clash between north and 
south came to a head, infamously, at the 1974 Bucharest conference when Third World 
governments delivered a blow to international agencies with the slogan ‘development is the best 
contraceptive’. Nonetheless, the Bucharest conference went further in defining the right to family 
planning outlined in Teheran. The Plan of Action included the statement that couples and 
individuals were entitled to family planning and also the information and contraception necessary 
to exercise this right. Bucharest, then, provided an outline of governments’ obligations to provide 
family planning services (Tomasevski 1994).
The overt hostility of the south, however, coupled with the failure of many family planning 
programmes to have an impact on fertility levels, was enough to prompt a rethink in the 
population establishment. As a result, the scientific technocrats were ousted by the social 
scientists as ‘emphasis on socio-economic criteria changed the terms of the debate and 
empowered a new group of demographers’ (Jaquette and Staudt 1990:222). The rise of the 
demographers led to a new interpretation of the best means to meet women's ‘need’ for 
contraception. Studies pointed to correlations between socio-economic variables, in particular 
female education, and levels of fertility. Such variables consequently came to be seen as levers
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through which fertility could be controlled (Pearson 1994).
2.9 Feminist concepts of reproductive rights
The international women's health movement emerged in the late 70s largely in response to the 
family planning programmes and policies supported by the population establishment. (Garcia- 
Moreno and Claro 1994). The resulting feminist concept of reproductive rights is based on the 
central tenet of reproductive self determination (Correa and Petchesky 1994) Within the feminist 
movement, however, there are differences over how this concept should be interpreted and 
implemented. In particular, the value of reproductive technologies is disputed. When initially 
marketed, the pill was seen by western feminists as a technology of liberation (Wajcman 1994). 
Extrapolating from western experience, feminists generally advocated the promotion of 
contraception in the Third World as a means for women to achieve greater autonomy and control 
over their own bodies (Jaquette and Staudt 1990). Coercion in the implementation of population 
policies, however, necessitated a review of this position leading to two broadly defined 
approaches. First, it has been argued that reproductive technology is inherently patriarchal and 
that there are no conditions under which such technology can contribute to female empowerment. 
The majority of activists, however, argue that such blanket condemnation of contraception denies 
the possibility of the legitimacy of the practices of the many women in the Third World who do 
use contraception and thereby portrays women as inevitable victims in the face of western 
technology. Proponents of this second approach would agree with the view that women have a 
‘need* for contraception, but see this need as arising from women's reproductive health 
requirements and rights rather than demographic aims. They thus dispute the way that this need
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has been interpreted and met by the population establishment (Warren and Porque 1993; Kabeer 
1994). Consequently, the focus of this approach is the contexts in which contraception has been 
employed (Smyth 1995). Analysis has concentrated on two aspects of the context of 
contraceptive provision. First, there has been analysis of the conditions of family planning 
programmes themselves and the ‘quality of care’ necessary to ensure women’s reproductive 
self-determination in relation to health workers (Winikoff 1988; Berer 1993). A second approach 
has concentrated on the broader context: the socio-economic conditions which enable women to 
realise particular choices about contraceptive use. These conditions involve social and political 
as well as material well-being. This analysis thus extends beyond the realm of interactions between 
health workers and clients and include gender relations within the private domain (Heise 1995; 
Kabeer 1992; Correa and Petchesky 1994).
These two aspects of the context in which contraception is provided have been incorporated into 
definitions of reproductive health and rights agreed at the Cairo and Beijing Conferences.
The Cairo Programme sets out a broad definition of reproductive health pertaining to all matters 
related to the reproductive system. It further defines the reproductive rights that should be 
promoted in government supported policies and programmes: the right of couples and individuals 
to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, and to have the 
information and means to do so; the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive 
health; the right to make decisions free of discrimination, coercion or violence (Family Care 
International 1994). The Cairo Platform sets out criteria for the practical realisation of 
reproductive rights in family planning service provision. It is recommended that all family planning 
programmes should: ensure free and informed choice of methods; ensure safe, affordable and
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convenient services for the user; ensure privacy and confidentiality; ensure a continuous supply 
of high-quality contraceptives; ensure adequate follow up care (Hardon and Hayes 1997).
As Cook and Fathalla outline, the Beijing Platform for Action reaffirms the Cairo definition of 
reproductive health but places it in a broader context. The Beijing Platform for Action reaffirms 
that ‘reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national 
laws, international laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents’ 
(paras 95 and 223). These include the rights to life and survival, liberty and security, the highest 
standard of health and the right to private and family life (Cook and Fathalla 1996). But, further, 
it recognises that the realisation of women’s reproductive rights is dependent upon equality in 
private sphere sexual relations. Thus, ‘the human rights of women include their right to have 
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including 
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationships 
between women and men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect 
for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility for sexual 
behaviour and its consequences’ (para 96).
2.10 Feminist critiques of reproductive rights
Despite, or perhaps because of, success at the international level, feminists remain concerned
about the use of human rights discourse as a means of ensuring women's reproductive
self-determination. The inclusion of the language of reproductive rights at international
n s
conferences has been seen by some the co-option of feminist values in the continued pursuit of 
reduced fertility levels (Smyth 1995). Concerns about the concept of reproductive rights arise
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out of critiques of human rights discourse discussed above. First, the issue of the private/public 
division remains unresolved. Some argue that international human rights documents continue to 
address reproductive rights in terms of protection of the private realm from public abuse rather 
than protection of women in the private realm (Heise 1995). Second, the emphasis on political 
and civil liberties at the expense of social and economic rights remain. While the enabling 
conditions for reproductive choice are included, the primary focus at international level, remains 
on family planning provision. A third area of criticism is that of difference between women. It 
has been argued that the idea of reproductive rights, as expressed within the international human 
rights framework, contains echoes of the biological determinism that feminism contests. There 
is little recognition of cultural or social differences in understanding of reproductive processes 
and, hence, rights. In particular, it is argued that the concept of reproductive rights, based on 
western ideas of individualism, autonomy and ownership of one’s body, do not address many 
women’s understandings of interdependence in reproductive and sexual relations (Correa and 
Petchesky 1994; Petchesky and Judd 1998; Schneider 1986). As outlined above, I argue that 
these questions and doubts have to be addressed through analysis of the use of discourses of 
reproductive rights by women at the local level.
2.11 Citizenship
While human rights discourse is global, in practice human rights are realized through the 
organisations and bureaucracies which make up the state (Wilson 1997). Examination of the value 
of human rights discourses at the local level, then, requires analysis of the relations between states 
and citizens. As van Gunsteren argues, citizenship can be studied at three related levels: as a
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theoretically constituted object of political thought, at the level of the formal institutions of 
citizenship and at the level of its practical realisation in the everyday relations between state 
officials and population (van Gunsteren 1978). Feminist analyses of citizenship have, in general, 
focused on the first two of these levels. It has been argued that, both as an abstract ideal and in 
terms of the formal citizenship rights, citizenship is gendered (Pateman 1991; Vogel and Moran 
1991). Following van Gunsteren and Lipsky, I suggest that in order to understand the processes 
by which citizenship institutions shape gendered outcomes, it is necessary to examine the reality 
of everyday interactions between citizens and state workers. As Lipsky argues, this requires 
analysis of the operation o f‘street level bureaucrats’ (van Gunsteren 1978; Lipsky 1980). From 
a feminist perspective, however, which highlights the importance of the relationship between 
private and public sphere, a fourth level of analysis is required. Examination of the gendered 
nature of citizenship necessitates discussion of the interplay between everyday interactions with 
street level bureaucrats and social relations in the private sphere.
As indicated above, feminist analyses have largely concentrated on deconstruction of the concept 
of citizenship in political thought, and the gendered construction of formal institutions of 
citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). The work of Pateman has concentrated on the first of 
these levels. Pateman’s analysis, and the debates her work has initiated, focuses on the gendered 
definition of the concept of citizenship in political theory. As already outlined, Pateman's analysis 
of the works of liberal theorists shows how the concept of equality among men rested on a 
public/private distinction in which women were seen as the natural subordinates of men in the 
private realm (Pateman 1992). Involvement in decision making was seen as requiring the ability 
to make decisions about the public good on the basis of objective rational standards rather than
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personal interests. Young argues that ‘founded by men, the modem state and its public realm of 
citizenship, paraded as universal values and norms, were derived from specifically masculine 
experience. The opposition between the universality of the public realm of citizenship and the 
particularity of private interest became conflated with oppositions between reason and passion, 
masculine and feminine* (Young 1989:253). Women, defined as mothers and associated with 
irrational emotion, were held by nature to lack the characteristics required for political life and 
citizenship. The notion of citizenship thus depends on the distinction between the realms of the 
public and the private and, as Pateman argues, that distinction is predicated upon gender 
(Pateman 1992). As Vogel and Moran argue, then, the very formulation of the concept of 
citizenship is dependent upon divisions of gender (Vogel and Moran 1991).
As Pateman argues, however, in Western societies women have not been totally excluded from 
engagement from the state but rather have been incorporated on a differential basis as mothers 
and, therefore, as subordinates (Pateman 1992). This observation has given rise to the ‘equality 
versus difference’ debate. As Pateman explains, ‘within the existing patriarchal conception of 
citizenship, the choice always has to be made between equality and difference, or between 
equality and womanhood. To insist that women's distinctive attributes, capacities and activities 
be revalued and treated as a contribution to citizenship is to demand the impossible; such 
‘difference’ is precisely what patriarchal citizenship excludes’ (Pateman 1992:20). Elshtain takes 
the ‘matemalist’ position of incorporation informed by the different values of love and intimacy 
(Elshtain 1983). Dietz argues that Elshtain’s model reinforces gender inequalities (Dietz, 1985). 
Young argues for a ‘group differentiated citizenship’ and is criticised by Mouffe for the 
introduction of an essentialist notion o f ‘group’ (Mouffe 1992; Young 1989).
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Feminist works have also focused on the issues that van Gunsteren defines as the second level of 
analysis - formal institutions and citizenship rights. The work of T. H Marshall stands as the 
classic reference point for the definition of citizenship rights. Marshall set out three categories 
of rights which he argued pertained to citizenship. First, civil rights referring to the legal status 
and civil rights of individuals. These rights were to be defended through a system of formal law 
courts. Civil rights were concerned with such issues as freedom of speech, rights to a fair trial and 
equal access to the legal system. Second, political rights which were associated with the 
development of electoral rights. Third, social rights which formed the basis of claims to welfare 
and which established entitlements to security in periods of unemployment, sickness and distress 
(Turner 1990).
As van Gunsteren argues, debates about citizenship as an abstract concept of political thought are 
interrelated with the reality of formal institutions of citizenship in any given state system (van 
Gunsteren 1978). Feminist authors have also examined gender differentials in definitions of 
citizenship rights. Citizenship, then, is gendered both as an abstract political concept and in terms 
of the historical development of citizenship rights. Analyses of the gendered construction of 
citizen’s rights have focused primarily on the welfare state. Walby argues that, in western 
European history, women’s achievement of political citizenship has been followed more slowly 
by the acquisition of civil and social rights (Walby 1994). As Phillips points out, much of the 
western women's movement has been concerned not only with acquiring a voice for women but 
with establishing the political legitimacy of discussions about supposedly private concerns, such 
as domestic violence, and, concomitantly, civil rights. This concern is stated in the feminist slogan
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‘the personal is political* (Phillips 1991). A second set of feminist analyses of citizenship 
institutions have concentrated on social rights. Walby argues, for example, that there are gendered 
differences both in employment rights and in access to welfare state social support (Walby 1994).
A second strand of feminist work on the institutions of citizenship has been the identification of 
the links between political participation and the definition of citizens’ rights. As outlined above, 
in conceptual terms, the western idea of citizenship has been predicated upon the equal 
participation of men in the public arena. This ideal of citizenship has been reflected in the 
historical reality of women’s exclusion from public political processes. In many societies, women 
have only recently acquired formal rights to vote (Moore 1988). Lister further argues that the 
material reality of women's economic subordination has prevented their full participation in public 
life (Lister 1995). The outcome, it has been argued, has been the gendered differential in the 
definition of citizens’ civil and social rights as described above. In terms of Fraser’s analysis of 
the struggle over the definitions and interpretation of rights and needs, the reality of political 
participation will define who has an authoritative voice in the politics of rights definition and 
interpretation (Fraser 1989). As Jelin argues, there is two way relationship between citizenship 
as a process of political participation and citizenship as a set of rights (Jelin 1996). Walby, 
acknowledging this relation, argues for greater feminist attention to political rights and processes 
(Walby 1994).
Some aspects of this relation between political participation and citizens’ rights have been dealt 
with in the literature on ‘civil society’. Haddenius and Uggla argue that, ‘a common way of 
clarifying the concept of civil society is to say that it denotes a) a certain area of society which
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is b) dominated by interaction of a certain kind. The area in question is the public space between 
the state and the individual citizen (or household). Civil society is further distinguished by the fact 
that the activities contained therein take an organised and collective form. When we speak of civil 
society, it is to groups arranged in social networks of a reasonable fixed and routinised character 
that we refer’ (Hadenius and Uggla 1996:1621). As Stewart observes, much of the literature in 
this field has focused on the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in mediating the 
relationship between the state and individual (Stewart 1997) 9. Jelin, for example, examines the 
actions of the New Social Movements of Latin America and the expansion of formally recognised 
rights in the region (Jelin 1996). The focus of this thesis, however, is not collective political action 
as a means of advocating new rights. I do not review, then, the ‘civil society’ literature 10.
The primary focus of this thesis is the local level implementation and value of a set of rights 
already defined in particular policies. I therefore concentrate on analysis of the relationship 
between participation in political processes and the realisation of rights. I assume that one of the 
prerequisites for the realisation of rights is the means for holding governments to account (Beall 
1998; Ferguson 1998; Paul 1991; Sen 1992). As Lonsdale argues, ‘[accountability] is a dual 
notion. It combines the ideas of responsibility and accountability. Rulers claim to be responsible 
to their people; people try to hold them to account. Accountability is thus the measure of 
responsibility’ (Lonsdale 1986:127). Without mechanism of accountability, there is no guarantee
Stewart provides a critical view, based on work in Zimbabwe, of many of the optimistic and 
unquestioned assumptions about the role of Non Governmental Organisations (Stewart).
10 Wuyts et al provide a useful overview of ‘civil society’ issues (Wuyts, 1992).
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that rights recognised in policy documents, or elsewhere, will be met. My focus, then, is on the 
relation between political participation and accountability rather than collective action as a means 
of advocacy.
The participation literature can broadly be seen as dealing with two problems, the ‘why’ and the 
‘how’ of participation. The ‘participatory development’ literature addresses the ‘why’ question 
and answers it in terms o f ‘empowerment’ and participation as a transformative process n . The 
Participatory Rural Appraisal literature focuses on the technical aspects of carrying out 
participatory research processes as a means of identifying local level ‘needs’ 12. In this thesis, I 
understand the term ‘participation’ to mean the collective involvement of citizens in some level 
of decision making. I do not assume or address the question of whether participation is in itself 
an empowering or transformative process. Neither do I address the construction of participatory 
processes as a technical issue. Rather, I examine the power relations between state agents and 
citizens which shape local level participation, or non participation (Mosse and others 1998). I do 
not, then, review the large body of literature on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of participation. I focus 
instead, as indicated above, on the relationship between political participation and accountability. 
In particular, I examine the effect of mechanisms for ensuring accountability on the practices of 
street level bureaucrats.
11 Oakley and Marsden’s text is generally recognised as the most authoritative introduction to issues of 
participation, development and empowerment (Oakley, 1984). Nelson and Wright provide a recent overview of the 
field (Nelson, 1995).
12 Holland and Blackburn provide a comprehensive overview of the technical issues involved in 
carrying out participatory research (Holland, 1998).
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Feminist analyses of citizenship have paid less attention to van Gunsteren’s third level of analysis 
- the everyday interactions between citizens and state workers. It is the practices of street level 
bureaucrats which define the concrete realities of citizenship in any society (van Gunsteren 1978; 
Lipsky 1980; Plant 1998). As Turner argues, different political systems determine, through 
legislation and particular institutions such as elections, the formal limits of citizen participation 
in decision making (Turner 1990). Turner’s own analysis of the mechanisms which define citizen 
engagement is, however, itself prescribed in terms of formal and legal institutions, rather than 
analysis of the organisations through which the majority of individuals interact with the state. He 
consequently suggests that, in the context of globalisation and the increasing reliance on 
international bodies as a means of upholding rights, the concept of citizenship has limited 
relevance (Turner 1993). In practice, however, few individuals ever have contact with these 
organisations. As van Gunsteren argues, citizens’ relations with the state are forged through 
contact with the low level bureaucracies and organisations which provide services and administer 
state legislation (van Gunsteren 1978). It is ‘street level bureaucrats’, who act as arbiters of 
citizenship rights and status. Local level bureaucrats, such as health workers, act as gatekeepers 
to public material and political resources and thereby shape the gendered reality of relations 
between states and citizens (Lipsky 1980). Globalisation has not, as Turner argues, negated the 
relevance of citizenship (Turner 1993). Rather it raises questions about the links between 
international discourses and local realities of citizenship (Plant 1998).
While van Gunsteren and Lipsky highlight the importance of examining the practices of local level 
state workers, feminist theory, as discussed above, highlights the interdependence of the public 
and private spheres. Discussion of the gendered construction of citizenship, then, requires analysis
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of household relations. A feminist framework for the analysis of citizenship should include, in 
addition to van Gunsteren’s three given levels, examination of the household. In order to 
question the links between international discourses and local realities of citizenship, it is also 
necessary to discuss the impact of the practices of street level bureaucrats on gender relations in 
the private sphere.
As set out in the introduction, questions about the links between international discourses of 
reproductive rights and the local level value of those rights to women in Mabika are addressed 
in the body of this thesis. In chapter three, I examine the impact of the western concept of the 
ideal citizen on the gendered construction of citizenship rights in colonial Rhodesia. In chapter 
four, I discuss civil, social and political rights in contemporary Zimbabwe. The impact of the 
gendered construction of citizenship rights on household relations in Mabika, and concomitantly 
women’s reproductive strategies, is discussed in chapter five. In chapter six, I examine the 
incorporation of international discourses about reproductive rights in the policies and programmes 
of the ZNFPC. The practices of street level bureaucrats, and the relations between their actions 
and processes of political accountability, are discussed in chapter seven. The final substantive 
chapter contains an analysis of how this discourse of reproductive rights has been used by women 
in their reproductive strategies.
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Chapter 3
The Rhodesian State And The Gendered Construction Of Citizenship
3.1 Introduction
In order to understand the meaning of citizenship for women in Mabika today, it is necessary to 
first examine the historical development of citizenship institutions during the colonial era. The 
everyday existence of women in Mabika is governed by the ‘living law. These uncodified rules 
are based upon local level understandings of customary and official law, as well as dominant 
understandings of Ndau beliefs and customs (Armstrong 1997). In this chapter I examine the 
creation of customary law under the colonial regime. I argue that in order to maintain an ideal of 
exclusive white citizenship, the Rhodesian rulers had to build upon social hierarchies of both race 
and gender. As Staudt argues, colonial rulers tried to incorporate African men into the state as 
subordinates to their European rulers. Men were compensated for their lack of political equality 
through the codification o f ‘customary law* and, consequently, the legal reinforcement of male 
authority in the private sphere (Staudt 1987; Staudt 1989). This process, however, was 
continually disputed and resisted. The gendered construction of citizenship was the product of 
social struggles, both among Africans and colonists as well as between rulers and ruled. Women’s 
subordination through state processes was neither complete nor unambiguous. In colonial 
Rhodesia, although the dominant discourse was one of female exclusion, a plurality of 
organisations and institutions created some spaces where women could claim different 
entitlements. Yet women’s action in resisting domination was, in itself, not straightforward. 
Women were not necessarily searching for, nor finding, the western ideals of freedom and
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autonomy.
The chapter commences with a discussion of relevant theoretical literature on the state and 
citizenship in Africa. This is followed by an historical outline of the changing discourses of 
citizenship from the pre-colonial era to the War of Liberation. The shifts, over time, in the 
dominant discourse are traced. Conflicting voices and practices, and women's manipulation of 
these contradictions, are then examined. This chapter is based upon existing historical accounts 
of the Rhodesian regime. Most of these works, such as those of Bourdillon and Ranger, are based 
upon research among the Shona (Bourdillon 1991; Ranger 1985). The histories of gender 
relations produced by, among others, Schmidt, Barnes and Jeater, also examine the lives of 
Shona women (Barnes 1992; Jeater 1993; Schmidt 1992). These works, then, refer to the 
majority ethnic group of which the Ndau of Mabika belong. In the next two chapters I will 
discuss the continuing influence of colonial institutions through examination of de facto 
citizenship rights in Mabika and the consequent construction of household gender relations in the 
village.
3.2 African citizenship
Discussions of African citizenship have highlighted the fact that, in contrast to European nations, 
entitlements to civil, social and political resources are determined by membership of kinship 
groups rather than the state per se (Ekeh 1990). In particular, historical analyses have focused 
on the colonial development of customary law and the creation of according to Mamdani, a two 
tier citizenship which granted individual civil rights to Europeans and left the rural African
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majority governed by a constructed tradition (Mamdani 1996). Analyses have further shown how 
African male elders colluded in the creation of customary law in order to enshrine their control 
over wives and daughters (Chanock 1985; Ranger 1983; Schmidt 1992; Staudt 1989). The 
Rhodesian identification of the ideal citizen as a white male resulted in the creation of institutions 
which reinforced women’s subordination. However, this process was neither unambiguous nor 
uncontested. Analyses, such as Mamdani's, both overlook the contradictions within colonial 
discourses and place too great an emphasis on the power of state enforced law as a tool through 
which rulers coerced indigenous populations into serving the needs of the settler economy. Such 
arguments fail to explain either the ambiguities in present day gendered state discourses in 
Zimbabwe or the failure of post Independence legal reforms to eradicate entrenched gender 
hierarchies. As Pringle and Watson argue, the state cannot be conceptualized as a monolithic 
entity (Pringle and Watson 1992; Pringle and Watson 1996)13. If the modem state does not 
consist of one coherent whole, then neither was the colonial encounter a linear, coherent process 
involving two clearly defined protagonists (Comaroff 1997). Customary law contained 
ambiguities in relation to the status of women. Moreover, the operation of different 
organisations - both governmental, such as welfare programmes and the family planning 
programme discussed in chapter six, and non governmental - the ‘living law’ of local practice - 
challenged as well as reinforced legal definitions of citizenship (Armstrong 1997; Barnes 1992; 
Ranchod-Nilsson 1992; Schmidt 1992; Weinrich 1979).
13 In MacKinnon’s model of the state, gender is integral to the nature of the processes of state 
functioning, and is not simply the result of male dominance of state apparatus (MacKinnon, 1987). In this thesis, I 
take Watson and Pringle’s definition of the state, ‘not as an institution but as a set of arenas and a collection of 
practices which are historically produced and not structurally “given”. This is not to say that there is no 
intentionality or purpose, but what intentionality there is comes from the success with which various groupings are 
able to impose themselves and it is always likely to be partial and temporary’ (Watson, 1992:186).
As Ekeh argues, one of the primary features of contemporary African citizenship is the continuing 
significance of kinship groups as political, entitlement giving, communities (Ekeh 1990). This is 
the product, according to Mamdani, of colonial governments’ attempts to control indigenous 
population through, first, direct and then indirect rule (Mamdani 1996). While direct rule, as 
defined by Mamdani, was based upon a single legal order, indirect rule institutionalized a separate 
system of'customary' law for native populations. The initial encouragement, through direct rule, 
of native populations to embrace the idea of individual rights encoded in western legal systems 
was soon replaced by the claims that communalism and customary law were more ‘naturally’ 
African (Chanock 1985). In reality, as Ranger suggests, the codification of customary law was 
‘the result of a conscious determination on the part of the colonial authorities to 're-establish' 
order and security and a sense of community by means of defining and enforcing “tradition”’ 
(Ranger 1983:249). The legal institutionalization of hierarchical groups, or tribes, was a 
construction that enabled colonial administrators to rule indirectly through chiefs and headmen 
and their customary courts (Jirira 1995). Individual Africans were, consequently, only indirectly 
linked to the state through membership of kinship groups and, concomitantly, attachment to a 
particular chief. While, as Ekeh and Mamdani argue, this fact has had consequences for the racial 
and ethnic definitions of citizenship, it also underpinned gender differentials in access to 
citizenship rights. In the case of colonial Africa, the exclusion of African men from full citizenship 
was predicated upon the further subordination of women. It was only through guaranteeing men's 
'customary1 rights over women that the colonial administrators were able to gain the collaboration 
of African men in their own subjugation (Schmidt 1990; Staudt 1987; Weinrich 1979).
In gaining the collaboration of African men through the subordination of women, customary law
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institutionalised a public domain on the basis of gender issues which, in western countries, were 
seen as matters belonging to the private realm. Customary laws, among other measures, defined 
women as jural minors and codified gender relations in the context of marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, child custody and property rights within marriage. As Staudt states, ‘the colonial 
state forged a public sphere, elevated from the lineage, clan and/or ethnic identity to the level of 
the state, that was one and the same, a male sphere. This new public sphere made marriage and 
divorce, and thus control over surplus accumulation and labour, a public matter administered by 
men, for what was often formerly a family matter’ (Staudt 1989:78). Previously autonomous 
social domains like the household, age sets and gender associations now fell within the scope of 
public chiefly power (Mamdani 1996). The gendered nature of citizenship in Africa was thus 
predicated upon the subordinate incorporation of men into the public domain of the state, while 
women were supposed to be part of the private sphere controlled and protected by men (Staudt 
1987).
As Comaroff points out, however, the creation of a separate world defined by custom could never 
be complete as the colonial state itself was not a single coherent entity: ‘The colonial process was 
never monolithic, never merely a matter of States and politics. And, far from being an encounter 
between two clearly defined “sides”, all the parties involved were as much remade by it as it was 
by them. In all this, moreover, in the building of new identities, of newly imagined world of 
possibility and political reality, the discourse of rights, rightlessness, even righteousness, loomed 
increasingly large - albeit within complex cultural fields and power relations.’ (Comaroff 1997). 
Thus, for example, as Schmidt observes of Rhodesia, there were some instances in which women 
gained from state intervention in the legal sphere as with the outlawing of child pledging and
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forced marriages (Schmidt 1992). Moreover, outside the ambit of legislation, there were other 
discourses originating in the state which provided resources for counter claims to the dominant 
view of women as rightless subjects. Women, as well as men, migrated between rural homesteads 
and towns and became involved in formal or informal wage labour and the concomitant discourse 
of individual contracts and rights (Schmidt 1992). The discourses of modernity also entered the 
village. State sponsored rural development initiatives provided channels through which the central 
state tried to manage rural social relations at the local level (Bratton 1978). These programmes 
introduced, albeit unintentionally, new discourses of individual needs and rights. Some, such as 
the family planning programme, provided a counter voice to the notion of women as dependants 
of their male relatives. Moreover the ‘living law’, people’s own evolving understanding and 
practices of their customs, provided a locally originating counter voice to the definitions of 
customary law (Armstrong 1987). On some occasions, such discourses provided women with a 
broader set of entitlements which they could claim. At other moments, as examined in the 
following chapter, beneficial changes for women in national legislation have failed to take root 
precisely because of the existence of opposing living law discourses (Schuler 1992). In either 
case, wherever they were able, women used these contradictions to press their own claims and 
make maximum use of their entitlements when they considered it in their own interests to do so 
(Armstrong and others 1993). The well documented accounts of colonial and pre-colonial Shona 
gender relations allows examination of these historical processes which have shaped the reality 
of women’s citizenship in present day Mabika. The structural constraints on the lives of the 




Among the pre-colonial Shona, it was kinship groups, rather than chieftainships or states, which 
were the primary source of rights and entitlements to political, social and economic resources 
(Ekeh 1990). It was only as a member of a lineage that individuals were able to obtain access to 
land and security. Male elders were able to maintain authority in the allocation of these rights 
through control over the distribution of women through marriage (Jeater 1993). Nonetheless, 
despite the apparent subordination of women, social organisation was flexible enough to enable 
women to gain power, and in some cases, authority in decision making (Weinrich 1979). As 
Ranger suggests, in contrast to the idealized version of tribal tradition produced during the 
colonial era, nineteenth century Africa was inhabited by a number of fluid and competing groups. 
‘These societies had certainly valued custom and continuity but custom was loosely defined and 
infinitely flexible. Custom helped to maintain a sense of identity but it also allowed for an 
adaptation so spontaneous and natural that it was often unperceived. Moreover, there rarely 
existed in fact the closed corporate consensual system which came to be accepted as characteristic 
of ‘traditional’ Africa... the boundaries of the 'tribal' polity and the hierarchies of authority within 
them did not define conceptual horizons of Africans’ (Ranger 1983:247-248).
These conditions of sometimes violent uncertainty characterized life for the nineteenth century 
inhabitants of the area that now forms Zimbabwe. At the time of the European occupation in 
1890, the central plateau of which was settled by 'a hotch-potch of chiefly dynasties with a variety 
of histories, united by geographical propinquity and a common culture’ (Bourdillon 1991:13). 
These groups, now classified as 'Shona', originated from the Bantu settlement of the area
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stretching between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers. The region to the southwest of the plateau 
was inhabited by the Zulu speaking Ndebele. The Ndebele arrived with a powerful military force 
organized under a central king which enabled raids into Shona territories to take captives and 
cattle from defeated peoples. In order to escape the uncertainties of this existence, small groups 
of Shona people would seek refuge in caves and shelters in the more mountainous areas of the 
region (Bourdillon 1991). As Ekeh suggests, the importance of ties of kinship in this pre-colonial 
era can be linked to the very uncertainty of these shifting and competing groups. While in some 
parts of the continent state formations did exist, they offered the individual little protection as a 
result of their fluctuating powers and the propensity of their rulers to turn on their own citizens 
as victims for the slave trade (Ekeh 1990). Yet, as examination of the Shona patrilineal system 
indicates, women had less to gain from the security of kinship networks than men. It was through 
the exchange of women for bridewealth that elders were able to accumulate both power and 
wealth (Jeater 1993). While women were also able to gain limited status through marriage 
transactions (Weinrich 1979), the fact that they were exchanged, rather than transactors, 
presupposed, and reinforced, women's subordination.
Shona kinship was, and remains, patrilineal. The Shona peoples divided themselves into clans and 
subclans, linked through the male line, each with its own name. These groups were usually 
associated with a particular chief but rarely, if ever, acted as a corporate whole. The ideal 
residential group, or chizvarwa, consisted of a group of living siblings and their descendants in 
the male line presided over by the senior male agnate. It was this group that acted as a decision 
making unit (Bourdillon 1991). As older women interviewed in Mabika confirmed, important 
decisions could not be made without reference to the head who was recognized as the legal
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guardian of all the family members - children, men and women. It was the headman who 
authorized marriages and acted as arbitrator in disputes among his wards. While women, then, 
were considered guardians of the headman, junior men also had subordinate status in the 
patrilineage (Ncube 1987). But women's legal status was further defined by the marriage contract 
which provided for a non-reciprocal arrangement of men's rights over /nooming brides. While 
marriage gave men certain rights in their female kin, it defined women as not possessing full rights 
to themselves. Marriage represented a contract between two kin groups rather than one couple. 
The husband's family gave bridewealth (lobolo) in exchange for rights over the bride's 
reproductive capacity. This endowed the patrilineage as a whole with a claim over any children 
produced from the union and gave the groom exclusive sexual rights over the bride. A husband 
could divorce his wife for any reason he deemed sufficient, but desertion and barrenness were the 
most usual grounds (Kuper 1954).
As women had fewer rights in themselves as men, so they also had less control over property 
(Whitehead 1984). Each chief was associated with a particular territory. The chief was caretaker 
and dispenser of land-use rights and distributed use rights in a given piece of land to each male 
head of household. Women only obtained access to land by virtue of their subordinate relationship 
to men as wives. Women did, however, have some informal rights to ownership and use of 
property. Each wife had her own plot of land (tseu\ allocated by her husband, on which she could 
grow crops for her own use. They were likely to lose access to this land if divorced or if, as 
widows, they did not marry their husband's successor. Women could keep income earned from 
making and selling pots or from work as a midwife. Older women also received a 'cow of 
motherhood' from their son-in-law at the marriage of each daughter. Women's property owning
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rights were thus determined by their changing relationship to their husband in the life cycle of 
marriage, child-birth, divorce or widowhood (Jacobs 1983; Kuper 1954; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 
1997; Weinrich 1979).
Control over women was central to elders' command of both material resources and the labour 
of younger men. The practice of pledging (kuzvarira) was common among the Shona in the pre­
colonial era (May 1983). This mechanism allowed young girls to be promised as future wives 
usually in return for grain. During periods of food shortage elders, who commanded access to 
land and its produce, were able to accumulate large numbers of young wives. Such polygynous 
marriages produced large numbers of sons and sons-in-law who were tied to the head of the 
household by relations of loyalty and indebtedness for their bridewealth payments or wives. Poor 
men could substitute service for bridewealth thereby expanding the labour pool of the big men'. 
These ties of loyalty and clientage formed the basis of the political power of the household head 
(Jeater 1993:22-23). While junior men could also manipulate these ties of patronage and start to 
build up their own power base, women, unable to exchange themselves in marriage, were 
excluded from this pathway to acquiring power. Moreover, as women moved to their husband's 
household at marriage, they were considered 'strangers' in the village where male ties of blood 
formed the basis of political unity (Weinrich 1979). The terms of the marriage contract thus 
underwrote men's strategies of power accumulation.
Successful big men' operated within the formal structures of Shona society. The Shona had no 
system of age classes or initiation schools. Within one chieftainship, groups of villages formed a 
ward under the authority of a ward head. Ward heads, as well as village heads and a panel of
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chosen advisers, assisted and advised the chief when requested (Jacobs 1983; Kuper 1954). One 
of the main political functions of the different groupings within the chieftainship was the 
settlement of disputes. Family conflicts were supposed to be resolved by an informal gathering 
of the senior men of that particular group. Any village headman could hold an informal court 
{dare) to resolve disputes within the community for which he was responsible. Cases which the 
headman failed to settle were taken to the higher court of a ward headman or, if necessary, the 
chiefs court (Bourdillon 1991).
In formal terms, women were considered to be incapable of arguing a case in court and, 
consequently, had to be represented by a male guardian (Bourdillon 1991). In practice, however, 
the flexibility of the legal system allowed women some voice in court proceedings. A guardian 
would either consult the woman he represented prior to the proceedings or allow her to present 
her own evidence in court. While court authorities might have derided women who presented 
their own cases they, nonetheless, gave them a hearing. This suggests that, although women did 
not have full legal status, they were not regarded as legal minors (May 1983:29).
There are also examples of women obtaining positions of political authority in pre colonial Shona 
societies. Some female relatives of Shona chiefs are recorded as having been vested with the 
office of headwoman. In these cases, women's authority was always dependent on their 
relationships with powerful men. Women could also gain public influence as midwives, healers 
and spirit mediums (Kuper 1954; Ranchod-Nilsson 1992). Two women interviewed in Mabika 
worked as healers. This position, or talent, is inherited through maternal ancestors. Both these 
women said that their grandmothers had been important members of the community.
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The position of spirit medium, in particular, was one of considerable prestige. As well as being 
called upon to divine the causes of misfortune, they were respected for their wisdom and often 
called upon to settle family disputes. Ancestral spirits, which are believed to enter a child while 
still in its mother's womb, are seen to be the dominant controlling force in the life of the 
community as well as individuals. The stronger the authority and power of a person in life, the 
greater their importance as a spirit after death. Powerful spirits speak to the living through a 
medium. Women were generally possessed by the lesser spirits; the lineage (vadzimu) and alien 
(mashave) spirits. They rarely communicated with those of the royal ancestors of the chiefdom 
(mhondoro) , considered to be the most important in the spirit world (Bourdillon 1991; Lan 
1985). The most famous of these female spirit mediums was Nehanda Nyakasikana who is 
reputed to have taken a leading role in the first uprising against the European settlers in 1890. 
Gaidzanwa argues that, ‘Nehanda's involvement in the anti-colonial struggles is an indication of 
the spaces which existed for women in pre-colonial society in the religious-political realm at a 
time when the distinctions between politics, religion and production were not pronounced’ 
(Gaidzanwa 1992:107). In public, then, some women were able to reach positions where they had 
a certain degree of power (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 1997).
In private women had little power, but were able to exercise a varying amount of informal 
influence over their husbands and other male kin (Bourdillon 1991). Women's standing and, 
consequently, influence within the family was related to her age and the number of children she 
had borne. Thus a woman's status increased over time as she became first a mother, then a 
mother-in-law and finally a grandmother (Kuper 1954; Weinrich 1979). In addition to private
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negotiations, there were culturally acceptable means by which women could express their views 
and make indirect criticisms of their seniors. These included gossip, women's songs and child 
naming (Schmidt 1992). Informal channels of communication thus allowed women a degree of 
influence which was not evident from the formal strictures of kinship arrangements. Moreover, 
while the marriage contract and bridewealth exchanges underpinned women's subordination in 
the lineage into which they married, it did provide some leverage within their own patrilineage. 
Bridewealth from a woman's marriage was often used in exchange for her brother's wife. The 
children of her brother's marriage were, consequently, the progeny of her bridewealth, a fact 
which gave her considerable influence over them. A woman became the 'female father' (vatete) 
of her brother's children. As such, she had to be consulted in all the major events of their lives 
including the selection of appropriate marriage partners. This role gave a woman considerable 
power within her own patrilineage (Bourdillon 1991; Weinrich 1979).
While, then, in formal terms women were defined as second class citizens in structures of lineage 
authority, in practice the flexibility of pre-colonial kinship groups enabled them to gain some 
power and status. As Ranger argues for sub Saharan Africa in general, the codified institutions 
of colonial regulation imposed a previously unknown rigidity on Shona societies (Ranger 1983). 
The ossification of Shona rules and customs precluded the strategies which women had used in 
pre colonial societies in pursuit of their own interests. It was not so much that colonialism 
imposed an unprecedented patriarchal order on Shona peoples, but rather that the colonial order 
blocked the informal channels which women had used as a means of counteracting their 
subordination (Folbre 1988; Gaidzanwa 1992). Nonetheless, as I suggest in the following 
sections, colonial rule also opened up new opportunities and spaces which women were quick to
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exploit (Barnes 1992; Jeater 1993; Schmidt 1990; Weinrich 1979).
3.4 Colonialism
If kinship groups had afforded Africans some escape from the vagaries of larger political 
organisations, in the colonial era such structures became the means by which colonial 
administrators tried to tie people to the state. As Ekeh suggests, ‘a major result of the way the 
colonial state developed was that the individual could only be indirectly related to the state. 
Membership of a kinship group became integral to the meaning of citizenship for the individual 
in the colonial state* (Ekeh 1990:685). The colonial state thus grew out of, and was tied to, the 
web of pre-existing kinship networks. While Mamdani and Ekeh have examined the implications 
of this mode of government for racial and ethnic distinctions of citizenship, here the consequences 
in terms of gender are discussed. The use of kinship structures as the primary means through 
which relations between colonists and Africans were mediated ensured that, in the growth of the 
colonial state, citizenship was defined as much by social struggles within kinship groups as by the 
encounter between whites and Africans. In order to retain the collaboration and compliance of 
African males, the colonial state legally reinforced their authority over female kin. The 
entitlements of citizenship, consequently, came to be predicated on gender as well as race. Yet the 
development of this construct was neither straightforward nor complete.
For the purposes of analysis, I divide the colonial discourse on citizenship into three overlapping 
eras. The early years of colonial rule, up to 1920, were characterized by a policy of racial 
'integration'. During this period the Rhodesian rulers attempted to 'civilize' the African population
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through the promotion of'modem' values. The initial promotion of modernity, individual rights 
and contract was followed by a shift to policies of racial segregation and a return to ideas of 
tradition and status. By the end of the 1950s, this discourse had shifted back to the necessity for 
'progress', to be promoted through programmes of'community development'. In the analysis of 
each phase, I examine the gender implications of changing colonial policies and the strategies 
which women adopted in order to use new opportunities to their best advantage.
3.5 Free Labour and Modernity
European settlers arrived in the region in 1890 in the form of the British South Africa Company 
led by Rhodes. During the 1880s Rhodes’ agents had secured a series of concessions from African 
rulers throughout Central and Southern Africa which gave the Company a monopoly of the 
mineral and commercial rights in their domains. The arrival of the Company in Ndebele and Shona 
territories, however, was greeted with fierce resistance. The risings, or first Chimurenga, began 
in 1896 in Matebeleland and then spread, to European surprise, to Shona speaking areas. Shona 
chiefs, who had a few years previously been fighting each other, joined forces alongside spirit 
mediums and villagers against the white invaders. The refusal of the Shona leaders to surrender, 
when offered terms at the end of 1986, led to a bloody suppression of the rebellion by the 
Europeans. In the end, the chiefs had to surrender unconditionally and many of them were 
brought to trial and hanged. In a number of areas, a new chief was put in place with white backing 
as a reward for loyalty* during the uprising (Ranger 1970). The squashing of the First Chimurenga 
marked the commencement of numerous battles, among colonizers and Africans themselves as 
well as between rulers and ruled, to reshape African societies.
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Law was one of the technologies employed by colonial administrators to try and assert their will. 
But, as Chanock argues, ‘African legal history is part of the transforming of the societies of 
Central Africa by colonial capitalism. The increasing involvement in markets for agricultural 
products and for labour and the new subordination to the state which this leads to are clearly at 
the heart of the transformation of 'customary' legal relations in African societies’ (Chanock 
1985:11). The development of the legal and political administration of Rhodesia, consequently, 
has to be examined in the context of the penetration of colonial capitalist relations into the rural 
areas. The colonial encounter involved not only the formal legal definition of gender hierarchies, 
it also institutionalized a gendered socio-economic order. As Barnes suggests, ‘within the colonial 
order, men of working age were transformed into labourers who were not paid enough to support 
families; women of working age were transformed into labourers who supported families without 
pay’ (Bames 1992:587). Notwithstanding Chanock's argument that economic and legal relations 
developed hand in hand, the colonial capitalist state cannot be seen as a coherently functioning 
whole. While, in many instances, capitalism and customary law were mutually reinforcing, 
changing economic conditions also provided women with a means of escape from legally defined 
kinship relations (Jeater 1993; Weinrich 1979).
The first colonial constitution was adopted in 1898 establishing mechanisms for Direct Rule 
through political and military control. Under the Southern Rhodesian Order in Council, Executive 
and Legislative Councils were created. The former consisted of the Company's administrative 
officers, the latter was originally composed of five nominees of the Company and four
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representatives elected by adult male franchise among the settlers (Leys 1959)14. The colonial 
rulers made it clear from the start, then, that Africans were not to be granted any form of political 
citizenship. Instead, Africans and their affairs were to be 'administered' by Europeans. The Native 
Regulations of 1898 set up an administrative apparatus which gave the task of appointing chiefs 
and headmen to a Native Affairs Department and vested extensive discretionary jurisdiction to 
Native Commissioners. These white government officials combined administrative, judicial and 
legislative powers including, after 1910, powers to decide civil and criminal cases concerning 
Africans (Bratton 1978; Worby 1994).
The Company geared its administrative machinery to meet settler needs within the limits of this 
legislation. The Company's original interest, which was slow to die, lay in the exploitation of 
supposedly vast gold reserves. After 1907, however, the Company turned its attention to 
agriculture and adopted a new policy of promoting European settlement on the land (Sylvester 
1991). Under the 1898 Order, the Company was required to provide sufficient land for the 
'natives' occupation and agricultural requirements. This led to the creation of a series of Native 
Reserves. The only common guiding principle followed by Company officials in the creation of 
Reserves was to leave undisturbed the fertile highland areas already occupied or alienated by 
whites. The amount of Reserve land was subsequently reduced by successive acts of parliament. 
The version of the bill that was passed as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 designated fifty 
percent of agricultural land as European, African areas constituted thirty per cent of available land 
and the rest was left unassigned (Kriger 1992:53). Moreover, as in present day Zimbabwe, the
14 Company Rule was eventually brought to an end in 1923 as a result of increases in the settlers' share 
of representation (Leys, 1959)
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majority of the African areas were situated in Natural Regions IE and IV, the low rainfall, poor 
soil quality, lowlands (Moyo 1995).
Apart from land, the settler economy also required labour to work in mines, farms and white 
households. The demand for African labourers underpinned the early colonial policies of 
modernisation and integration through Direct Rule. The moral value of'free labour' was promoted 
as an antidote to the purportedly slave based indigenous African economy (Cooper 1989). Early 
administrators thus encouraged Africans to embrace the idea of individual rights, in the name of 
modernity, in order to affect what they perceived to be the evolution of human societies from 
status to contract (Comaroff 1997).
Unfortunately for the white administrators, Shona men didn't share the European vision of the 
dignity of labour and refused to take part in the wage system. By 1903 only 13 per cent of Shona 
men aged between 18 and 40 were in wage labour for more than three months of the year (Ranger 
1970). In order to combat this resistance whites, in the face of free labour proclamations, first 
pressganged men into wage work and then applied economic pressures in the form of hut tax. The 
latter was initiated in 1896 then raised, in 1904, from 10s to £1 per hut and 10s for each 
polygamous wife. At this time it required three months' labour for an African to earn £1 (Leys 
1959). Despite state intervention, however, African farmers were determined to maintain the 
'peasant option', and resist dependence on wage labour, for as long as possible (Ranger 1985). 
Even severe drought and the consequent food shortage of 1912 failed to motivate the male rural 
population to search for employment. In the face of famine, rural dwellers preferred to rely on the 
traditional strategy of searching shrublands and forests for wild produce and sustenance (Diffe
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1987). This option, as present day inhabitants of Mabika recalled, was more viable in the days 
when there was a shared knowledge of the shrubland and its natural products. These days, only 
a handful of people know how to survive in the wilds.
The early attempts by the Shona to resist male proletarianization led to modifications in the 
gender division of labour. Historically, a large proportion of agricultural work had fallen within 
women's domain. As peasant households tried to meet tax demands through increased production, 
the burden of augmented agricultural labour fell on women's shoulders. In the pre-colonial era 
while the male head of household maintained rights to land, women's agricultural labour 
guaranteed continued access to it. Men's labour was concentrated at specific points in the 
agricultural cycle - at the end of the rainy season when land had to be prepared for replanting and 
during the harvest period. Women, in contrast, worked all year round. They undertook the back 
breaking tasks of planting and the daily chore of keeping the fields free of weeds. As well as 
agricultural labour, women's domestic tasks included child care, the collection of wood and water 
and the preparation of food. When hut tax was imposed, many African households extended the 
acreage of land under cultivation and sold their surplus to Europeans as an alternative means of 
acquiring cash. Rather than adapting the gendered division of labour to cope with the increased 
workload, it fell to women to produce the necessary additional effort. Even where men were not 
absent, women's workload was increased by the expansion of acreage under cultivation (Jeater 
1993;Schmidt 1992; Weinrich 1979).
The settlers themselves, as already noted, were initially more interested in mining than farming 
and so provided a ready market for African farmers. But, after 1910, the further alienation of
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African land, increased taxes and the legislation of marketing arrangements, favouring new 
European producers over Africans, meant that cash obligations could no longer be met by 
agriculture alone. It was only in areas favoured by natural fertility and good communications, 
such as Makoni where Ranger carried out most of his research on peasantization, that rural men 
could resist the push into wage labour (Ranger 1985). In other areas, an increasing number of 
African men were obliged to migrate to find employment. By 1912, colonial records indicate that 
proportionally more men were taking up waged labour and they were also more likely to work 
continuously from 6 to 12 months (Jeater 1993). Furthermore, the response to food shortage in 
1916, in contrast to earlier famines, was marked by an increase in the supply of male labour 
despite declining wages (Hiffe 1987).
While rural men were reluctant to enter into wage employment, young rural women were keen 
to make the most of the economic opportunities which the settler occupation provided. Women 
found work on the farms and the mines. Indeed, African women worked in the mines in the early 
years of colonial rule when men objected to working underground. As the mines expanded, 
however, women turned to brewing beer and prostitution (Weinrich 1979). Prostitution was not 
a practice which made any sense in terms of pre-colonial societies where all women were under 
the control of either a father or a husband. Moreover, sexuality was not regarded as a detachable 
commodity but was defined within marriage and kinship relations (Jeater 1993). The colonial 
economy, then, provided women with the economic and, concomitantly, ideological means of 
evading the strictures of kinship control. Women's readiness to grab these opportunities illustrates 
the extent of dissatisfaction with their lot in kinship regulated societies. The fact that women's 
entry into capitalist relations of monetary exchange and contract was based on their exploitation,
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sexually and economically, highlights the limits and contradictions inherent in the process of 
colonization.
During the early years of colonial rule the occupying administrators voiced little objection to 
women's independent activities. Indeed, in terms of the colonial mission to produce a modem, 
integrated labour force, women's migration to the towns and mines was welcome. Colonial 
authorities saw women in the urban areas as a 'civilizing' force on migrant men. Moreover, the 
initial view of the Native Affairs Department was that, in order to facilitate male labour migration, 
the authority of rural chiefs had to be undermined and replaced by that of the Native 
Commissioners. Legislation from this period reflected this strategy. The Charter granted to the 
British South Africa Company in 1889 made provision for the recognition of African custom and 
law so long as it was not 'repugnant to natural law, justice and morality' and did not conflict with 
statute law (May 1983:158). This mling imposed a European distinction between civil and 
criminal law and, initially, removed the latter from the jurisdiction of the chiefs (Kriger 1992). The 
so called 'repugnancy clause' was also used in the first decade of colonial rule to justify European 
interference with indigenous practices. Thus the Marriage Ordinances of 1901 and 1912 
emphasized women's individual rights at the expense of lineage authority.
In contrast to later legislation on marriage and adultery, the Native Marriage Ordinance of 1901 
was not formulated as a response to lobbying from sectors of the African community and there 
is little evidence of consultation having taken place (Jeater 1993). Child pledging and forced 
marriages were deemed repugnant to European standards of justice and morality. The 1901 Act, 
which governed all non Christian marriages between Africans, thus outlawed child pledging and
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required that women's consent be obtained before a marriage could take place (May 1983); 
(Schmidt 1992). The Act also limited the amount of lobola that could be claimed to four head of 
cattle for the daughter of a commoner and five head for that of a chief, or cash at the rate of five 
pounds per head of cattle. The Act thereby put a temporary halt to the commercialization of 
bridewealth transactions. The Marriage Ordinance of 1912 attached criminal penalties to the act 
of child pledging. A further amendment in 1917 stipulated that any man who entered into a 
marriage agreement concerning a girl 12 years or under was liable to a fine of £50 or to 
imprisonment with or without hard labour for up to one year (May 1983; Schmidt 1990). While 
this legislation was passed in the name of European standards of civilization, the commercial 
interests of the colonial administrators were evident in the failure to place an outright ban on 
bridewealth. Although some sectors of colonial society, notably the missionaries, objected to 
lobola transactions on the grounds of its demeaning effect on women, employers saw it as an 
incentive to encourage young men to enter wage labour (Jeater 1993).
Just as women were quick to make the most of the economic opportunities proffered by the 
colonial state, so they also took advantage of the openings created by new legislation. Between 
October 1899 and February 1905, the Native Commissioner of Goromonzi District heard 345 
cases. Of this total, 95 cases concerned girls who had refused to marry men who had paid 
bridewealth for them and 65 concerned wives who had run away (Schmidt 1990:640). In their 
bid to ensure sufficient labour for settler enterprise, colonial administrators had been prepared to 
pass legislation which undermined indigenous authority structures and young women had been 
quick to take advantage of this fact. The strength of male reaction to these policies was a further 
indication of the success with which women had taken advantage of the legal spaces that
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colonization had opened up.
Rural chiefs and headmen, concerned about their loss of power as a consequence of women's 
increased economic and marital opportunities, started to lobby colonial officials for a change in 
legislation. The Native Commissioner's report of 1908 noted the growing number of'native' 
complaints concerning the desertion of married women to the mines (Jeater 1993:119). The 1909 
Superintendents of Natives Conference adopted a resolution that adultery should be penalized 
noting that ‘it was pointed out by all members of the Conference that this proposal emanates from 
the natives themselves who ...are unanimous and constant in their demands that such legislation 
should be introduced’ (Minutes, Superintendents of Natives Conference, Salisbury 3 Feb 1909. 
Cited in Jeater 1993:133). Moreover, Native Commissioners reported an increasing number of 
rural hut burning cases in relation to marital disputes. The growing incidence of rural violence, 
combined with the strength of the chiefly lobby, served to convince the Native Affairs Department 
that the cooperation, rather than the destruction, of'traditional' authority was required in order 
to administer the reserve lands. The initial collaboration of colonial rulers and rural patriarchal 
elite, then, was based on the perceived threat from African men to the authority of the Rhodesian 
state (Jeater 1993).
3.6 Customary Law
From the point of view of colonial administrators if, initially, they were concerned with the 
problems of labour supply, once there was a steady stream of migrant men coming into towns, 
they began to worry about issues of control in both rural and urban areas (Cooper 1989).These
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fears prompted a change in administrators' attitudes towards those women who migrated to the 
mines and towns in search of economic gain. Whereas, in the early years of colonialism, such 
women had been seen as a positive force in the civilizing of the male labour force, they were now 
perceived as a nuisance if not a threat. Women, it was argued, should remain in the Reserves as 
preservers of family life (Jeater 1993). It was the problem of maintaining order that underpinned 
the colonial'volte face ' from a policy of integration to one of segregation and, concomitantly, the 
pursuit of modernity to the recreation of tradition (Chanock 1985). Colonial administrators 
realized that Africans who were accorded pre-modem 'customs' might be easier to rule over than 
those who were aware of their rights (Comaroff 1997). Moreover, if such 'customs' restricted the 
movement and freedom of women this could only, in the eyes of the colonial administration, be 
a good thing.
The change from modernization to the enforcement of 'tradition' was justified by claims that 
communalism was more 'naturally' African than individual rights. In a speech made in 1929, 
General Smuts extols the virtues of supposed African communalism in contrast to the false 
imposition of equal rights. ‘The principles of the French Revolution which had emancipated 
Europe were applied to Africa; liberty, equality and fraternity could turn bad Africans into good 
Europeans...In some of the British possessions in Africa the native just emerged from barbarism 
was accepted as an equal citizen with full political rights alongside the whites. But his native 
institutions were ruthlessly proscribed and destroyed. The principle of equal rights was applied 
in its crudest form, and while it gave the native a semblance of equality with whites, which was 
little good to him, it destroyed the basis of the African system which was his highest good’ (Cited 
in Mamdani 1996:5). The emphasis, then, in colonial policy switched from the modernization of
84
Africans through the introduction of European values and rights to processes of education within 
the limits of a segregated and 'traditional' society.
In order to ensure that 'tradition' was adhered to, administrators had to determine the customary 
laws of indigenous groups and translate them into an instrument which could be utilized within 
a legal system based on Western judicial concepts (May 1983). The first colonial ethnographers 
in Southern Rhodesia were nearly all Native Commissioners 15. Their accounts were a mixture 
of observation and unashamed evaluations of tribal character. From the 1930s onwards, however, 
a new cadre of professional anthropologists came to dominate the production of ethnographic 
texts in southern Africa (Worby 1994). Thus Holleman's 'Shona Customary Law' was written at 
the request of the Southern Rhodesia Native Department, which wanted someone to provide 
systematic documentation of marriage and family law (Holleman 1952). In carrying out this 
exercise, anthropologists invariably consulted only those members of society whom they 
considered to be legal experts - chiefs, headmen and male elders. It was this male interpretation 
of custom that came to be legally institutionalised. Practices which had previously afforded some 
degree of flexibility became enshrined as custom (Ranger 1983). Moreover, these customs were 
captured in a form that reinforced the subordination of women (May 1983).
Male elders had their own particular interests to pursue in the definition of custom. As Chanock 
argues, in the changing socio-economic world of colonial capitalism, ‘claims about custom were 
competitive rather than descriptive. Where people are trying to make others change what they do,
15 One of the exceptions was Mrs H. N Hemans who was, in fact, the wife of a Native Commissioner. 
Mrs Hemand produced the first published account of the Bashankwe and Batonka in 1928 (Worby, 1994).
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law is a weapon. It describes not regular behaviour, but what some people want others to do’ 
(Chanock 1985:17). The exodus of young men and women to the towns for work posed a 
challenge to the structure of power and authority in the rural areas and, consequently, to the 
authority of male elders. As junior men became involved in the cash economy, so the balance of 
expectations between the generations was changing. Instead of young men looking to their elders 
to provide them with cattle for bridewealth, older men were hoping to benefit from the wages of 
their juniors. In this battle between the generations, women provided the main point of leverage. 
As long as elder men maintained control over their daughters, they had some hold over younger 
men who wanted to maintain a base in the rural areas and thus a means of extracting cash from 
migrant sons. Consequently, in making claims about their 'customs', Shona elders emphasized 
practices which reinforced their rights over wives and daughters (Chanock 1985; May 1983; 
Schmidt 1992).
The first inkling of this new and somewhat uneasy partnership came in the Native marriages 
Ordinance of 1912. While the ordinance, as outlined above, criminalized the practice of child 
pledging, it also lifted restrictions on the amount of lobola that could be paid for a bride (Schmidt 
1990). This concession to pressure from chiefs and elders also coincided with the broader 
commercial interests of the administrators. The 1916 Natives Adultery Punishment Ordinance, 
however, had no other motive than the appeasement of the rural male elite. Nonetheless, the 
decidedly European interpretation of adultery contained in the act illustrated that African men 
were still very much the junior partners in the alliance. The African lobby demanded that only the 
male partner in adultery should be punished. This approach was in accordance with the indigenous 
view of men as having authority over, and therefore responsibility for, the behaviour of women.
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In the event, however, the Ordinance stipulated that both partners in the act of adultery were 
subject to a penalty of £100, thereby recognizing women as legal individuals. This 
acknowledgement, however, was couched within the gender and race ideologies of European 
administrators. Adultery, then, only occurred between an African man and a married African 
woman. This definition did not cover sexual intercourse between married African men and 
unmarried African women or European men and African women of any marital status (Jeater 
1993; Schmidt 1990). While the 1916 Natives Adultery Punishment Ordinance can be interpreted 
as a lukewarm victory for African patriarchal values, the 1917 Native Marriages Ordinance 
appeared to confirm their ascendancy. The Ordinance required the registration of all African 
marriages. This, in turn, demanded a definition of'customary1 marriage and the official recognition 
of the authority of chiefs and headmen to act as witnesses to the fact that a marriage conformed 
to 'traditional' standards (Jeater 1993). The 1917 Marriage Ordinance can be seen as marking the 
break in colonial legislation between the pursuit of modernity and the preservation of tradition. 
In this change of policy, women were the biggest losers. The institutionalization of 'custom' 
denied women the informal routes to increased power and status offered by pre colonial Shona 
societies. Under colonial definitions of'customary' law, women were formally defined as jural 
minors (Ncube 1987). Moreover, the state definition of public offices, such as headman and chief 
officially precluded women from taking up those positions (Schmidt 1992).
The legislative reinforcement of patriarchal power in rural areas was further bolstered by 
economic processes. The monetization of bridewealth, which was consolidated during the 20s, 
enabled even the smallest of land holders to accrue wealth and, consequently, expand ties of 
patronage (Jeater 1993). Yet, despite these legal and economic developments, rural women still
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found opportunities to assert their independence. Early legislation could still be used by women 
as a means of protecting themselves against male threat. By the nineteen twenties one colonial 
official was able to observe that, ‘most native women are well aware that they cannot legally be 
forced into marriage against their will and refusals are far from uncommon’ (CNC S138/150, NC 
Inyanga, 7 March 1924, cited in Schmidt 1990:139). Moreover, as the Native Commissioner of 
Chipinga observed, girls often appeared before the registering officer, supposedly to give their 
consent to a union, but instead claiming that they were being forced into an unwanted marriage 
(Schmidt 1990:639). Women also used the loopholes in the Native Marriage Ordinances to evade 
prosecution under the Native Adultery Punishment Ordinance. The 1917 Ordinance ruled that an 
African marriage was invalid unless registered. Women charged with adultery could claim that, 
if their marriages were not registered, they were legally single and therefore innocent of the 
charges. This loophole could also be used as a means of claiming custody of children (Jeater
1993).
Women also continued to make the most of available markets and economic opportunities. The 
construction of a number of railway lines across the country increased women’s means of escape 
from rural areas (Jeater 1993). Barnes suggests that from the 1920s onwards an increasing 
number of women travelled around the colony (Barnes 1992). One of the older women in Mabika 
recounted how, as an unmarried girl, she had gone to Mutare to sell some produce at the market 
and had then got on a train to Harare (Salisbury), just to see what it was like. Many of the women 
who travelled, however, were specifically looking for markets to sell agricultural produce and 
other goods. The periodic sale of various produce in urban areas provided an important source 
of income for women in nearby rural areas (Barnes 1992). Other women started brewing beer for
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miners or entered into short term domestic arrangements with single men.
Whatever the source of women's income, once they had earned it they made every effort to use 
it in their own interests rather than handing it over to male relatives. Indeed, the monetization of 
the economy and, consequently, bridewealth payments allowed women, in some cases, to buy 
themselves out of the lineage system. The daughter of Chief Ndzimende, a woman called Emily, 
was pledged to marry a man against her choice. In 1926 she found herself work as a domestic 
servant to an European. With the money she earned, Emily sent her father £4 10s to replace four 
cattle given as bridewealth by the man to whom she was pledged (Jeater 1993:251). While Emily, 
as the daughter of a chief, was not typical, many women used wages to purchase cattle and other 
goods which they then claimed as their own. Whereas husbands could often claim the cash 
earnings of women, they had less hold over material goods bought with that money (Kazembe 
1986). Women's entry into the labour market, then, also entailed introduction to ideas about 
property rights over both material goods and their own persons.
Yet this process was neither straightforward nor necessarily liberating. As the decade progressed 
Rhodesia's economy stagnated then sunk towards recession and women's income earning 
opportunities declined. An increasing number of women turned to prostitution. Moreover, the 
going rate had declined from 10 to 15 shillings per night in 1910 to 5 shillings by 1920. During 
the 1930s, women exchanged sex for credit tokens (Weinrich 1979). The freedom of the market, 
then, also entailed the necessity to earn cash in order to survive. And many women could only 
claim ownership of their bodies and sexuality in order to sell them.
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The increased mobility of women during the twenties was increasingly regarded with hostility by 
African men and colonial administrators alike. Government officials in a Native Department 
conference of 1927 observed that ‘natives in the reserves and other places (have) pointed out the 
freedom with which women can proceed, for instance, from Marandellas to the Salisbury location 
or Salisbury town; they live here for a week or a month or longer, and there is no check on their 
movements, and nobody questions what they are doing in town. What are these people doing 
here? They cannot be selling their grain or chickens’ (Salisbury conference of SONs and NCs 
1927, 53, S235/493 cited in Barnes 1992:595). By the end of the twenties, administrators and 
chiefs were in agreement on the need to pass legislation to restrict the mobility and independence 
of women. In 1929, the Native Marriages Ordinance was amended so that unregistered marriages 
were not invalid for the purposes of the law (Jeater 1993). Women could no longer use non 
registration as a means of avoiding prosecution for adultery or for claiming custody of their 
children. The 1936 Native Registration Act stipulated that in order to enter an urban area, all 
'unmarried' women, as well as married women who did not meet exemption criteria, were required 
to obtain passes from an authorised state official. In 1939, the native commissioner of Salisbury 
ruled that female visitors to the city would only receive a pass if their husband or guardian 
consented (Barnes 1992; Schmidt 1990). Avenues of escape, opened by colonial legislation during 
the first decades of European occupation, had now been blocked off.
3.7 Community development
The collaboration between African elders and colonial administrators was based, as outlined 
above, on the officials' concern with maintaining order. Government administrators had come to
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believe that, ‘unless the government supported African men in exercising 'their rights over the 
wives,’ not only the family but the whole existence of a nation' could be placed in jeopardy’ 
(Schmidt 1992:104). The driving concern of the administration was to retain their minority rule 
over the majority black population (Jeater 1993). Legislation that restricted women's civil 
citizenship rights was, ultimately, a pay-off for men's exclusion from full political citizenship. Yet, 
as the economic hardships of the thirties depression worsened, the value of this pact to African 
men decreased. From the government's point of view, the changing economy, and perceived 
potential unrest, necessitated a shift in policy. The decline of conditions in the Reserves and the 
expanding demand for a stable industrial labour force pointed to the need to end the migratory 
labour system and its attendant social and political dangers . A two pronged approach was 
adopted to meet these problems. On the one hand, certain sections of African population were 
to be modernised. On the other, the power of the traditional authorities in the rural areas was to 
be bolstered. A policy of indirect rule, promoted as 'community development' was consequently 
adopted (Bratton 1978); Phimister 1986; Worby 1994).
The introduction of 'development' policies in Southern Rhodesia, then, entailed the distinction 
between modem and primitive Africans. While the wives of the urban elite might enjoy the 
dubious benefits of being classified as 'civilized', women in the rural areas faced the strengthened 
collaboration of traditional authorities and colonial administrators. No longer able to seek redress 
from colonial legislation or officials, women sought means of assistance and advance among other 
sections of the colony. Missions and missionaries provided an avenue of escape from rural 
subordination (Stott 1990;Weinrich 1979). The expansion of rural welfare programmes, often 
initiated by the bored wives of Native Commissioners, provided a further counter voice to the
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dominant discourse of female subordination (Ranchod-NIlsson 1992). One of these initiatives, to 
be discussed in chapter six, resulted in the Family Planning Association of Rhodesia.
The need for ‘development’, as perceived by the Rhodesian authorities, was itself the product of 
earlier colonial policies. The resettlement of the African population on poor quality, small acreage 
holdings in the Tribal Trust Lands inevitably affected peasant production. By the early 1930s male 
wages had surpassed food production as the determining factor in household survival. In 1903, 
the sale of produce accounted for about 70 per cent of Africans' total cash earnings. By 1932 the 
percentage value of agricultural crops had fallen to 20 per cent of household income. Levels of 
poverty in the rural areas were exacerbated during the Great Depression when many men lost 
their jobs in the towns and mines. An increasing number of rural women were forced to seek 
temporary employment on European farms for wages which fell below even the minimal level paid 
to men. (Schmidt 1992). The colonial government responded to declining peasant production 
with the introduction of legislation to compel 'correct' methods of land and livestock management. 
Native Commissioners were empowered to regulate the number of cattle that Africans owned. 
During the 1940s, a policy of cattle destocking was implemented. But it was clear, by the end of 
the decade, that this was no solution to land shortage in the reserves (Iliffe 1987). And while 
demand for urban industrial labour was expanding, administrators were haunted by the spectre 
of the anonymous mass of detribalized Africans inhabiting the towns. The solution, in the eyes 
of government officials, was to create two separate, but stable, populations. One was to be fast 
track, civilized and urban, the other second rate and rural. This policy necessitated an end to the 
migrant labour system which would encourage the mixing of the two groups. The Land 
Husbandry Act of 1951 was an attempt to put this policy into place through measures to
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encourage individual registration of plots and fixed, continuous cultivation (Worby 1994). In 
practice, these measures only served to exacerbate problems of both landlessness and soil erosion 
and added to the discontent of African peasants (Bratton 1978; Ranger 1985). Furthermore, the 
registration of land instituionalised the loss of women’s land that had already been taking place 
as the result of economic pressures (Schmidt 1992).
Policies of agricultural control were followed by political and administrative segregation. 
Electoral qualifications were designed, from the outset, to exclude African men. In 1898 the vote 
was open to all men who were British subjects over 21 and literate enough to fill out the 
application form, provided they had an income of £50 per annum, occupied property or buildings 
worth £375 or owed a mining claim. These financial qualifications effectively meant that only 
Europeans, and until 1919 only European men, were eligible to vote. These financial criteria were 
raised every time inflation threatened to open the floodgates to African qualification (Leys 1959). 
Yet, from 1930 onwards, the rise of black nationalist political consciousness fed the 
administrators' fear of the entry of Africans into the world of democratic politics (Worby 1994). 
In order to dam this potential flood, the Rhodesian government decided to take limited pre 
emptive measures. The government appointed electoral commission decided that a limited number 
of African men should be admitted to the electoral register through the creation of a special 
qualification of an annual income of £180.The 1957 Report of the Southern Rhodesian Franchise 
Commission considered that an African in this class had ‘proved himself a citizen’ (The Tredgold 
Report 1957 cited in Leys 1959:225).
The bulk of rural peasants were to be given the so called opportunity to develop their political
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skills through the adoption of a policy of community development. The Prime Minister's Directive 
of July 1965 described the programme as ‘an active, planned and organized effort to place 
responsibility for decision making in local affairs on the freely chosen representatives of 
responsible people at community and government levels, and to assist people to acquire the 
attitudes, knowledges, skills and resources required to solve, through communal self-help and 
organization, as wide a range of local problems as possible in their own order of priority’ (cited 
in Holleman 1970:260). Here, then, while the urban elite was to be granted limited political rights, 
those in the rural areas were invited to define their own ‘felt needs’. Local self-reliance was to 
be encouraged by the delegation of certain legislative and financial powers to decentralized 
African councils. This approach culminated in the African Councils Act of 1957 which provided 
for the establishment of elected institutions that could impose rates and by laws. Before long, it 
became clear that these were merely gestures towards decentralization and participation (Worby
1994). The switch to a policy of community development, in reality, marked little more than a 
shift from direct to indirect rule (Bratton 1978). In practice, it was the powers of the chiefs that 
were enhanced. In 1951, the government created chiefs' provincial assemblies as vehicles for 
expressing African views on legislation. The 1957 act allowed chiefs to nominate members of the 
council. Successive acts restored their jurisdiction over legal cases (Kriger 1992).
The continuing concern of chiefs to maintain their authority over rural women was evidenced by 
the results of the 1973 committee, appointed to investigate laws affecting marriage and family life. 
The committee consisted of four male senators - two Europeans and two chiefs. The committee 
argued that, ‘tribal authorities recognize that the Africans, especially women, are becoming 
emancipated and are in the process of casting aside family and tribal ties. However, the tribal
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authorities do not want to see a wholesale severance of these ties by legislative action because 
they think that this will encourage young women to leave the tribal areas for towns where they 
will enter into casual employment, work until they are no longer capable of doing so and then 
return to the family to be maintained, having brought nothing into the family by way of lobola or 
personal savings. We recommend that customary law should not be changed by legislative 
direction merely to make it conform to 'western' practices’ (1976 Report of the Select Committee 
of the Senate on testate and interstate succession cited in Weinrich 1979:129).
Women's opportunities, given the collaboration between chiefs and administrators, to escape rural
•fewer
subordination, were A than in the early decades of colonialism. Yet women still found spaces 
for manoeuvre. One of these was the church. Whereas in the first part of the nineteenth century, 
women had asked missionaries for support in negotiating the legal system and avoiding forced 
marriages, many women now wanted to enter the mission as ‘Brides of Christ’. Entry into the 
church provided them with an education, as well as refuge from the hardship of rural life (Schmidt 
1992; Stott 1990;Weinrich 1979). Two women interviewed in Mabika had female relatives who 
had joined one of the missions in the area during the sixties.
Another, less well documented, counter voice to the dominant discourse came in the form of 
welfare programmes. State sponsored rural development initiatives provided important channels 
through which the central state tried to manage rural social relations at the local level without 
disrupting bifurcated structures of social authority (Munro 1996:6). National projects, which 
bypassed African councils and which were beyond community control, were defined to include 
a wide gamut of 'primary development' measures such as health (Bratton 1978). However
95
insubstantial the claims, the language of'development' and 'needs' inevitably posed a counter voice 
to the prevalent declarations of tradition and custom. While many of these programmes, such as 
agricultural extension services, were primarily aimed at men, some government supported social 
and welfare programmes, including the family programme discussed in chapter six, had women 
as their targets. The women's club movement, for example, was initiated by European wives of 
civil servants and later found government backing. Club meetings provided demonstrations for 
rural women in domestic skills such as cookery, sewing, knitting, hygiene, nutrition and childcare. 
The club organizers emphasized what they thought to be the similar concerns of women across 
class and race lines and the idea that women should help each other with slogans such as ‘each 
one, teach one’. However conservative the premises of the movement, these clubs provided a 
space for women to gather and discuss their own felt needs'. These turned out to be very different 
from the definition o f ‘needs’ imposed from above. By the mid 60s, the membership of women's 
clubs had massively expanded and members were demanding additional training in skills that were 
certainly not part of the original emphasis on homecraft. The focus of the clubs was forced to 
switch from teaching domestic skills to providing education in areas such as agricultural methods, 
leadership, club management, literacy and communications (Ranchod-Nilsson 1992). Women, 
then, continued to make the most of any opportunity to claim a broader set of entitlements when 
it suited their interests to do so.
3.8 Conclusion
As Mamdani argues, one of the most enduring effects of the colonial period in Africa was the 
creation of a dual citizenship through the construct of customary law (Mamdani 1996). This
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determined a pattern of differential entitlements, shaped by ethnicity and gender, which has 
persisted until today. If, however, customary law was the product of the pact between the 
Southern Rhodesian state and an African patriarchy, that partnership, and the power of colonial 
law, was never total. As outlined above, the relationship shifted over the decades of colonial rule 
as a consequence of the ongoing struggles between, and among, rulers and ruled. Perhaps the 
most telling point in this history, as Kesby suggests, is not that state and elders were prepared to 
form a partnership to bolster male authority, but that men were able to maintain their power at 
all in the face of extremely adverse conditions (Kesby 1996). The fragility of this pact was always 
underlined by the presence of counter voices suggesting different alignments. If the dominant 
discourse was one of women as subjects to their male kin, different discourses recognised women 
as individuals with specific needs and rights. The existence of competing state and non-state 
organisations, as well as different and conflicting legal systems, has meant that women have 
always had a range of entitlements to claim. Wherever possible, women used these claims to their 
advantage. The reasons why some were rejected in favour of others were not straightforward. 
While women may have appealed to the colonial state through the deployment of liberal values 
such as natural justice and equity, women's objectives did not necessarily coincide with 
liberalism's goals of individual freedom and autonomy. Although some women used opportunities 
to pursue a life outside the patrilineage, many took what they could from colonial rule to improve 
their position within customary family relations. Moreover, the supposed neutral universality of 
liberal politics and processes, such as the market, masked different sets of gender ideologies. As 
I will discuss in the next chapter in relation to the war years in Mabika, women often paid a high 
price for apparent liberation.
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Chapter 4
Gender And Citizenship In Contemporary Zimbabwe
In this chapter, I examine the Zimbabwean government’s attempted reforms of colonial 
citizenship institutions and the consequent reality of civil, social and political citizenship for 
women in Mabika. Women gained formal citizenship rights, status as full legal individuals and the 
right to vote, after Independence. For the first time women were granted a direct de jure 
relationship with the state. Critics have suggested, however, that while the rhetoric and hopes of 
the war years suggested that women would be incorporated into the new Zimbabwe as 
independent and equal, the reality has been that they remain identified as dependant mothers and 
wives. There has been piecemeal reform, but women’s autonomy has not been systematically 
inscribed through legislative change. The dual legislative system remains intact and, within 
customary laws, women continue to be defined as the dependants of men (Cheater and 
Gaidzanwa 1996; Jacobs and Howard 1987; Ncube 1996). Thus, in Mabika, women’s lives are 
still governed by the patriarchal norms of customary law. Lack of sustained government action 
on social issues means that these women are unable to own land and have unequal access to 
education and, consequently, employment. I argue that women’s continuing exclusion from social 
and economic processes is, at least partially, the product of government action to win the support 
of rural male elites. As under the colonial regime, the government has reinforced institutions of 
patriarchal authority as a means of keeping the support of rural men excluded from any 
meaningful political participation (Alexander 1995; Munro 1995; Mw Makumbe 1996). The 
Zimbabwean government has done little to break down the colonial hierarchy of citizenship based 
on differences of class, race and gender.
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As discussed in the theoretical chapter, van Gunsteren provides a three level framework for the 
analysis of citizenship. He argues that citizenship can be examined as a theoretically constituted 
object of political thought, at the level of the formal institutions of citizenship and in terms of its 
of its concrete realisation through street level bureaucrats. This chapter focuses on the institutions 
of citizenship: the rights and rules defining citizens’ entitlements in Zimbabwe (van Gunsteren 
1978). This analysis is based upon both secondary sources and field date from Mabika. In the first 
section of the chapter, I discuss the discrepancy between nationalist expectations of gender 
reform and the reality of ZANU’s rule. Analysis of women’s experiences during the war years 
suggest that feminist faith in ZANU’s commitment to gender equality was misplaced. In the 
second part of the chapter I examine the government’s attempts at first political then civil and 
social reform. In each section, I examine the de facto reality of formal entitlements for women 
in Mabika. In the next chapter, I discuss the impact of women’s de facto social and economic 
entitlements on household gender relations and women’s reproductive strategies.
4.1 The War of Liberation: Nationalist Expectations
The Zimbabwe African National Union ( ZANU) entered, and won, the first national election in 
March 1980 as a self-proclaimed party of Marxism-Leninism. ZANU, under the leadership of 
Robert Mugabe, won 57 seats, largely supported by the majority Shona, while Joshua Nkomo’s 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) gained 20 seats mainly in Ndebele areas (Sithole 
1986). The declared socialist agenda of the liberation movement and the new government created 
high expectations, at least among academics and activists, of radical reform of Zimbabwean
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society. By 1990, however, Mugabe had created a one party state 16, abandoned its programme 
of gender reform and had only resettled a tiny percentage of the peasant population. The failure 
of the government to deliver on the promised programme of redistribution of political and 
economic resources led to debates about the nature of the post colonial state. Academic 
commentators, seeing Zimbabwe through the framework of the revolutionary mythology of the 
united struggle for liberty, argued that Zimbabwe was in a ‘transitionary’ phase on the road to a 
Marxist utopia, or was a reformist, rather than revolutionary socialist government (Davies 1988). 
More embittered Marxists opined that the revolution had been betrayed by the black petite 
bourgeoisie who had taken power from the hands of the whites (Moore 1991). As Moyo argues, 
however, both these views depend upon a pre-determined model of Zimbabwean history and, 
consequently fail to illuminate the complexities of political reality (Moyo 1992). More recent 
analyses have portrayed Zimbabwean politics since Independence as the outcome of the struggles 
of social groups with different interests competing for their share of political and economic 
resources (Jirira 1995;Moyo 1992). As in the colonial era, the government has attempted to 
maintain control by forming partnerships with powerful sections of society at the expense of the 
majority of rural inhabitants(Alexander 1995). But, again, as with the colonial regime, this process 
has never been total or gone uncontested (Werbner 1997).
The easy sacrifice of gender reform by the Independent government has led to a rethinking of the 
issue of gender relations during the liberation war. Early analyses of the liberation war presented
16 ZANU and ZAPU had been amalgamated as ZANU-PF. In theory, Zimbabwe has a multi-party 
constitution. In practice, first ZANU and then ZANU-PF have dominated elections, however, since Independence. 
Sylvester suggests this hegemony is the consequence of command of resources and, hence, patronage as well as 
outright political intimidation (Sylvester, 1995). As Chakaodza argues, then, Zimbabwe is a de facto one party state 
(Chakaodza, 1993).
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these years as a period of change and opportunity for women. This interpretation has prompted 
the question of why apparent gains made by women during the war years did not last beyond 
Independence (Folbre 1988; Jacobs and Howard 1987; Seidman 1984). Subsequent analyses, 
however, suggest that these initial nationalist interpretations romanticised the liberation movement 
as a whole and women’s role within the war effort (Kesby 1996; Kriger 1992; Nhongo- 
Simbanegavi 1997;Stott 1990). As Mandaza argues, while ‘revolutionary myths’ might be a 
crucial part of the struggle, their continuation after fighting has ceased only serves to mask the 
less glorious political realities of the present. The danger arises, however, when this mythology 
is in turn imbibed by the analyst, academically refined, and then reimposed onto the 
characterisation of social and political processes in a given society. The danger is compounded 
if the analyst is largely removed from the dynamics of those processes; and more so if, in a 
particular historical conjuncture, the objects of analysis are themselves either unable to expose 
these new myths or find it convenient to integrate the latter into their own mythology about the 
struggle. (Mandaza 1986:4). Recent analyses of peasant women’s war experiences, then, suggest 
a more complex and grimmer tale of war than that told by the nationalists. This story is as much 
about nationalist violence against women as against the Rhodesian forces (Nhongo-Simbanegavi 
1997). These new interpretations, in turn, shed a different light on contemporary gendered 
citizen-state relations. Discussions with women in the area of fieldwork suggest that, if there has 
been a lasting legacy from these years, it is one of distrust of the state and its agents. While state 
resources were to be taken went there was an opportunity, they could not be relied upon and 
neither could its employees.
The war, which lasted 14 years, was largely fought in the rural areas by the two main parties of
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the nationalist movement: ZANU and ZAPU and their respective military wings ZANLA and 
ZIPRA. ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas conducted a clandestine struggle against the Rhodesian 
security forces supported by village committees which the liberation forces set up to replace state 
backed authorities (Lan 198); Maxwell 1993; Ranger 1985). Initial accounts of the war painted 
a tale of heroic and united struggle against the colonial state. Ranger’s view of peasant 
participation in guerrilla activities was paramount in shaping this nationalist interpretation of 
liberation politics. Ranger argued that while middle class nationalist leaders were fighting to 
obtain full political citizenship, the rural population willingly joined in the struggle, fired by a 
‘peasant consciousness’, in order to regain their land. The nationalist movement was thus, 
according to Ranger, underpinned by a broad consensus tied by the aim of overthrowing the white 
Rhodesian government (Ranger 1985).
Feminist writers were quick to argue that women, both urban middle class and rural peasants, 
were part of this apparent consensus, and also willingly joined in the struggle. Women, it was 
argued, insisted on their right to participate as combatants, and went to Mozambique to be trained 
as fighters, despite initial male resistance (Gaidzanwa 1992; Nyasha and Rose 1983). According 
to this early interpretation of the war years, women who remained in the rural areas were also 
keen to contribute to the struggle. Weiss quotes one peasant woman who states that ‘ Women 
were more politically conscious, more revolutionary and more involved in the armed struggle, 
because the war was happening in the rural areas - where the women were - (cited in Weiss 
1986:79). Young men (mujibas) and women (chimbwidos) worked for the guerrillas as scouts 
and suppliers of provisions. Older women joined in the clandestine village committees which 
organised local affairs in support of the guerrillas (Ranchod-Nilsson 1992; Staunton 1990).
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Nationalist accounts of the liberation war also suggest that ZANU and ZAPU followed a socialist 
feminist agenda. Weinrich, for example, writing in 1979, has little doubt that the new government 
will abolish bridewealth. From this perspective, the war represented a period when gender 
relations were renegotiated to women’s advantage. The shape of the future life in Zimbabwe is 
slowly emerging in these camps. Often women have to fight for recognition as equals. One 
woman said that when a group of fighters returned late at night and wanted food, they always 
woke up some women comrades to cook for them. The women in the military and refugee camps 
are unanimous in their expectations for the future Zimbabwe: 96% demand and expect that in a 
free Zimbabwe all sexual discrimination will fall away and men and women will have equal access 
to jobs* (Weinrich 1979:45).
Later analyses, however, question both women’s commitment and the concern of ZANU and 
ZAPU with gender equality. Seidman suggests that ‘in retrospect, it is possible to see that many 
party leaders only paid lip service to women’s rights in order to mobilize women for the war 
effort. During the struggle, however, it was not clear that party leaders were not, in fact, 
committed to emancipating women’ (Seidman 1984:428). Gaidzwana also baldly states that 
women were mobilized for instrumental reasons and notes the guerrilla’s invocation of heroines 
such as Nehanda, who fought in the nineteenth century struggles against the colonial rulers, as 
a means of galvanizing women’s support (Gaidzanwa 1992).
Kriger’s analysis of guerrilla activities marks a challenge to Ranger’s view of a rural consensus 
with the suggestion that the pattern of warfare was shaped by local conflicts rather than 
nationalist concerns. The war between guerrillas and the state, it is argued, provided a framework
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within which social battles between elders and juniors, men and women, continued to take place. 
Young girls and men ran away to the guerrilla camps not out of fervent support for nationalist 
aims but as a means of escaping oppressive relationships in the village. Women welcomed the 
guerrillas into the villages as they were able to call on them to mediate in cases of domestic 
violence. Older women were given responsibility for organising provisions giving peasant women 
control over important aspects of logistical decision making (Gaidzanwa 1992; Kriger 1992). 
Equally, as Kesby argues, male ‘peasant consciousness’ had a distinctly patriarchal agenda. 
Freedom from the colonial state, it was hoped, would give older men greater authority in their 
communities and homes (Kesby 1996).
As Phimister suggests, ‘On the one hand, armed struggle opened up the prospect of revolutionary
transformations of both the land question and the position of women. Yet it also accommodated
conservative and patriarchal class forces* (Phimister 1988:8). While, in some cases, the war
■these
opened up new opportunities for women, were framed within continuing relations of gender 
subordination (Kesby 1996). The presence of the guerrillas, then, may have provided women with 
escape routes from traditional patriarchal relationships but it did not necessarily offer an 
alternative to male domination. The organisation of peasant support, for example, was carried out 
along the lines of a strictly conservative division of labour. Girls cooked, washed and cared for 
the guerrillas. Boys acted as scouts and lookouts. Moreover, much of this activity was forced 
through the use of violence, and particularly rape, of local populations by the resident combatants 
(Kesby 1996; Kriger 1992; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 1997). As the testimonies from women in the 
area of fieldwork suggest, it is the violence of the relations with the guerrillas, rather than the 
opportunities provided by their presence, which have left the most deeply etched legacy.
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4.2 Women and war in Mabika
The different ways in which guerrillas and village populations interacted varied from region to 
region, depending on geographical factors as well as existing local social relations. The degree 
of coercion used by guerrillas was likely to vary depending on the extent to which control of a 
particular area was seen as crucial (Schmidt 1996). Mabika was, according to informants, seen 
as a site of great strategic importance as it was situated on the Mozambiquan border and was at 
the centre of the irrigation network. Interviews largely confirmed the guerrilla’s use of coercion 
and violence. Mrs Muchuro recounted that, ‘the village women had their duties to carry out for 
the comrades. They had to cook for the guerrillas. They also had to cook for their girlfriends. The 
village women had to serve the comrades and their girlfriends on their knees. If you tripped while 
you were serving and dropped the food, then you would be beaten. The comrades would say that 
their ancestors had made you trip because you were about to serve them poison. The comrades 
and their girlfriends never wanted to eat vegetables. They only wanted to eat meat. So then if you 
were found hiding hens from the comrades they would beat you. Some women were also killed 
because the girlfriends said - “this one is a witch.’”
Some women reported that they had been beaten on account of their husband’s activities. One 
man from the village worked as a policeman for the Rhodesian government. It was rumoured that 
he had been involved in a number of killings as well as torture and electrocution of guerrillas. 
Someone in the village informed on him and he was killed. He had six wives who were all taken 
and beaten with a cow stick by the guerrillas. Another woman in the village also had a husband 
who was a policeman. Someone, rumoured to be a relative, told the guerrillas of his whereabouts.
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They captured him and brought him back to his homestead in the village. His wife was forced to 
watch the guerrillas shoot him and she was then told to take her children and leave the village.
A number of women reported that either they themselves, or their daughters, had been raped 
during the war. Some of these women had, subsequently, bome illegitimate children. Mrs Gunera 
said that, ‘many women were raped during the war. The guerrillas just came and could take a wife 
for a few days, even if they were already married. Many women were impregnated by the soldiers. 
The women would be in trouble with their husbands unless someone had witnessed them being 
raped, because the husband would doubt that they had been forced into having sex.’ While 
nationalist analyses portrayed the guerrilla camps as providing a positive model of egalitarian 
gender roles (Weinrich 1979), women informants perceived the soldiers’ behaviour to be a 
catalyst for a general deterioration in relations between men and women. ‘During my time, 
women might get pregnant and fail to marry the father, but this was quite rare. Things changed 
during the war. Soldiers impregnated girls and did not marry them. It was the soldiers who 
introduced this habit.’
While in some cases, as Gaidzanwa and Kriger suggest, women may have been able to use the 
presence of outside forces to renegotiate gender relations, the accounts of informants suggest 
that, in general, women’s main consideration was one of survival. Few women were able to take 
advantage of the situation (Gaidzanwa 1992; Kriger 1992). Rosie recounted that, ‘during the war 
I was staying in Chibuku village. There was a lot of fighting in that place. There were some white 
people near Chibuku. They would beat and torture the women saying - you are the ones who feed 
the guerrillas, you know where they are staying. But then the comrades would also abuse the
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women - particularly young girls. They would take the young girls to their camps, make them 
cook for them and look after them, then rape and impregnate them. Then they would say - if you 
tell anyone that I am the father, I will kill you. So the young girls couldn’t even tell their mothers 
who the father of the child was. So when the whites were there, you had to say that you loved 
the whites and when the comrades were there, you had to say you loved the comrades.’ As I will 
discuss in the next chapter on household relations, many women in Mabika thought that the war 
years marked a deterioration in gender relations rather than a change for the better. The 
entwinement of local disputes with the organised forces of violence appears to have added an 
edge of brutality to social conflicts in the village.
Women’s experiences during the war years created a cynical, if not antagonistic, view of the 
Independent government. Women saw that the guerrillas who had abused them were now their 
rulers. Sara said that, ‘during the war, I was in Mabika. There were a lot of soldiers around...Lots 
of women were abused at this time. It happened to so many women. The guerrillas were the 
worst for this. People now think of the guerrillas as the ones who are in government.’ Another 
woman explained that ‘many women were raped during the war...Now these women hate the 
government because these soldiers now rule the country and they remember what the men did to 
them.’ Some women thought that the government only represented male interests. One woman, 
who had been raped by a soldier and consequently gave birth to a daughter, stated that, ‘lots of 
women were abused during the war. Now the government is giving money to the comrades who 
fought - but the women also had their own war. They were tortured and abused. They were the 
ones who cooked and served the comrades. This makes women very bitter. The government has 
never recognized what happened. There is nothing in the pipeline to suggest that the government
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is even thinking about this. And now they even have problems getting welfare for these children. 
The government doesn’t give them any money.’ Few women in Mabika who had lived through 
the war identified with the Zimbabwean state.
In legal terms, Independence marked women’s acquisition of formal citizenship. Many of the 
women in Mabika, however, felt that the new political order was predicated upon their violent 
subjugation rather than an ideology of gender equality. If nationalist academics and urban elites 
had high expectations of the new government, they were not necessarily shared by village women. 
As I will discuss in the next section, the reality of post Independence government reform has 
given women few reasons to change their opinions. The experience and memories of the liberation 
war underscores women’s continuing exclusion from social, economic and political processes in 
the public domain.
4.3 Political participation
Munro argues that the Independent government saw its first task, after coming to power, as the 
renegotiation of the ‘contours of citizenship’. Its aim, according to Munro, was to secure the 
state, rather than traditional authorities, as the final arbiter of the terms of local community 
membership (Munro 1995:108-109). The government, in the early years, pronounced its 
determination to take apart colonial institutions of citizenship and uproot traditional rural 
structures of authority. Its primary tools in this process were policies of decentralisation and the 
establishment of local level decision making bodies (Mw Makumbe 1996). At the bottom rung 
of this supposed ladder of upward participation were the Village Development Committees
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(VIDCOs). Munro argues that the VIDCOs were to serve the ideological purpose of expanding 
the realm of public institutions and discourse which underpinned the new national, inclusive 
citizenship. The VIDCOs were supposed to ‘establish an institutional/ideological forum for 
private citizens to congregate as a constituted public whose rights/membership in the community 
are underwritten by a state-centred public authority’ (Munro 1995:125). In practice, however, 
the VIDCOs merely served to perpetuate the colonial exclusion of particular groups, including 
women, from equal citizenship in the new Zimbabwe.
In many rural areas occupied by the guerrillas during the war, village committees had been set up 
to replace state authorities. These village organisations were, during this period, the effective 
centres of administration in the communal areas. They heard legal cases, allocated land and dealt 
with the provision of services. The state backed authority of the chiefs was discredited by the 
guerrillas. In some instances, chiefs themselves were killed for being representatives of the 
colonial state (Lan 1985; Maxwell 1993; Ranger 1985). It has been suggested, as discussed 
below, that in some areas these new organisations opened up opportunities for women to take 
part in local decision making processes. Yet, if the war did create spaces for women’s greater 
political participation, post Independence developments were to highlight the contingent nature 
of those opportunities (Alexander 1995; Kesby 1996). As soon as the guerrillas departed from 
the countryside, male elders used elections to village committees to re establish their authority 
and, in some areas, the process of finding replacement chiefs was set in motion (Ranger 1983).
The government was initially determined to halt reassertion of traditional authority in the form 
of the chiefs. To this end, the government placed local courts under the control of the Ministry
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of Justice17 and handed over the chiefs’ powers of land allocation to local government (Helmsing 
1991). The government also announced its intention to increase participation in local decision 
making processes. Rather than building on the structures set up during the war, however, the 
government replaced them with a new set of institutions. Senior ZANU officials were reluctant 
to empower rural party committees, formed during the struggle, that could act independently or, 
worse, in opposition to the government. The powers of these local war time committees were 
thus handed over to district councils, established from the top down. While the rural ZANU 
committees were involved in the initial creation of these councils, they were soon displaced by 
them (Alexander 1994).
In 1984, the government announced its plans for further decentralisation. In a speech to Local 
Government officials in 1984, Mugabe declared that the aim of decentralization was to bring 
about ‘a comprehensive and more democratic system of involving the local communities, both 
horizontally and vertically in the process of planning and effecting their development, thus 
providing the Government with a viable channel for receiving and assessing the developmental 
needs and priorities of the district, ward and village areas within the province’ (Speech by Robert 
Mugabe at the opening session of the Seminar for Provincial Governors. Cited in Mw Makumbe 
1996:38). The subsequent Provincial Councils and Administration Act of 1984 instituted a 
hierarchy of local organisations with the intention of allowing development priorities to be set 
from the bottom up. This hierarchy consisted of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), 
Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), District Councils and Provincial Councils. Each
17 The 1981 Customary Law and Primary Courts Act did away with the judicial authority of chiefs, 
headmen and district commissioners and instituted new primary courts at village and community level.
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VIDCO was to consist of a representative for every group of one hundred houses in a village. The 
WADCO was supposed to include representatives from six VIDCOs. One of the primary 
functions of the VIDCO was given as the identification and articulation of village needs (Mw 
Makumbe 1996).
In theory, local government institutions were supposed to constitute the lowest rung in the 
bottom up participation of villagers in decision making. But in practice, they have become nothing 
more than a means of implementing top-down national level policy initiatives (Munro 1996;Mw 
Makumbe 1996). VIDCOs and WADCOs were, from the start, staffed by local people. The 
government, however, reluctant to lose control over the rural areas, ensured that District and 
Provincial Councils were dominated by state appointed ‘experts’ and bureaucrats who could act 
as the mouth-piece for central policies (Alexander 1995; Munro 1995).In general the VIDCOs 
were starved of independent resources and so, had to present plans to the District Councils 
(Alexander 1994; Alexander 1995). Makumbe states, then, that where plans did emerged from 
the VIDCOs and WADCOS, they were largely ‘shopping lists of villagers’ demands and 
aspirations.’ The lack o f ‘technical expertise that is required in order to prepare and present 
developmental proposals which technocrats will appreciate’, meant that VIDCO plans were often 
dismissed by civil servants sitting on District and Provincial Councils (Mw Makumbe 1996). In 
practice, then, VIDCOs were expected to implement policies originating from central 
government. Many of these development policies, notably in the health and education sectors, 
entailed the further expansion of government offices in the communal areas (Helmsing 1991). 
Decentralisation, then, rather than allowing villagers greater participation in the structures of 
government decision making, appeared to be enhancing bureaucratic advance into rural life.
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If the government’s intention had been to uproot traditional structures of authority through the 
restructuring of local government reform, the VIDCOs did not achieve this. Local level action 
ensured that the chiefs and their headmen returned, if indeed they had ever gone away, to 
dominate rural political structures. Whatever rural people’s views on the institution of 
chieftainship, the ‘traditional’ system was preferred to the government’s attempts to impose the 
authority of state employed technocrats (Alexander 1995). As Werbner points out, in rural 
Zimbabwe there is a long history of locally effective resistance to technocracy and its top-down 
development plans (Werbner 1997). Pressure was exerted, in response to both local government 
measures and legal reforms discussed below, to reinstate the powers of the chiefs (Folbre 1988). 
The government soon gave in to the demands of the rural patriarchs. Following the establishment 
of the new district councils, The Ministry of Local Government decreed that chiefs should act as 
ex officio council members, even if village communities objected. Additionally, chiefs were to 
receive higher salaries than either elected local councillors or local party leaders. The move was 
justified, by senior ZANU officials, in terms of the need for reconciliation and through an appeal 
for the preservation of culture, custom and tradition (Alexander 1994). The inclusion of chiefs 
on local councils was the first in a series of concessions that bolstered their power in rural areas 
and thereby reinforced the ‘traditional’ patriarchal powers of male elders. (Maxwell 1993; 
Sylvester 1991). In 1985, Mugabe promised to return jurisdiction over local courts to the chiefs, 
a move which was legalized in 1990. In practice, this power had never been completely removed 
as it was often chiefs who served as local judges under the Ministry of Justice (Alexander 1995).
While chiefs were officially allowed onto District Councils, the evidence suggests that VIDCOs 
were, from their inception, unofficially dominated by local elites. Mw Makumbe notes the limited
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participation involved in the creation and establishment of VIDCOs and WADCOs (Mw 
Makumbe 1996). As Munro argues, they are commonly dominated by ‘local notables with 
particular interests - farmers and teachers. VIDCOs tend to reflect rather than to mitigate existing 
relations of local power’ (Munro 1995:130). Not surprisingly, then, few women have held formal 
positions in VIDCOs, WADCOs or District Councils (Chimedza 1987).
Although VIDCOs and WADCOs do not have the resources to implement local decisions, those 
who sit on the committees and councils are in a position to profit from the delivery of centrally 
originating services and resources (Alexander 1995). Consequently, as Cousins et al observe, in 
rural Zimbabwe political power and economic status tend to be mutually reinforcing. Evidence 
suggests that political power, through membership of VIDCOs and District Councils, has resulted 
in preferential access to development funding as well as key ecological resources, such as prime 
agricultural land. Thus, ‘within units such as lineages, villages or districts, a power elite who are 
likely to belong to a group of would-be rural accumulators, often benefit disproportionately from 
resource capture’ (Cousins and others 1992).
The attempts of the government, then, to create a participatory citizenship merely succeeded in 
reinforcing the political exclusion of already marginalized social groups. Organisations of local 
government have been dominated by a few rural notables, including chiefs and headmen. 
Decentralisation has given these organisations little control over the content of policy, which is 
largely decided at national level. Many rural men, not to mention the majority of rural women, 
have been left with little effective political voice. It has allowed, however, those who sit on local 
committees to control, and benefit from, the downward flow of benefits and resources. As
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Alexander states, ‘people in Zimbabwe’s rural areas were largely unable to influence 
policy-making processes; instead, patronage, squatting and opposition by traditional leaders 
dominated rural politics. Far from empowering the disadvantaged through democratic bodies, 
policies reinforced patriarchal authority within communities, thus helping to marginalize women, 
the young and the poor’ (Alexander 1995:180).
4.4 Political institutions and women’s participation in Mabika
Not all villagers in Mabika were willing to talk openly about local, or national, political 
institutions. National politics was a particularly sensitive issue as the area of fieldwork was known 
for its opposition to ZANU-PF. When informants did offer their opinions, however, their views 
confirmed the picture of local political institutions dominated by local elites who were more 
concerned with patronage than policy.
Mabika’s Village Development Committee was one of four VIDCOs which made up the local 
Ward Development Committee (WADCO). In addition to the council committees and meetings, 
village meetings were held primarily to discuss the irrigation system and health. As a general rule, 
few women said that they bothered going to village meetings. Some women said that it was their 
husband’s job to do deal with village affairs. Others said it was nothing to do with the fact that 
they were women, it was simply because the meetings were not worth the effort. People would 
go to meetings, as one woman explained, if they thought they might get something out of them; 
‘the government asks for cooperation, but people aren’t going to cooperate. If there is a meeting 
to give out loans, then hundreds of people will turn up. Then when it is time for the government
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to be repaid, well there will be no-one at the meeting.’ In general, then, women expressed a sense 
of weary cynicism about government organised meetings. It was not that they didn’t have the time 
to go. It was just that time could be better spent elsewhere. As one woman explained, ‘it is better 
to go to the church and the sewing club than meetings in the village. In church you can worship 
God. At the sewing club you make money. At village meetings you get nothing.’
There was, then, a general reluctance to participate in meetings arranged by government 
organisations. As I will discuss in chapter seven, health meetings were seen as a particular waste 
of time. Nonetheless, it was evident from observation that some women did attend local meetings 
concerned with agriculture and irrigation. During the meetings I observed, women did speak and, 
in some cases, appeared to take a leading role. One male informant suggested that there were, in 
fact, fewer restrictions on women taking a lead in village meetings than in the home. ‘Sometimes 
there are more men than women, depending on what the meeting is about. If there is a visitor 
from the government to be greeted, there will be more women than men. They will be doing the 
cooking and the singing - they are the ones who are concerned with cooking in the home - they 
go to these meetings to get the meat. Sometimes women can be at the forefront in meetings - it 
depends on your intelligence. Not like in the home, where men are the leaders in decision making. 
But in most cases, it is men who make the decisions and are more interested in what is going on 
in the village.’
The public space in between state and household, then, was seen as being less restricted by the 
rules of behaviour and authority, discussed in the next chapter, which governed household 
relations. There was no ‘rule’ concerning how women should behave in these meetings. As one
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woman suggested, ‘you just have to be fearless.’ Some women, suggested, however, that while 
all women could speak, in practice it was only the ‘well-ups’ who did. As Rosie explained, ‘if I 
go to a meeting, I can’t say anything. I just sit there and listen. If I wanted to say anything, I 
would just tell my husband to say it. The women who speak are usually the ones like Mrs Mutede 
- the Village Community Worker - the well-ups. They are not afraid to speak’. When women did 
bother to attend meetings, then their participation was shaped as much by relations of class as by 
gender.
Key informants were openly critical of what they perceived to local level political cronyism. Mrs 
Muchuro pointed out the wealth of present and ex councillors in the village. She implied that their 
economic success was the result of their political position and it wasn’t that they had been elected 
because they were good businessmen. ‘Look at Jack. He is a committee man. Look at how much 
land he has, and how many wives he has. He says he is a good farmer and so he makes money. 
But anyone can make more money if they have some to start with. Where did he get his money 
from in the first place? And then there is Mr Mutede [an ex councillor]. Now he has started his 
own taxi business. How did he manage that? All these men - they don’t give us anything. They’ve 
eaten our maize and now they are too fat to get into their t-shirts.Of course we resent them.’ 
Rosie said that, ‘it is impossible to even complain about the government or voice any sort of 
opinion, because there are some people in the village who are benefitting: the councillors, those 
on the committees, the well-ups. If there are goods coming into the village, then they will take 
their share. So you can’t complain to them because they are happy with the way things are. And 
they will fix you if you say anything.’ In chapter seven, I will examine how the operation of local 
level political institutions effects the delivery of family planning services in Mabika.
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The perceived misuse of political power and public resources shaped attitudes of men and women 
in Mabika towards the traditional institutions of chieftainship. People acknowledged the power 
and authority of the local headman and chief, but they had little respect for them. There was an 
on going dispute over a large amount of highly profitable agricultural land, in the nearby mountain 
region, between a state run plantation and the chief. The plantation managers confirmed that the 
outcome of the dispute depended upon the decision of the chief. The opinion of other state 
officials was largely irrelevant. Older women in Mabika thought that chiefs now had more power, 
but they had lost respect because they abused it. Sylvia recalled how, in the past, the chief had 
known his place and had acted as the authority of last resort. In times of emergency, if there was 
a problem which affected the whole village such as famine, he might call people together and look 
for solutions through discussion and through consultation of the ancestors. Now, she suggested, 
the chief and headmen wanted to be involved in all village decisions, but they had nothing wise 
to say. Tobius, a key male informant expressed his disdain for the local headmen during 
conversations about my research. I told Tobius I would ask for the headman’s permission before 
I started interviewing in the area. He replied that this was the correct way to proceed. Then he 
threw his arms in the air and said I shouldn’t waste my time with those ‘rubbish men’ because 
nobody cared what they thought anyway. Lack of respect for the institution of chieftainship had 
implications for the settlement of disputes. Family cases and arguments, which might once have 
been taken to the chief for settlement, were now more likely, as I discuss in the next chapter, to 
result in accusations of witchcraft and judgement by a spirit medium. As Alexander argues, in the 
rural areas inhabited by the Ndau, local inhabitants preferred the authority of the chief to that of 
state appointed technocrats. Their support for traditional forms of authority, however, stemmed 




The reassertion of traditional rural male elites in local politics was reflected, at the national level, 
in the government’s abandonment of legal reform for gender equality. In the early days of 
Zimbabwean rule, Mugabe proclaimed the government’s commitment to gender equality. ‘The 
principle of equality between men and women is basic to the political philosophy of our 
government. It is the objective of our government to create such an environment to make these 
objectives possible.’ (cited in Lapchick and Urdang 1982:8). In 1981, the Ministry of Community 
Development and Women’s Affairs (MCDWA) was established under the leadership of Teurai 
Ropa Nhongo, who had been one of the first women to be trained as a fighter (Batezat and others 
1988). The new Ministry set out to discover the ‘needs’ of Zimbabwe’s women. The subsequent 
survey, entitled ‘We Carry a Heavy Load’, documented women’s poor health, low literacy, lack 
of skills and formal employment opportunities and discrimination in terms of legal rights 
(Zimbabwe Women's Bureau 1981). Based on the findings of the survey, the Ministry drew up 
a radical plan of reform which included the abolition of lobola. The reconstitution of customary 
law, then, was top of the agenda of the new Ministry. Moreover, such legislative reform was in 
keeping with the government’s objective of inculcating a concept of citizenship based on national, 
rather than local, identity (Munro 1995).
Yet, in its foundations, the new de jure model of citizenship that the government introduced was 
gendered. The 1980 constitution specified race, creed and colour as causes of discrimination, but
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failed to include gender. In addition, family and customary law were exempted from constitutional 
regulation. In contrast to many other sections of the 1980 constitution, these provisions have not 
been amended. Moreover, it was not until 1996 that the government addressed the issue of the 
formal acceptance of a patrilineal model of access to citizenship. The outcome of this principle 
was that citizenship could only be acquired through male descent. While the foreign wives and 
children of Zimbabwean men could become citizens of Zimbabwe, the overseas husbands and 
children of Zimbabwean women could not. Customary law reinforced the notion that citizenship 
was defined according to the membership rules of particular patrilineages. The new Zimbabwean 
model of citizenship elevated this principle to the national level (Cheater and Gaidzanwa 1996). 
Subsequent attempts to reform legislation relating to women’s rights started from, rather than 
challenged, this double framework of gender differentiated citizenship.
Nonetheless, during the first years of its rule, the government did pass legislation which supported 
the formal rights of women, most notably the Legal Age of Majority Act of 1982. The Act 
reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 and conferred majority status on African women. The 
recognition of women’s status as full legal individuals meant that they could now sign contracts, 
acquire property in their own name and enter into marriage contracts without their parents 
consent (Gaidzanwa 1992). The Act, however, generated a strong reaction from chiefs and elders 
who saw it as undermining their parental authority. In response, Mugabe declared that the Act 
had been passed in order to enable women to vote, rather than amend their legal status under 
customary law. And, indeed, the details of the legislation supported Mugabe’s claim. In spite of 
the Act, two systems of law remain. Prior to the Act, African women had to have their guardian’s 
permission to marry under both civil and customary Law. Under the new Act consent was no
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longer required for civil marriage, but was still necessary for customary law marriages. 
Nonetheless, the Act did have implications for the application of some aspects of customary law, 
as the infamous 1984 case of Katekwe illustrated. Under customary law, a father was entitled to 
sue for damages for the seduction of his daughter. In the Katekwe case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the father could no longer claim damages because his daughter, under the Legal Age of 
Majority Act, was no longer a legal minor and, consequently, was not the property of her father 
(Ncube 1987). The outcome of the case led to strong protests. When the Prime Minister met with 
over 200 traditional chiefs in March of 1985, the Act was the biggest bone of contention (Jacobs 
and Howard 1987:32; Folbre 1988). But despite hints of repeal, the law remained on the statute 
books (Batezat and others 1988).
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1985 also caused uproar. The Act decreed that, at divorce, 
matrimonial property should be shared according to the court’s decision, even if the marriage was 
contracted under customary law. Moreover, it changed the procedure whereby the father 
automatically gained custody of the children. An anonymous official in the Ministry of Labour 
expressed the commonly held view that the payment of bridewealth entitled the husband to both 
property and children and that women only had a claim over the ‘kitchen ware’ (Kazembe 
1986:390).
From the outset, the plans of the small, under-resourced Ministry of Women were challenged by 
some ZANU leaders, who warned against the importation of western feminism and the 
undermining of tradition. At the same time there was a fierce public debate, carried out in the 
press, about the role of women in Zimbabwe. While socialist ideology might allow for women’s
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liberation, Shona and Ndebele tradition, it was argued, demanded that women should be dutiful 
mothers. Newspaper articles questioned whether women who fought in the war could make good 
wives. In March 1984, a vitriolic campaign against ‘baby dumping’ was initiated, with 
sensationalist reporting on abortion and cases of women who abandoned newborn babies 
(Gaidzanwa 1992; Jacobs and Howard 1987; Seidman 1984; Sylvester 1991).
Faced with this opposition, the MWCDA moderated its tone. From then on, its main objective 
was the development of educational and income generating projects for women, working within, 
rather than challenging, the existing framework of rural institutions (Seidman 1984). The 
weakness of the Ministry was clearly illustrated by its response to the round-up of several 
thousand women from the streets of Zimbabwe in 1983. The women were stopped while walking 
in public places and charged, under the Emergency Clause of the Vagrancy Act of 1960 with 
prostitution. The women were held in prisons or police stations and only released on the 
presentation of marriage certificates or proof of employment (Gaidzanwa 1987). The most 
notable feature of this episode was ‘the silence of the ministry of women’s affairs and its complete 
inability to defend black women from state harassment and the violation of their human rights.’ 
(Gaidzanwa 1992:115).
Gaidzwana argues that the round ups marked a shift in the government’s position towards women 
and the beginning of their ‘re-domestication’ after the war years. This sea change, Gaidzwana 
suggests, was symbolically marked by the decision to name Harare’s largest maternity hospital 
after Nehenda, the female spirit medium who was known for her role in fighting the settlers and 
not, up until that point, for her maternal instincts (Gaidzanwa 1987). Her identification as patron
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of child birth underlined the reality of women’s relations to the state. They were not to be 
identified and incorporated as independent, but as wives and mothers. As Pateman observes of 
western societies, ‘motherhood exists as a central mechanism through which women have been 
incorporated into the political order. Women’s political standing rests on a paradox; they have 
been included and excluded on the basis of the same attributes...women were included as 
subordinates,as “women”’ (Pateman 1992:19). Women’s subordinate status was reinforced in 
concrete terms in March 1985 when Mugabe promised the return of control over local courts to 
the chiefs in response to protests about legal reform (Folbre 1988;Jacobs and Howard 1987) .
The government, then, limply abandoned its programme of legal reform, confirming the expedient 
nature of ZANU’s commitment to gender equality in the first place. Munro comments that, ‘In 
raising the legal status of women in order to penetrate and reorient rural society, the government 
created the risk of antagonizing men. In the end, the government moved very gingerly in pressing 
through reforms, and by the end of the 1980s, gender issues were being edged off the public 
agenda’ (Munro 1995:126). Gender equality, then, was an easy sacrifice in the context of 
potential dissatisfaction, among the rural male population, with the government’s programme of 
socialist reform.
4.6 Mabika
As Gaidzwana argues, in practice, the legislation that has been passed by the Zimbabwean 
government, such as the Legal Age of Majority Act, has had a differential impact on women. 
Black middle class women benefited most from the reforms as they had jobs, income and
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education which allowed them to make the most use of their new majority status both within and 
outside their marriages (Gaidzanwa 1992). Indeed, it was urban, middle class women’s groups 
that campaigned for these reforms during the 1980s (Davison 1997; Kesby 1996). For most rural 
women, the fact that majority status now allowed them to enter into contracts and acquire 
property independently is irrelevant. Moreover, as Kesby points out, for many women in the rural 
areas disputes never reach the courts but are settled within families according to ‘custom’. ‘In the 
villages where perceptions are influenced more by cultural discourse and practice than by statute, 
and where action has a long tradition of being outside “the law”, resistance to change is fierce’ 
(Kesby 1996:563). As outlined in the theoretical chapter, Armstrong labels locally understood 
rules and regulations as the ‘living law’. It is comprised of an evolving and contested mixture of 
perceptions of ‘traditional’ pre-colonial law and customary law (Armstrong 1997). As Kesby 
argues, the ‘living law’ is firmly entrenched in the lives and organisation of the majority of rural 
inhabitants in Zimbabwe (Kesby 1996). It is referred to as a means of settling the everyday 
disputes over land, birth, marriage, death which colonial rulers hoped to govern through 
customary law. While customary law under colonial rule, then, reinforced the authority of the 
‘living law’, the partial reform of customary and national law under the Independent government 
has not, by itself, overturned entrenched ‘tradition’(Armstrong and others 1993; Ncube 1987; 
Schuler 1992). In the next chapter I examine local understandings of one of the central concerns 
o f‘living law’ - the terms and conditions of the marital contract, in this section, I briefly examine 
women’s understandings of living and customary law and mechanisms for dispute settlement.
In general, women in Mabika did not know about formal customary law, but perceived then- 
understanding of rules and traditions to be the one and only set of regulation. If I asked why
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certain procedures were followed, for example, why women had been made landless, I was told 
that it was ‘the law’. When I asked, whose law, the reply was generally, the ‘rule of the Ndau 
people’. It was these commonly understood rules that remained paramount in dispute settlement 
and not the content of customary law. Despite reform of customary laws as outlined earlier, a 
number of women said that the payment of bridewealth as compulsory, as the ‘rules’ required that 
it was necessary for a marriage to be valid. Research in the Ndau area confirms that only 7 per 
cent of all women aged between 13 and 49 had contracted a marriage under civil law. Of all 
women married, 83 per cent had marriages based on the exchange of bridewealth (Gregson and 
others 1996). A number of women I spoke to about this issue were also fervently convinced that, 
in the case of divorce, the ‘law’ ruled that children always went to the father. I will discuss the 
impact of these understandings of the law on household gender relations in the next chapter.
As in the colonial era, some women drew upon the state enforced legal system to better their 
position within the household. One woman, for example, having a registered civil law marriage 
had instigated divorce proceedings against her husband and claimed custody of her children 
through the courts. The majority of women, however, did not view the courts as an option in the 
settlement of family disputes. As indicated above, many women in Mabika were not sure about 
the content of formal customary law or the operation of the courts. Their uncertainty about the 
formal legal system was not helped by the fact that the nearest community court was situated in 
the main town of the district, half a day’s bus ride away. Some women in Mabika thought that 
the community court enforced the same rules that were in everyday operation in the village. The 
court was consequently seen as working in the favour of men. One woman said she had thought 
of going to court to try and claim maintenance from the father of her child. She was afraid,
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however, that the court might try and take the child away from her instead because the man had 
offered to marry her, but she had turned him down. The woman was sure that the judge would 
condemn her because she had refused to ‘love’ the man in question. Another woman had 
successfully obtained a court ruling specifying that the father of her child should pay maintenance. 
When the father refused to pay, however, the woman felt that she could not go back to court as 
she thought it unlikely that she would be iucky’ twice in a row. Women’s everyday existence, 
then, was governed by the ‘living law’. The ‘living law’ was, in turn, shaped by understandings 
of customary law introduced under the colonial regime. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
colonial legislation reinforced male authority in household relations. Attempts to increase 
women’s autonomy through piecemeal reform of customary law have had little impact on the 
everyday rules and norms which govern rural women’s existence.
Bourdillon states that in Shona families, serious quarrels or disputes are largely resolved within 
the family. An informal gathering of the senior men of the family listens to the evidence and offers 
solutions. When this mechanism fails, family disputes may be taken to the headman or chief 
(Bourdillon 1991). In Mabika, some family disputes and problems were settled in this way. One 
on-going dispute in the family of a key informant in Mabika concerned problems with bridewealth 
payment which had resulted in a rift between mother and daughter. The male head of the family 
was in South Africa. The eldest brother was left with authority over his sister and was able to 
instruct her both in her dealings with the proposed husband and her mother. In another case, there 
was a dispute between two male family members about health treatment for their mother. One of 
the sons wanted her to go to hospital, the other wanted her to see a traditional healer. In order 
to settle the disagreement, other senior members of the family were called together and a decision
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was made to send the mother to hospital. As indicated above, however, many disputes ended in 
unresolved accusations of witchcraft rather resolution by either family members or the chief 
Witchcraft was one of the most common topics of conversation in Mabika. There were always 
rumours about who was and who was not a witch. Some of these cases, as I will discuss in the 
next chapter, degenerated into violence. The prevalence of such ongoing, violent disputes, 
highlighted the lack of legitimacy, in the eyes of Mabika’s inhabitants, of either the institutions 
introduced by the Zimbabwean government or the traditional authorities of the rural areas. In the 
next chapter, I will further discuss the implications of witchcraft accusations for household 
gender relations.
4.7 Social and economic citizenship
Land
The ineffectiveness of customary legal reform has been compounded by the government’s failure 
to systematically address gender issues in other areas. Social and economic institutions, such as 
rules governing the distribution of land, which reinforce women’s subordination in the rural areas 
have not been restructured. As discussed in the previous chapter, colonial rule affected women’s 
access to land in two ways. First, the confinement of the African population to the native reserves 
created an artificial land shortage and, consequently, increased competition between men’s and 
women’s access to land. As a result, the plots traditionally allocated to women (tseu) have shrunk 
in size and been moved to marginal lands. Secondly, under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 
1951, as discussed in the previous chapter, men were required to register as individual owners 
of particular land properties. In the process of formalizing men’s land rights, women’s access to
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any sort of land became discretionary (Pankhurst and Jacobs 1988). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, under the Zimbabwean government the native reserves were renamed as communal areas. 
In contemporary Zimbabwe, approximately 1 million households, comprising 70 to 80 per cent 
of the rural population, are based in the communal areas. The majority of inhabitants in these 
areas are women. The average size of arable plots in the communal areas is 2 hectares. A minority 
of 10 per cent of households control over 6 hectares of arable land and 20 per cent are landless 
(ZWRCN 1996).
As Jacobs argues, land resettlement was the most concrete manifestation of the pledge made by 
the new government to restructure Zimbabwean society (Jacobs 1983). But post Independence 
plans for land resettlement and redistribution have not materialized on a grand scale. By mid 1990 
a total of 52, 000 families, about 6 per cent of the peasant population, had acquired plots of land 
in the new Resettlement Areas. Moreover, the pace of resettlement has slowed, as 36,000 families 
had already been settled by 1985 (Muir 1992). Women have not been allocated land under these 
schemes other than as wives of male heads of households (Pankhurst and Jacobs 1988).
The Communal Land Act of 1982 vested ownership of communal areas in the President. 
Allocation, occupation and use of communal land, as already indicated, is through the District 
Council, advised by Village Development Committees and, having had their powers officially 
reinstated, chiefs and headmen. The District Council grants consent to land according to 
customary law. As Moyo points out, theoretically customary law allows women, as members of 
property holding clans, access rights to land. Those organisations, however, which have been 
vested with authority over land allocation, have interpreted customary law in favour of men
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(Moyo 1995).
In 1993, President Mugabe set up the Land Tenure Commission to investigate the 
appropriateness of different types of land tenure systems. Women’s organisations, such as the 
Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN) campaigned, in particular, for 
joint allocation of land to a husband and first wife and for the institution of neutral Land Boards 
to administer the distribution of land. The Commission produced its report in 1994. The report 
recommended that the legal rights for arable, residential and grazing areas should be held by the 
head of the family in trust for the rest of the family. The Commission argued that village 
authorities should intercede on behalf of widows threatened with eviction by other family 
members. But it asserted that the allocation of land should remain under the authority of 
Headmen, Chiefs and Rural District Councils. In effect, the recommendations of the Land 
Commission, if implemented, would strengthen traditional structures and institutions for dispute 
settlement, thereby reinforcing barriers to women’s ownership of land (Ncube 1996; 
ZWRCN). Whatever Mugabe’s plans for the redistribution of land in Zimbabwe, they are 
unlikely to result in more favourable conditions for women.
Mabika: Land
Land, as Lan and Ranger suggest, has an important symbolic value to the Shona (Lan 1985; 
Ranger 1985). As I discuss in the next section, however, research indicates that off form income 
is the most important indicator of wealth in Zimbabwe (Cousins and others 1992). Nonetheless, 
land offers a degree of security and insurance of a means to subsist. It consequently retains its 
social and economic value. Women’s entitlements to land in Mabika have to be examined in the
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context of general land shortage. This problem was compounded in Mabika by the necessity for 
irrigation to make soil agriculturally viable. As already discussed in the introduction, Mabika was 
located in a communal area in one of the fertile regions of the country. Defined as being in 
natural region IV, Mabika was in a hot low-lying area subject to seasonal drought (Campbell and 
others 1989). Cultivation in this region was precarious, with the size of the harvest depending 
largely upon the amount of rain received. The irrigation scheme, operating in the village and the 
surrounding areas, supplied water to the fields of approximately one third of all inhabitants. In the 
non-irrigated areas, it was possible to grow maize for subsistence purposes. In the irrigated areas, 
farmers grew wheat and maize in the summer season and beans and tomatoes in the winter. When 
there was a surplus the produce from the irrigated areas was either sold at local markets or to a 
commercial dealer. In the latter case, the dealer would negotiate with farmers in the area and a 
fixed price would be set for a particular crop.
In Mabika and surrounding areas, the irrigated fields were divided into boons, strips of land 
about four foot wide which run the length of the field. Interviews with farmers revealed keen 
competition over who could produce the most from one boon. All crops, according to informants, 
required substantial cash inputs. People who owned irrigated land were supposed to pay an 
annual fee for use of the communally run irrigation system. The fee, however, was a source of 
continual dispute as the irrigation system sometimes failed or worked to serve certain areas better 
than others. These problems were one of the primary reasons that people were willing to attend 
meetings held by Agritex, the government agricultural extension bureau, as discussed above. 
Peasant farmers said that the size of the harvest, and the consequent profit, depended upon 
generous use of fertilizer as well as the added extras of fanning skill and expertise. These inputs
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added to the requirement for cash inputs. If a farmer didn’t own oxen, these had to be hired in 
order to plough the land. The demand for intense labour at times of planting and harvesting also 
meant that labour might have to be hired, depending upon the size of land holding. The household 
of Mrs Mabika, for example, had access to one and a half acres of irrigated land. The household 
of seven, five children, herself and her husband, all worked on the field. They would hire one 
other person to assist with the work for three or four days per year. In total, the cost of inputs 
for an average year would be around ZWD 2,000. Expected profits from these inputs would also 
be about ZWD 2,000ls.
Ownership of land, then, was not enough to guarantee income from crops. Some villagers with 
access to irrigated land, but no source of cash, rented out their fields. Access to land could thus 
be acquired through a number of different methods; formal allocation, inheritance or renting. Out 
of the ninety four heads of household interviewed, forty three said they had access to some 
irrigated land, either as the result of inheritance or through access to the fields of relatives. A 
further twenty five said they had access to enough dry land to grow subsistence crops. Fourteen 
said the only land they had was the small amount on which their homestead was built. They 
classified this as having no land, because they did not have enough to guarantee their subsistence. 
Twelve said they gained access to irrigated land through renting.
As I described in the introduction, Mabika was divided into two regions. Households with rights 
to irrigated land were located along the main track through the village near to the fields. Others
18At the time of field work, one Zimbabwe dollar was worth approximately eight pence.
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were situated in the surrounding drylands. Formally, newcomers to the area applied to the 
council for a stand where they could build a house and small garden. In practice, however, the 
Headman told people where they could set up home. In fact, all of the land in the irrigated areas 
had already been allocated. Any newcomer, then, had to set up home in the dry lands.
The primary method of acquiring access to land in Mabika was through inheritance or sharing 
land with other kin. Population increase and absolute limits to land availability meant that holdings 
were being divided into ever smaller plots. As one male informant explained, his father had 1 acre 
of irrigated land which he divided among his five sons. Mr Chipiro had inherited 3 boons. He said 
that this wasn’t really enough to do anything with. He also had five sons. He didn’t know how 
he would be able to divide this land between them, but as he pointed out, fortunately he would 
be dead when this happened so he wouldn’t have to find a solution anyway. Of the forty three 
households with access to irrigated land, only one had more than three acres. Fifteen said they 
had around two acres. The remainder had between one and two acres.
Traditionally, while parents are alive they share land with their sons. Ava Maposa's husband, for 
example, didn't have any fields of his own, but he had access to the land of his father. Ava 
worked on the fields of her parents in law and then, after the harvest, they shared out the crop. 
Ava had also been allocated a small plot of her own, within the fields of her parents in law, to 
grow tomatoes for sale. She gave the cash from this produce to her husband. Where plot sizes 
are smaller, however, this system of shared labour and produce is not so viable. Instead of 
allowing their son to share in the labour and produce of all their land, Mr Rupia's parents had 
allocated him 2 boons of land in their plot In effect, in terms of produce, this was little more than
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a token gesture. However, even token gestures were dependent upon the goodwill of the 
parents. Some were reluctant to allow their sons and daughters in law use their land at all. Wilder 
Chipiro was living with her parents in law, but they refused her access to their fields; she moved 
elsewhere and they were now renting land for both subsistence and cash crops.
As women do not have any formal rights to land in their own name, they are always dependent 
on the good will of others. In practice, while men's access to land is primary; women's entitlement 
is secondary and entirely dependent upon male relatives. As married women they have secondary 
land use rights through their husbands. As single women, preference is give to their brothers. As 
divorcees, they have to vacate land with no guarantee that they will have access to land in their 
natal homes. As widows they may be evicted from the land they have tilled (ZWRCN 1994). Of 
the fourteen households with no access to land, eight were headed by women who were either 
widowed or divorced. None of the three women interviewed, who said they were divorced, had 
access to land. Widows with access to land usually come to some arrangement with their son 
to take care of the grandchildren. This enabled them to stay in the homestead of their deceased 
husband. Other women were not so fortunate.
Tamara was 66 years old. She used to live in the irrigated area of Mabika with her husband. 
Tamara was his second wife. They married after the death of his first wife. After her husband 
died, however, the children from her husband's first marriage came and chased her away from 
the fields. She was now living in the dry lands. Tamara stayed alone and the only land she had was 
around her house. She could only grow food for consumption and at times there was n't enough 
even to feed herself. Rosa, 54, lived with her mother Tuten, who was too old to remember her
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age. Rosa was born in Mabika then went to live with her husband's family in Chibuku. She had 
to leave that area when her husband died. After this, Rosa wandered around for a while, staying 
with various men. But she got tired of this way of life and decided to return to her family in 
Mabika. In the meantime, however, her father had died and Tuten had been forced off the land 
that he had owned. Rosa and Tuten were left with a house and some land in the diy lands but they 
were unable to grow enough food for consumption let alone sale.
Some single women over the age of eighteen had access to the land of their parents, but this was 
usually on a temporary basis. One twenty six year old woman, who had one child but was not 
married, was living on two acres of irrigated land that belonged to her now deceased father. She 
farmed this land with her younger sister. They had merely been able to take advantage of a 
situation, however, in which a family dispute had delayed the division of the land between her five 
brothers.
Irrigated land, as indicated above, could also be rented. Land was rented by the boon for one 
agricultural season. Prices varied according to the time of year and the location of the field. In 
winter, when the most profitable crops could be grown, the going rate was about ZWD 50 per 
strip. In summer, the price dropped to ZWD 25. In theory, women could rent land on their own 
behalf. In practice, however, this did not happen. Out of the twelve households that rented land, 
eleven were headed by a married man. According to informants, it was not worth renting one or 
two strips as the costs would outweigh the profits. Renting land consequently required some 
form of off farm income. As I discuss in the next section, few women in Mabika had access to a 




As already noted, the 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe failed to specify gender as a cause of 
discrimination. There has, subsequently, been little legislation passed to address discriminatory 
practices against women in the labour market. In terms of employment opportunities, African 
women’s access to formal sector jobs is still shaped by patterns of migrant labour introduced 
under the colonial regime and concomitant ideologies of men as bread-winners and women as 
home makers. Many potential employers in the private sector are white men whose practices are 
rooted in these colonial ideas. African women, then, often have to overcome the double prejudice 
of race and gender when looking for work.
Given such employment practices, high general unemployment affects women's opportunities 
disproportionately as women are less likely to be given jobs when there are men who are out of 
work. In general, there is an acute lack of jobs in Zimbabwe. Since independence, only ten to 
thirty thousand jobs have been created annually while secondary school leavers have numbered 
two hundred thousand per annum since the late 1980s (Kanji 1993:47).The total number of 
unemployed has been rising since the introduction of a structural adjustment programme in 1991. 
This is, at least partially, the result of cut-backs in civil service personnel. The Confederation of 
Zimbabwean Industry estimated that by mid 1993 the total number of people retrenched 
nationwide was eighteen thousand. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions puts the figure at 
twenty five thousand. Whatever the actual figure, retrenchment has undoubtedly meant an 
increase in male unemployment and the consequent knock-on effects on women’s employment
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(Brand and others 1995).
The problem of limited employment opportunities for women is compounded by their relative lack 
of education. Since Independence, there has been a massive expansion in education at both 
primary and secondary levels. While the maleifemale enrolment ratio for primary schools is now 
equal, from the fifth year of primary school onwards it declines and boys outnumber girls in 
secondary schools and higher educationj The increase in primary and secondary school fees, 
as a result of Zimbabwe’s structural adjustment programme, means that fewer girls are likely 
to reach higher levels of education (Kanji 1993). While women in the rural areas, then, are 
disadvantaged in terms of access to land, inequalities in education and the labour market 
ensure that women are more dependent on peasant farming than men.
Whether cash is earned through employment or farming, inflation since the introduction of the
structural adjustment programme has meant that money buys a lot less. Zimbabwe introduced its
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. The second phase of funding was
supposed to start in 1996. Difficulties with the International Monetary Fund, however, over the
continuing budget deficit meant that it had still not started by the beginning of 1997. The extent
to which Zimbabwe, given its relatively strong economic growth during the eighties, needed the
is clebcituir^ kJhat
usual structural adjustment package anyway (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). is clear, however,
is that there is a general perception that economic conditions have rapidly worsened since its
introduction. The general inflation rates in 1991 and 1992 were 23.5 per cent and 59.5 per cent
respectively. Real average earnings fell from ZWD 8,600 per annum in 1990 to ZWD 6,700 in
1992. By 1995, the real value of earning was around the same as it was in 1970 (Gibbon 1995).
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Mealie-meal prices rose by 30-35 per cent in April 1991, by 20 per cent in 1992, by 50 per cent 
in June 1993 and by about a further 30 per cent in July 1995 when the price stood at ZWD 28.80 
for a twenty kilogramme bag (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). While those farmers who had surplus 
maize to sell might have benefited from this increase, for many households in the communal areas 
where agricultural production has to be supplemented by purchase, such prices rises were sharply 
felt.
Mabika: Employment and education
As already discussed, few women in Mabika had access to any form of formal waged 
employment. The 1992 census report for Manicaland province, in which Mabika is situated, 
indicates that 20.27 per cent of rural women are in paid employment in comparison to 45.3 per 
cent of rural men. Men constitute 73.36 per cent of the paid employees in Manicaland while 
women make up 81.18 per cent of unpaid family workers (Central Statistical Office Zimbabwe 
1992). Out of the total of one hundred women interviewed in Mabika, five were in paid 
employment. Three of these women were teachers. They earned about ZWD 400 per month. The 
other two worked as local government administrators. Two more women had been teachers in 
the past, but had lost their jobs to younger, more qualified college leavers. One woman had 
worked as a secretary and earned ZWD 350 per month. Two other women had previously 
worked in Harare. One managed her own hairdressing salon. Another worked in a shop.
The most common form of income for women in the village was casual agricultural labour. Out 
of the one hundred women interviewed in Mabika, twenty worked on other people’s fields when 
work was available. The work, however, was seasonal and did not provide a reliable and regular
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source of cash. And even when the work was available, it didn’t pay much. A woman could earn 
money weeding and harvesting at a going rate of ZWD 5 per boon. Most women said they could 
work two boons in a day. In comparison, men were employed to plough at ZWD 10 per boon and 
could probably complete 15 strips in one day. Women also earned money moulding mud bricks. 
This was generally seen as a male job. Women, however, who were prepared to undertake the 
arduous work could earn about ZWD 20 for one day’s labour.
Most women were involved in some additional form of informal sector income earning. Weaving 
hats and baskets from baobab bark was a common activity. The goods were either made to order 
or sold at the central craft stall in the nearby township. Either way, the rewards were low. Mrs 
Chibvuma, for example, could sell one basket, the product of a day’s weaving, for ZWD 12. More 
profitable, but requiring mobility and some capital input, was buying and selling fruit and 
vegetables. Women would buy fruit and vegetables at a local market, about 20km from the 
village, and then sell them at a marked up price in the nearest town. Women said that they could 
earn anywhere between ZWD 200 and ZWD 400 from one trip, depending on what was available. 
A few women in the village also ventured into cross border trading with South Africa. These 
women took locally crocheted goods, unavailable in South Africa, and barter them for other 
products which they would then sell on return to Zimbabwe. Some women worked as commercial 
sex workers in the township, where there was rumoured to be a lot of passing trade from lorry 
drivers heading to South Africa. One group of women had a stall selling vegetables outside the 
busiest bar in the township which allowed them to make a bit of extra cash through sale of 
vegetables while waiting for customers for sexual transactions. The profits from commercial sex 
work, however, were low with women sometimes having sex for favours, food or beer rather than
cash.
Access to waged employment was clearly related to levels of education. All of those women who 
had, at some point, been in waged labour, had gone onto secondary education. Records of 
education levels among women, given in the table below, confirm the national picture of greater 
female attendance in primary, rather than secondary, education. In contrast to those over forty 
years of age, the majority of women below forty had received four or more years* education. Few 
younger women, however, had gone on to complete secondary education.
Table 2: years of education by age of women interviewed in Mabika
ed.
age
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
15+ 2 . 1 2
20+ 2 1 2 8 1 5 9
30+ 3 1 3 2 6 4 7 3 1
40+ 1 1 1 1 V 2 1
50+ 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 1
60+ 4 1 4 1 2 1 1 1
Total 10 1 7 8 9 10 11 17 1 13 13
While women made the most of available opportunities for informal income earning, it was
generally expected that men could, or should, look for salaried work. Of all the women
interviewed, less than ten had a husband under the age of fifty permanently resident in the
household. Soldiers’ wages were around ZWD 2,000 per month and they were also eligible for
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extra benefits, such as help with payment for housing. A man with no education could work as 
a security guard and earn around ZWD 600 per month. Labourers in the mines or on the forestry 
estates in the highland areas earned approximately ZWD 800 per month. Men were also 
predominant in the small enterprises in the village. There were a number of male tailors in the 
village. Men also worked as blacksmiths, furniture makers, general repairers and in the seemingly 
booming hair salon business. As indicated above, however, increases in inflation mean that even 
those with jobs in Mabika perceived themselves to be suffering from a falling standard of living. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the impact of these economic changes on household gender 
relations.
4.8 Conclusion
The Rhodesian colonial state, as described in the previous chapter, was built upon a notion of 
citizenship divided by both gender and race. The nationalist liberation movement promised 
universal citizenship for all Zimbabweans through the redistribution of political and economic 
resources. Decentralisation and the establishment of village level committees was to give all 
citizens a say in the policies which governed their lives. In practice, however, the VIDCOs were 
to become little more than the bottom rung in a top down decision making process. While lacking 
any voice in policy processes, local level government structures did enable the traditional 
authorities of chiefs and headmen to reassert their power through control of material resources 
and other forms of patronage. The reassertion of traditional rural authority was marked, at the 
national level, by the abandonment of the government’s programme of legal reform. War time 
promises of the abolition of customary law and bridewealth were not to be realised. Women’s
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independence was further curtailed by the failure of the government to systematically address 
gender bias in access to land, labour and education. The Zimbabwean government, then, has done 
little to dismantle those institutions which defined women as the dependants of men rather than 
citizens in their own right. Just as the actions of the colonial government can be seen as 
attempting to buy male African support at the expense of women, so post Independence policies 
which reinforced rural male authority can be interpreted as compensatory action for men’s own 
exclusion from full citizenship. Deteriorating economic conditions however, particularly since the 
introduction of a structural adjustment programme, have undermined the perceived value of this 
pay off to men. In the next chapter, I will examine how women’s access to material, social and 
political resources shapes household gender relations in Mabika and, in particular, women’s 




Household Gender Relations: The ‘Conjugal Contract’ And Reproductive 
Strategies
In this chapter, I examine the impact of women’s entitlements as citizens on household gender 
relations and women’s reproductive strategies. As I discussed in the previous chapter, women 
continue to be defined as dependants of men through customary law and exclusion from social, 
economic and political processes. As a consequence of their institutionalised disadvantage, 
women in Mabika must marry in order to gain access to resources. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the majority of Ndau women continue to contract marriages under customary, rather 
than civil, law. The local living law interpretation of the terms of the ‘conjugal contract’ vests the 
groom and his family with rights in fertility. If the woman fails to have children, the marriage is 
void. The counter side of the groom’s rights in fertility, however, is his obligation to provide 
material support for his wife and offspring. In Mabika, then, women must trade procreative 
self-determination for social and economic gain.
As Whitehead argues, the ‘conjugal contract’, which defines the terms and conditions of marriage
agreements, is the main charter of gendered rights in the household (Whitehead 1981). The
dominant Ndau understanding of the terms of the ‘conjugal contract’ draws upon customary law
defined during the colonial regime, rather than the reforms to legislation introduced by the
Zimbabwean government. According to Ndau ‘living law’, marriage provides the groom and his
family with rights in a bride’s sexuality, labour and fertility. Infertility and women’s adultery
remain grounds for divorce. The corollary of men’s rights is their duty to provide access to
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resources for the women and their children. Once a woman is married, then, she may bargain for 
resources within the terms of the conjugal contract. Women must use the limited amount of 
control they have over their fertility and sexuality to claim a greater degree of social and material 
support. Women’s primary tools in this bargaining process are children themselves. While 
customary definitions of the conjugal contract allow women few entitlements as individuals, they 
may make claims on the basis of the recognised needs of their children to food, clothing and 
education. In the perceived absence of viable alternative forms of survival, women prefer to 
bargain within, rather than challenge, the terms of the marital contract. This strategy, however, 
depends on men’s recognition of their own conjugal rights and concomitant obligations. Evidence 
suggests that as changing economic circumstances have increased the costs, and devalued the 
benefits of having children, men may be less willing to claim their rights to women’s fertility. In 
Mabika it was women, rather than men, who were fighting to maintain adherence to customary 
understandings of entitlement.
In the first part of this chapter, I examine relevant demographic theories and models of the 
household. I argue, following Moore, that the distribution of economic resources in the 
household is the result of bargaining based upon socially constructed definitions of rights and 
needs, such as those set out in the ‘conjugal contract’ (Moore 1994). The theoretical section 
will be followed by a discussion of Ndau living law understandings of marital relations, 
based on data from interviews with men and women in Mabika. I then discuss household 
negotiations over resources and men’s and women’s reproductive strategies. I finally 
examine evidence to suggest that men in Mabika are becoming increasingly reluctant to 
claim their customarily defined conjugal rights.
5.1 Demographic theories: from costs and benefits to rights and responsibilities.
In this section, I outline a shift in theories about fertility behaviour from cost benefit explanations 
to the analysis of women’s reproductive strategies. Drawing on the work of Whitehead, I suggest 
that the latter approach requires examination of the terms of the ‘conjugal contract’ and 
understanding of who is vested with what rights over fertility.
The focus of orthodox demographic concern is fertility decline. Classic demographic transition 
theory outlines a model of fertility change, at the national level, in which high mortality and 
fertility is followed by a decrease in mortality rates, leading to a period of population growth 
followed by fertility decline and population stabilization. The model has been widely criticised by 
demographers themselves, who argue that it neither fits the European date from which it was 
supposedly built nor the histories of the Third World countries to which it has been exported 
(Wilson and Cleland 1988). Nonetheless, demography has found it difficult to leave this model 
behind.
Becker’s New Home Economics provides a micro level version of demographic transition theory. 
Becker posits a model of the household based on the assumptions of altruism, a nuclear family 
and a joint utility function. Fertility, it is argued, declines when societal changes alter the 
cost/benefit ratio of having children to the household (Becker 1976). The costs are usually 
identified as the material necessities and time required to raise children to independence. In terms 
of benefits, demographers have primarily focused on ‘lineal factors’, that is the cross-generational,
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child to parent gains to be made from having children. Demographers have defined the primary 
lineal benefit as children’s potential value as providers of security in old age. This support may 
be in the form of labour or cash from remittances (Cain 1981; Cain 1983).The more immediate 
value of children’s agricultural and household labour has also been highlighted (Mueller 1976).
Feminist theory, however, has clearly underlined the shortcomings of Becker’s model of the 
household. From the feminist viewpoint, the household is a site of competition based upon 
hierarchy and conflicts of interest between men and women (Harris 1981; Folbre 1986; Guyer and 
Peters 1987). Feminist analyses have utilised revised models of the household to highlight the 
gender differentiated costs and benefits of child bearing and rearing (Birdsall 1976). Kabeer, for 
example, argues that in patriarchal societies, it is women who bear the reproductive costs of 
raising children but men who have authority over reproductive decision making. Men, 
consequently, ensure that fertility rates remain high as they do not have to pay the full cost for 
their decisions (Kabeer 1983).
Feminist analyses have also highlighted the links between the household and broader 
socio-economic structures (Roberts 1991). Demographers have taken up this point and developed 
theories which place household reproductive decision making within a broader meso and macro 
structural context. Frank and McNicoll, for example, have focused on the impact of local social 
institutions, such as rights to land, on the gender differentiated costs of reproduction (Frank and 
McNicoll 1987). Caldwell has further added to the institutional approach through his insistence 
on the importance of cultural variables such as religion and ideas about sexuality. Caldwell argues 
that in Sub-Saharan Africa children are valued because they represent the living embodiment of
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the ancestors and the continuation of the lineage (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987)19. Marxist 
demographers have attempted to link demographic analyses to the international political economy 
through analyses of the relations between social structures and the demands of international 
capital (Cordell and Gregory 1987). However, while these developments underline the importance 
of the broader socio-economic context, they also emphasize the problematic exclusion of human 
agency.The structural approach to demography contains a conceptualisation of women as hapless 
victims at the end of a chain of capitalist and patriarchal oppression (Vock 1988).
As Greenhalgh argues, both cost-benefits analyses and socio-cultural demographic frameworks 
are inadequate as a means of explaining fertility decisions. While the former take no account of 
structure, the latter fail to acknowledge human agency (Carter 1995; Greenhalgh 1990a). 
Demographers, then, have turned to anthropological approaches which emphasize a 
contextualised understanding of women as decision making actors and, in particular, Bourdieu’s 
concepts of everyday practice or ‘habitus’ (Greenhalgh 1990a). Everyday behaviour, Bourdieu 
argues, is governed by actors' strategies that are not necessarily articulated, but are formulated 
within a set of cultural and social constraints (Risseuw 1991). Strategies embrace the ‘products, 
thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions, whose limits are set by the historically and socially 
situated conditions of its production’ (Bourdieu 1977:73). Actors’ strategies, from this 
perspective, are neither entirely governed by autonomous rationality nor systemically imposed 
passivity.
The adoption of contemporary anthropological perspectives has also facilitated a second shift in
19 Ahlberg criticises Caldwell’s description of ‘African culture’, suggesting it is based on an
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demographic analysis of fertility behaviour. The classic anthropological understanding of kinship 
as descent systems has been replaced by an emphasis on practice and the way in which kinship
20  inrelations are operationalised and manipulated (Patel 1997) . From this perspective? the present 
day, more diffuse lateral ties of kinship are as important as the direct lineal links between 
generations. Demographers have, consequently, adopted both an emphasis on the contextualised 
strategies of the actor and analysis of the lateral benefits of having children. As Guyer argues, 
for example, in the changing economic circumstances of Sub Saharan Africa, the potential claim 
on the father’s relatives that a child may facilitate are as important as future returns from child 
labour (Guyer 1994).
Anthropological approaches such as Guyer’s highlight women’s reproductive strategies as a 
process of continual negotiation. Women are not just seeking an end goal of a particular number 
of children, but rather are searching to make use of a multiplicity of opportunities and ties which 
arise through the process of forming sexual relations and reinforcing those relations through 
childbirth (Lockwood 1997). As Moore argues, such processes of intra-household bargaining 
draw upon ideological constructs, such as ideas about the rights and needs of particular 
individuals. These constructs, defining ideas about particular entitlements, can be seen as 
resources to be drawn upon in the process of negotiation as much as fixed constraints on action 
(Fraser 1989;Moore 1993; Moore 1994).
ahistorical stereotype (Ahlberg, 1991)
20 See, for example, Bledsoe’s analysis of women’s reproductive strategies in Kpelle society (Bledsoe,
1980).
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In the household, it is often the ‘conjugal contract’ which constitutes the central charter of gender 
differentiated rights and needs. Whitehead uses the term ‘conjugal contract’ to describe ‘the terms 
on which products and income, produced by the labour of both husband and wife, are divided to 
meet their personal and collective needs’ (Whitehead 1981:108). The term contract here refers 
to general understandings, or the ‘living law’ definitions, of the terms and conditions of marriage, 
rather than a definitive outline of the deal. In many Sub Saharan societies, the initial terms of the 
conjugal contract are worked out through a series of bridewealth negotiations. In such 
transactions, there is an exchange of beasts, goods and cash for a particular set of rights and 
obligations. The groom’s family generally acquires rights over the bride’s labour, sexuality and 
fertility. But the husband’s family also takes on an obligation to provide the incoming wife and 
any children she might produce with a means of subsistence (Parkin and Nyamwaya 1987; 
Whitehead 1984). As Moore suggests, competing discourses about rights and needs implicitly and 
explicitly invoke each other (Moore 1994). Women, then, may refer to understandings of marital 
agreements in order to negotiate access to a share of household resources. The strongest claim 
that a woman might make to resources for herself and her children is through reference to a man’s 
right to fertility. In order to obtain customarily defined entitlements to support, a woman has to 
continually invoke the rights invested in men, through the terms of the marital contract, over her 
fertility. Yet, as Whitehead argues, women’s capacity to own and control rights in material 
resources, as well as rights in other people’s labour, is constrained by their own definition as a 
less than full subject (Whitehead 1984). Women’s negotiations within the terms of the conjugal 




5.2 Mabika: the terms of the ‘conjugal contract’.
As women in Mabika themselves observed, they have little economic choice but to marry in order 
to gain access to land and cash. As figures in the table below illustrate, all women over the age 
of thirty defined themselves as having been married at some point in their lives. The youngest 
married woman interviewed was eighteen. The oldest never married woman was twenty five. 
None of the single women interviewed thought that not marrying was a viable possibility. They 
were all hoping to find a husband.
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Table 3: Women’s Self Defined Marital Status21.
Marital Status 
Age
Single Married Separated Divorced Widowed
15+ 3 2
20+ 8 21 1
30+ 25 1 2
40+ 5 1 1 2
50+ 7 1 5
60+ 4 2 9
totals 8 67 3 4 18
Women’s claims to resources within marriage, however, are limited by the terms and conditions 
of the ‘conjugal contract’ (Whitehead 1981). These conditions are defined by norms and ideas 
about gender relations and marriage as well as the more overt agreements made during 
bridewealth negotiations. In the following section, I examine dominant ideas about marital 
relations drawing on the results of semi-structured and informal interviews with both men and 
women in Mabika. The dominant view of the ‘conjugal contract’ is that marriage, sealed by 
bridewealth payments (lobola), provides the groom and his family with rights over the bride’s 
fertility, sexuality and labour.
5.3 Lobola
In Mabika, terms and conditions of marital relations are formally confirmed by lobola 
(bridewealth) payments. Under the African Marriage Act, prior to the Legal Age of Majority Act,
21 These figures are based on women’s responses m semi-structured interviews. As I will discuss 
below, women sometimes defined themselves as married because they had given birth. It was generally during 
informal discussions that women might say they had a child but no official husband.
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the African Marriage Officer was obliged to ensure that a lobola agreement had been reached 
between the woman's guardian and his proposed son in law before the agreement could be 
solemnized. The payment of lobola consequently became institutionalized in national legal 
practice under the colonial regime (Ncube 1987). The post Independence Legal Age of Majority 
Act of 1982 implies that a valid marriage can be contracted without the payment of lobola and 
parental consent, as majority status implies that a father no longer has proprietary interests in his 
daughter (Helium 1995). Consequently, he can no longer claim lobola unless his daughter agrees. 
In practice, as discussed in the previous chapter, Zimbabwean Africans of all classes continue to 
charge and pay lobola (Ncube 1987). Demographic research among the Ndau indicates that 80 
per cent of all women had a customary marriage, while 11 per cent had registered under the 
African marriages Act. In 83 per cent of all cases, bridewealth had been paid (Gregson and others 
1996). Mabika conforms to this pattern with only four ever married women stating that they had 
married under civil law. All women married under customary law said that lobola had been paid 
or the groom’s family had agreed to pay it. All of the single women interviewed said they didn’t 
have a choice about whether of not lobola would be paid when they married.
As these figures indicate, in Mabika, payment of lobola, or agreement to pay, remains the official 
primary indicator of whether or not someone is married.Lobola should, according to Ndau 
tradition, be paid by the father of the groom. According to Bourdillon, Shona bride-price used 
to be divided into two parts; rutsambo, a smaller payment for sexual rights in the woman and 
roora, a larger payment associated with rights over children bom to the woman (Bourdillon 
1991). In present day Mabika, however, while payments were made to various members of the 
family these amounts were considered as one sum, which was repaid in the case of divorce.
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In Mabika, lobola generally consisted of cash, rather than cattle. The prospective groom was 
expected to pay amounts prior to negotiations with smaller sums also being given to the female 
relatives of the proposed bride. The girl could refuse the groom’s offer at this pre-negotiation 
stage but, in practice, women usually accepted. Following pre negotiation payments, the main 
sums were paid with the mother of the bride receiving around ZWD 1000 and the father about 
ZWD2000. Both parents should also be bought a complete set of clothes. The total amounts paid, 
including the additional goods which have to be purchased, could amount to around ZWD 4000. 
All these amounts, according to informants, were negotiable within general understandings of 
what was reasonable. Fathers, for example, could demand more for an educated daughter as 
compensation for school fees paid. All these amounts were to be repaid in full in the case of 
divorce. As with all financial transfers in a cash tight economy, payments were never simple but 
involved complex borrowing and lending agreements which created, and fed into, networks of 
social indebtedness and credit. Lobola transfers were rarely, then, a one-off payment. In reality, 
the evidence suggested that lobola negotiations, and their reverberations, lasted as long as the 
marriage.
Polygamy is legally permissible under the African Marriages Act but, at least in Mabika, was not 
officially common. Out of those interviewed in Mabika, there were three households based around 
polygamous marriage with, in each case, the man being married to two wives. One man, killed 
during the war, had six wives, five of whom still lived in the village in separate households. In 
practice, however, it is likely that unofficial polygamy was more common, as husbands working 
away in the mines, plantations and towns often set up second homes and families where they were
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employed.
5.4 Fertility and rights over children
The issue of divorce perhaps illustrates most clearly the primary terms of the ‘conjugal contract’. 
In Mabika, infertility remained the most common cause of official marital separations. While the 
payment of lobola formally legitimized a marriage, in practice it was childbirth which was seen 
as cementing the union. It was agreed by both men and women alike that, really, you were not 
married until you had a child. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1985, failure to fulfil conjugal 
obligations, sterility, barrenness and impotence are no longer considered formal grounds for 
divorce under customary law (Armstrong 1987). Both men and women interviewed in Mabika, 
however, stated that infertility, generally assumed to be the fault of the female partner was the 
main grounds for divorce.
In the village, there were six individuals who said they were divorced, two men and four women. 
There was a good deal of reluctance to talk about the issue and I was later told that the one 
woman who refused to be interviewed at all was in fact a divorcee. Two of the female divorcees 
interviewed were over the age of sixty. Both said that their infertility had been the reason for 
divorce. The third woman, who gave birth to six children, said that her husband wanted to marry 
a younger woman but he did not want two wives. The fourth woman, aged forty four, said that 
the fact that she had not wanted more than two children had been a contributing factor to her 
divorce. One of the wealthiest women in the area, aged thirty five, who lived in a nearby town, 
had been divorced because of her infertility. She had subsequently been unable to remarry, despite
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the fact that she had set up several successful businesses and would obviously be able to support 
both herself and her partner. Two of the women who defined themselves as ‘separated’ said this 
was a temporary explanation and did not provide a reason for the decision to live apart. The third 
woman, in her twenties, said that her husband had sent her away because he thought she was 
‘possessed’ and consequently unable to give birth. She had returned to live on the land of her 
deceased parents until she was cured.
Both the male divorcees interviewed said that mental illness caused by ‘bad spirits’ had been the 
cause of their divorce. In each case, their wives had given birth to two children. In one case, the 
man said that the first baby of his wife had refused to suckle. According to Ndau custom, the 
refusal of a baby to suckle is seen as an indication either that the mother is a witch or that the 
mother has been unfaithful22. In the second case, the man did not want to provide details of the 
nature of the problem but suggested that his wife was ‘mad’ and ‘possessed’ and this had meant 
that she was unable to have any more children
There were two women living in Mabika who were married but thought that they were infertile. 
One of these women, aged thirty eight, had one child but it died and she had subsequently been 
unable to conceive. She said that this had not caused any problems in her marriage and she 
remained her husband's only wife. The second, aged thirty four, had been married for twelve years 
but had not conceived. She said that this was not an issue between herself and her husband, but
One woman explained that a baby might also refuse to suckle if the mother's parents had died before 
lobola payments had been completed. In this case, the husband had to ensure completion of payments in order to 
cure the problem.
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her mother in law was pressurizing him to find another wife. In both cases, however, the women 
were the subject of much gossip and both of their husbands were rumoured to be living with other 
women. The most important obligation of women, then, in marriage is to give birth.
Children are a central issue in divorce. Under the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act of 
1989, parental rights and duties are decided according to ‘the best interest of the child’, regardless 
of whether the marriage has been contracted under customary or general law and, consequently, 
whether or not lobola has been paid (Helium 1995). As discussed in the last chapter, however, 
post Independence legal reforms are often ignored at village level. In Mabika, the living law 
interpretation of the terms of customary marriage was that payment of lobola gave the father the 
right to take the children. Women insisted that men always wanted to claim their rights and take 
what ‘belonged’ to the patrilineage. Male informants confirmed this interpretation of Ndau culture 
and the pulling power of the patrilineage over its members. As Tobius explained, ‘if Ava and 
Joshua divorce, the relatives will say “you must bring that child home. I want to see the child 
here. He has our blood and blood is stronger than anything. He has our name.” And they won’t 
rest until the child arrives. Then it can be very difficult for the child. Because I can sit here and 
talk to the ancestors and say “where is that child? I wonder whether he is on Matopos or 
somewhere else.” And this will cause pain in the child. He will feel as if he has a fire inside him. 
There won’t be anything that Ava can do to stop that pain - no clinic or doctor will be able to 
cure him. He will not stop crying until he is back in my arms.’
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5.5 Sexuality
As the cases of divorce illustrate, while fertility is of primary importance, the man’s exclusive 
rights to a woman’s sexuality are also emphatically defined by the terms of the conjugal contract. 
In Mabika, girls are groomed from an early age in the arts of finding and keeping a man. They are 
taught by their elder sisters and relatives how a good wife should behave. Satisfying a husband’s 
sexual demands is seen as central to maintaining a marital relationship. Young girls are shown by 
their sisters how to stretch their labia, as this is thought to increase a man's sexual enjoyment. 
They are also taught about various herbal and chemical potions, such as toilet bleach, which are 
supposed to keep their vaginas ‘dry and tight - like a virgin’. Evening conversations among 
younger women in Mabika often turned to the secrets of sexual success.
Women discussed the merits of different love potions - concoctions of herbs to be found in the 
local markets - and the names of herbalists renowned for the effectiveness of their aphrodisiacs. 
The sexual prowess of women thought to be prostitutes was another topic of raucous 
conversation. Seasoned raconteurs acted out their stories, much to everyone’s delight and hilarity. 
The tales told, however, often contained a general moral lesson or a direct warning for a 
particular individual about their sexual behaviour. A tale about a known prostitute, for example, 
might be used as an indirect means of telling someone in the group that there were suspicions 
about their marital faithfulness. Such discussions, then, had a double edge. They were open, 
informal and entertaining, but they were also a means of exerting peer group pressure to behave 
correctly.
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Research on male attitudes towards sex indicates that men also use herbs as aphrodisiacs. But 
they have a strong view that it is women who should ‘prepare’ themselves for sex. Men expected 
women to make themselves ‘dry and tight’ to ensure their physical sexual pleasure and to foster 
the sexually positive image, in men’s eyes, of sexual innocence. Men further claim that this 
enhances their sexual pleasure and that women’s sexual fluids are unhygienic (Ray and others 
1996).
Although women in Mabika generally discussed sex in terms of satisfying men, some also talked 
about their own fulfilment and sexual enjoyment. Older women, in particular, stated that women 
needed to have and enjoy sex on a regular basis. Women, however, always described men as 
having the stronger sexual appetite. Men were likened to cocks or to dogs, depending on whether 
the general tone of the conversation was pro or anti men. In informal discussions among women, 
it was often the latter.
Men interviewed shared women’s view of their sexual capacity. As one man explained ‘Men are 
always sexy. They are more sexy than women.’ Men were keen to boast about the number of 
times they could have intercourse in one night. Once, I was told, was never enough. Some 
claimed that seven or eight times in one night was normal. On their part, women confirmed that 
they would be suspicious if a man only wanted intercourse once or twice in one night. Women 
might see this as an indication that their partner no longer loved them or that they were finding 
sexual satisfaction elsewhere.
Men’s sexual appetite was used, by both men and women, to explain asymmetry in marital
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fidelity. While adultery on the part of women was seen as grounds for divorce, it was considered 
normal for men to be unfaithful. As one male informant explained, ‘men can't stick with one wife. 
Generally most men don't stick with one wife. Married women have no choice, they have to stick 
with their husband.’ Another male informant confirmed this interpretation of the marital contract; 
‘of course a man can have lots of girlfriends and there won’t be a divorce. But a wife cannot go 
off and have lots of befriends. No, that isn’t heard of. That isn’t our culture. That would be a 
case for divorce. Women are kept very strictly under control. Maybe they don’t like it. But that 
is the way it is and there is nothing they can do about it’.
All men interviewed said that it was not possible for a man to stay with one wife. Only two of 
the currently married women interviewed said that they thought that their husband was faithful. 
This asymmetry in marital monogamy was reinforced by the widely held belief that if a woman 
was unfaithful to her husband, he would vomit blood and die. In contrast, as a number of women 
pointed out, if a man was unfaithful the most he would get was a sexually transmitted disease. 
Older women said that in the past men had affairs but they kept quiet about it rather than making 
it a public issue: ‘ These days men go with prostitutes and they can't even walk properly because 
they have diseases. It doesn't show respect if they are so public about it. Of course, men have to 
do these things because it is in their nature. But they should do it quietly without their wife 
knowing.’ It was generally accepted, then, that the terms of the conjugal contract gave the groom 
exclusive rights to his wife’s sexuality. This, however, was not a reciprocal arrangement.
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5.6 Labour
In Mabika, the payment of bridewealth was also seen as vesting rights over the bride’s labour in 
the groom and his family. When a young woman married, she moved into the household of her 
parents in law. She entered the home as a stranger and outsider and, consequently, had very little 
status. This was indicated, symbolically, by the still often followed customary rule that a woman 
should kneel in the presence of her in-laws. The power of the in-laws was increased by the fact 
that, in Mabika, men were frequently absent for work. It was the female in-laws with whom the 
bride spent most of her time. While the mother in law was the most senior relative, a bride's 
relationship with her sister in law, vatete, was equally important23. The relationship between a 
woman and her sister in law was seen as one of respect because the vatete is a direct blood 
relative of the husband's father, the head of the household. If there were marital problems, or 
other household issues to be discussed, a woman was supposed to first consult her sister In law, 
even if she was younger than herself. A new bride was expected to do as her female in-laws 
directed. Demands made on her time and labour could be considerable. Some newly-wed women 
in Mabika said that they were usually given the most tedious and laborious household tasks - 
fetching water, gathering fire wood, sweeping the yard.
When women established their own home, they were expected to provide the labour for the day 
to day running of the home and care of the children. In Mabika agricultural tasks were
23 As indicated in chapter three, the term vatete can also mean paternal aunt. This double usage of the 
term further reinforces women’s junior status in their husband’s household. When a woman marries into a family 
she moves down a generation in terms of the use of kinship terminology. She refers to her husband’s relatives as if 
they were the relatives of her father. Thus, a woman must refer to her husband’s sister as if she was her paternal 
aunt.
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customarily divided between the sexes. As described in the last chapter, men were in charge of 
ploughing the land, women were responsible for sowing and weeding and both men and women 
took part in the harvesting. If the husband was away, as was generally the case, it was the wife 
who has to ensure the completion of all agricultural tasks. If children were old enough and not 
at school, they helped women in the fields. Key informants said that as both land and the 
women’s labour were defined as belonging to the groom’s family, women were not able to claim 
the products of that work for themselves. Produce from a husband's land could be used directly 
for subsistence purposes. If produce was sold, all married women interviewed said that they either 
had to hand the cash over to their husband or account for how they had spent it when their 
husband returned from work. In Mabika, then, men retained control over the products of land 
despite the fact that it was generally women who put in more hours of agricultural labour.
Some women also had access to a small garden 24. Many women, with or without access to 
irrigated land, set up their own tiny plot where they could grow vegetables and tomatoes for 
consumption as relish. The gardens were generally located within the boundaries of the 
homestead itself or in a slightly more favourable position nearer to an irrigation channel. Women 
in Mabika were immensely proud of their gardens. In many cases, the plots were so small there 
was only enough produce for family consumption. If there was surplus, however, it could be sold 
and the profits disposed of as the women wished. In some cases, women used money raised from 
produce of the vegetable garden as contributions for a church savings club. Each woman who
24 In the pre colonial era, as discussed in chapter three, women had an entitlement to their own tseu 
(garden). In present day Mabika, access to a garden depended on the availability of household land and the 
husband’s discretion.
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belonged to the club agreed to put in a certain amount each week and, at the end of the year, they 
shared the kitty out between all the members. Women said that they generally used this as a form 
of security which could cover unexpected demands for lump sums of cash..
5.7 Household authority
In Mabika, then, the dominant understanding of the conjugal contract was that payment of 
bridewealth vested rights in a woman’s fertility, sexuality and labour in the groom and his family. 
Dominant interpretations of the conjugal contract did not define women as having rights within 
marriage. As one civil servant working in the township sadly told me, ‘women in Zimbabwe do 
not have rights in the home or the bedroom. Even me, an educated woman, I have to go down 
on my knees to my husband’. This gendered asymmetry in rights was underpinned, although not 
directly determined, by the reality of the division of economic assets. As women had neither equal 
access to land nor equal opportunities to earn a salary, they were in no position to directly 
challenge the definition of men as primary bearers of conjugal rights.
Both men and women interviewed in Mabika said that the decision-making authority of the male 
household head was absolute. According to female informants over the age of sixty, even in the 
days when chiefs had more status, their authority to intervene in household matters was strictly 
limited to adjudication in cases of dispute. During interviews, women often said that if they voiced 
disagreement with their husband, the response would be, ‘so you want to be head of the 
household? Well then you can make decisions on your own.’
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Some women observed that the commercialization of bridewealth made it difficult, in practice, 
to do anything other than obey and stay with your husband25. As one informant explained: 
‘leaving is very difficult, because maybe the parents of the wife have received fifteen cattle in 
lobola. Then if the wife goes home and says “I want to leave my husband, he has been seeing 
another woman”, they will say “don’t be silly, get back to your husband”. Of course, they don’t 
want to pay the lobola back. So a man can beat his wife, he can have lots of girlfriends and still 
the wife obeys him’.
It was common for authority to be further enforced through violence or its threat. In Mabika, 
marital violence, within limits, was seen as an everyday part of being a wife. As several women 
pointed out, all wives get beaten regardless of their status. One woman told me about a teacher, 
married to a headmaster, who was severely beaten on a regular basis. The point of this story was 
that, however educated and independent a woman might consider herself she is not above being 
beaten by her husband. The threat of everyday violence informed women’s decisions and actions. 
As indicated in the introduction, informants often brought up the subject of AEDs. One question 
which women themselves asked was what they could do if they knew their husband had HTV. 
They generally concluded that they couldn’t force their husband to wear a condom or refuse to 
sleep with them, because they would be beaten.
In some cases, however, violence became extreme. One informant was severely beaten by her 
husband on a regular basis. In discussions following a particularly vicious beating that took place
25 May argues that, in Zimbabwe, the inflation of brideprice has undermined its symbolic value and 
encouraged the transformation of the exchange into a purely commercial transaction (May, 1983).
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in the yard of her homestead, neighbouring women said they thought that her husband had gone
too far. Beating in private, they agreed, was acceptable. A public display of marital violence was
not. The woman herself later explained that sometimes she ran out into the courtyard, when her
husband was beating her, so that the neighbours would see what was happening. This was the
only strategy she could use to combat her husband’s attacks. The officials of the church for which
he worked had spoken to him about his behaviour. This had only made matters worse. She was
beaten for informing on him. Sara had nowhere to go to. Her parents wouldn’t take her back,
-to
because they did not want? or could not, repay the lobola. Her mother in law had thrown Sara out 
of her house because she didn’t want the disturbance.
Ruby, a thirty year old married to a ‘drunkard’ had been beaten so severely on one occasion she 
had to go to hospital and stay there for a week. She said that her husband had been ‘taken away 
by the police’ for a while. But when he was released, he merely came back and started beating 
her again. Ruby was desperate and had no conceivable means of escape. Her mother in law 
advised her to ‘run very fast’ if her husband tried to beat her. But, as she said, maybe you can run 
for a while. But if you have nowhere to go to, eventually you will have to return to your husband.
Some women, however, saw male authority as a benefit rather than a burden. One widow 
explained, ‘I don't feel free without a husband. I was used to that system of asking my husband 
what I should do. Now it's all on my shoulders. There is no one to say do this or do that. But I 
still regret that my husband isn't here.’ Mrs Muchuro said that, ‘I don’t mind my husband making 
the decisions. It is right that he should be head of the household because I am in his home. He is 
the one who provides for me, so I should do what he says.’ These women were prepared to
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accept their husband’s authority in return for economic support.
5.8 Negotiating strategies: words and actions
The converse side of the conjugal contract was thus the duty of the groom to provide the bride 
and their children with a means of subsistence. But the extent of provision was not a given. 
Rather, resources had to be bargained for within the context of the extended family unit and the 
competing claims and demands of both the husband and his family to goods.
Whether or not a woman could gain access to land through her husband, daily subsistence also 
required cash. In Mabika, as discussed in the previous chapter, differences in household economic 
status, evidenced by construction of the house, ownership of livestock and consumer durables 
such as radios, were related to the amount and regularity of cash remittances from working 
husbands rather than access to land. Some of the wealthiest households, judged by these criteria, 
were inhabited by the families of soldiers who, as new arrivals, had no access to land but a stable 
income26. The least well off households were those where, even though the husband had a regular 
income, none of this was being fed into the household. As already indicated, ownership of land 
without access to an off farm source of income was worthless as farming depended on cash 
inputs.
Cash was equally essential for everyday subsistence. At the time of fieldwork, a loaf of bread cost
26 Furthermore, as strangers to the area, in contrast to long time inhabitants,they did not have the direct 
and daily pressure to share income with relatives.
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ZWD 4, a bar of soap ZWD 2, a 10kg bag of maize ZWD 20 and the bus trip to the nearest main 
town ZWD15. One of the biggest household cash outlays was on school fees. Primary school fees 
for a state school were around ZWD 50 per child per term. State secondary school fees were 
ZWD 80 per person per term. Church schools, generally considered to be better that the state 
ones, charged anything up to ZWD1000. In Mabika, education was highly valued in itself, 
whatever the correlation between years in school and success in getting employment.
Women’s vulnerability to economic destitution and physical abuse prevented the use of direct 
confrontation or challenge in negotiations over resources with their husbands. They had, instead, 
to use indirect means and whatever tools they had at their disposal. One approach employed by 
women in Mabika was to challenge the dominant interpretation of the meaning of the terms of 
the conjugal contract, rather than to directly argue against its substance. A common topic of 
conversation among both men and women was what entitlements bridewealth payments gave to 
the husband. Male informants argued that the payment of lobola meant that they had ‘bought’ a 
wife. This was not an interpretation, however, that all women accepted.
When interviewed, some women expressed outrage at men’s views that they had been ‘bought’. 
They said that men used this argument to try and force their wives to be obedient. One informant 
said that when her husband used this argument she would counter by saying that a wife was 
different from cattle and could not be bought. Another said that when her husband claimed he had 
‘paid’ for her, she would retort that things had obviously changed from the time of their 
grandparents when lobola was held in greater respect. Women, then, could offer their own 
interpretations of Ndau tradition as a means of defending their position.
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Women also disputed men’s understandings of conception and their consequent claims to total 
rights over fertility. These different interpretations allowed women to place a higher value on the 
assets they had brought to the marriage, and therefore to demand a greater share of its produce. 
According to the Ndau explanation of conception, it is the man who creates the child. The woman 
has blood in her uterus, which is in a shapeless mass before the man’s ‘eggs’27 enter and form the 
foetus. A woman’s blood has to be ‘thick’ if the baby is to be formed. Menstruation is seen as an 
indication that the blood is ready. Women reported that men would often claim that they were 
the ones who had given birth to the children. In the male explanation of conception, children 
inherit the man’s blood, while the woman just provides the baby’s form. As one male informant 
explained, ‘my wife is like a suitcase and I am the one who puts the clothes in it. She comes to 
the marriage with an empty suitcase and if she goes she will have to leave its contents behind’. 
The dominant understanding of fertility and conception, then, was used to justify men’s claims 
to children and, concomitantly, their earnings.
Some women, over the age of fifty, agreed with this understanding of conception. According to 
Rosa, ‘the woman is just like a sack. The man is the one who puts something in it. She’s not 
important, because she just takes care of something that is put there. The woman has something 
that the sperm mixes with, but it is the sperm that is important’. Younger women, however, 
interpreted ideas about conception to their own advantage. Women emphasized the importance 
of their role in carrying the foetus and the pain of childbirth. As one woman said of her nine year 
old son, ‘I carried him around for nine months. I cried with pain when I gave birth to him.
27The Ndau used the term ‘mazai’ for sperm, which also means eggs.
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Without my pain there would be no son’. A number of women flatly contradicted the Ndau 
description of conception. They said that they had been taught by a European man who worked 
in the nearby hospital a few years back that women had eggs too. So they could just laugh when 
men claimed that they gave birth. Women, then, offered their own interpretation of conception. 
This interpretation was the basis of claims to resources from their offspring. As Mrs Nehanda 
said, ‘I carried my son in my stomach. I cried in pain when I gave birth to him. I clothed and fed 
him when he was young. I hope that when I get older he will remember all that I have done for 
him and look after me as a good son should’.
Women used actions, as well as words, to squeeze more resources from their husbands. One 
woman said when her husband returned from work, but failed to hand over any cash, she would 
put too much salt in his food. Other women said that they used sex as a bargaining counter when 
they wanted some extra money or other goods. Women could not refuse outright to sleep with 
their husband. If they were displeased with their partner, however, they could claim that they 
were too ill or tired to have sex. Women also utilised the taboo against sleeping with a 
menstruating woman and claimed that they were bleeding as a means of denying their husband’s 
claimed right to have sex. Women were on relatively safe grounds in employing these strategies 
because, as one male informant explained, you cannot divorce a woman just because you want 
to have sex more often than she does. Men were aware, however, that women sometimes used 
sex as a means of negotiating for material resources. Joshua said that, ‘women use sex to try and 
get whatever they want. Maybe you refuse to buy them something and they say that they don’t 
want to sleep with you that night. Although it’s quite natural that women shouldn’t want to have 
sex every night, even men sometimes don’t want to have sex. Men know that they can’t have sex
166
with their wife every day. But you have to judge what she says by the situation’.
5.9 Fertility as a negotiating tool
In Mabika, interviews with women indicated that the primary bargaining tool in household 
negotiations over resources was children. Women viewed children as the glue which held 
marriages together. While bridewealth formally legitimized a marriage, as discussed above, it was 
commonly understood that this meant nothing without the birth of a child. The corollary of this 
understanding was that pregnancy and childbirth could be used as a means of turning a casual 
relationship into a marriage. Pregnancy, then, as Guyer argues, may provide women with the 
means of converting an affair into a marriage and ensuring resources for both the woman and her 
child (Guyer 1994).
In Mabika, there were informal mechanisms to ensure that pregnancy did lead to marriage. This 
progression from partner to wife, however, depended on men’s acknowledgement of their 
customarily defined conjugal rights. Women explained that if a girl became pregnant before she 
was married, she was not supposed to tell her parents. She was expected, however, at some stage 
during her pregnancy, to ‘elope’. The girl would secretly go to stay with her lover or his parents. 
The man could then decide whether or not he ‘loved’ the girl. If he wished to many her, he would 
have to pay ‘damages’ to the girl's father in recognition of improper conduct. This was a sum that 
was non-negotiable and non-returnable in the case of divorce. If he didn't ‘love’ the girl, she could 
then return to her parents’ home. The parents, however, might insist that damages were paid 
before allowing the girl to return. The man could opt to pay damages anyway, as recognition that
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he was the father of the child. Such payment meant that, in terms of customary understanding, 
the father could ‘claim’ the child at any point up to adulthood. In the past, it was assumed that 
elopement would, indeed, lead to marriage. As I discuss in the next section, however, the 
evidence suggests that changing economic conditions have meant that young men are no longer 
so keen to claim their rights to woman and child. Among younger women, more often than not, 
elopement led to rejection.
While one child may be enough to initiate a marriage, the dominant values of Ndau pro-natalist 
culture support the view that a good marriage requires a large family. Most men, according to 
women, want lots of children in order to ‘carry on the name of their clan’. Women insisted that 
men’s desire to have more children was too deeply rooted in Ndau culture to be denied. Some 
women argued that as men wanted as many children as possible, they must carry on giving birth 
in order to keep their husband. ‘Men want more children than women. I think I will end up having 
more than three children, I think that he probably wants more than four children. When he has 
four children he might want more. I am worried that if I stop at four, he could look for another 
wife’. According to Stembeni, her husband might say that he only wants four children but then, 
‘he sees that a friend’s wife is pregnant and says, “why don’t we have another one.’”
Men supported, to a certain extent, women’s interpretation of their own wants. As one man said, 
‘Of course, in Ndau culture it is important for men to have children. In the past, men would boast 
and say “I have fifteen or twenty children” and that would mean that they were veiy strong. In 
some cases - like Tom - if he doesn’t have another child then people will mock and say maybe he 
isn’t capable. Maybe the others aren’t his’. Moreover, some men went on to argue that if a
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woman refused to continue having children at any point in their marriage, this would be grounds 
for divorce. Mr Chiprio, for example, said that, ‘if my wife refused to have another child, I would 
ask the elders what I should do. I would suspect that my wife no longer loved me. She might be 
worried about the costs of bringing up the children. But in the end - you don’t think about 
support. If she doesn’t want to have more children then you are already divorced’. Both men and 
women agreed, then, that marriage required not just one child, but the ongoing production of 
children to sustain the relationship.
There are additional material incentives for married women to have more children. Childbirth, 
apart from increasing a woman’s status, also enables her to make claims on particular resources. 
Women are not entitled to their own kitchen until they have their first child. Women’s further 
entitlement to resources is dependent upon the recognised needs of her children, rather than any 
needs claims she might make on her own behalf. Access to land and cash is given on the basis that 
women are working to feed the children of the patrilineage rather than themselves. Apart from 
subsistence requirements, children’s needs for clothing and the husband’s obligation to provide 
are also recognised. As one weary father said, on the impending birth of his fifth child, ‘I expect 
this means my wife will be asking for more nappies and blankets’. In laws were also expected to 
provide material goods for a newborn baby. It was considered to be a social embarrassment for 
the family if a baby was presented to the village without a new towel to use as a wrap.
In order to gain access more resources, then, a woman could claim that her children had needs 
which it was the father’s obligation to fulfil. Another recognised obligation of the father was to 
provide cash for school fees. This was one claim that was acknowledged as giving the wife
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priority over her in laws in claims to a husband’s remittances. In a few cases a woman and her in 
laws joined forces to extract money from an errant husband so that school fees could be paid. One 
woman said that she relied on her brothers in law to squeeze money out of her husband when she 
needed cash for her children’s education.
Women used children’s recognised entitlements to make both negative and positive claims to 
resources. While women made claims to resources on the basis of their needs, they also used the 
threat not to have any more children as a means of extracting additional support. As Chipo 
explained, ‘when my husband says he wants another child, I say maybe you should think about 
giving me some more money then. If you want another child you will have to pay for it’. Other 
women made the point that, in any discussions with their husband about having more children, 
they stressed the extra cash that would be required for support.
Children’s recognised needs, then, could be used by women as a bargaining counter in 
negotiations over how and when household resources should be spent. As Guyer argues, children 
have an economic value in terms of the lateral claims they represent, as well as in the possibility 
of future returns from labour and support (Guyer 1994). Interviews with women in Mabika 
suggest that such lateral claims were of primary importance in shaping women’s reproductive 
strategies. These claims, however, had to be made in terms of the rights and obligations of the 
conjugal contract. Women could not claim rights to resources. A woman could instead, as 
illustrated above, remind her husband of his social and economic obligations through reference 
to his conjugal rights to fertility and sexuality.
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5.10 Economic crisis: conflict and competition for resources
Women also had to compete with their mother in law and her family for access to land and a share 
of her husband’s salary. As outlined in the last chapter, since the introduction of a structural 
adjustment programme in 1991, prices have spiralled and the value of salaries has decreased. 
People living in the rural areas say that they are no longer able to afford everyday items such as 
sugar and soap (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). As Helium argues, ‘In the present situation of 
economic crisis and scarcity, women in different generations and classes compete for male 
providers. This form of competition for resources takes place in the context of coexisting nuclear 
and extended family obligations’ (Helium 1995).
While wives could make claims to a husband’s cash on behalf of their children, their mothers in 
law could also demand resources on the basis of past care. Such competing claims often led to 
dispute. Chipo, for example, lived in a house next to her mother in law in the village. Her 
husband was working as a bus driver and came home every two weeks and provides her with 
some cash, but never enough to cover the costs of looking after their three children. Her mother 
in law was a widow with no access to cash herself. Every time Chipo walked past the house, her 
in laws shouted out and asked her to give them something. ‘They always want money from me. 
As my husband is working, they say, “my child is earning money. You should give me some of 
it. You must be rich”. Now it is difficult even to walk past their house with a loaf of bread 
without them demanding some of it.’ The only solution, as far as Chipo was concerned, was to 
move to another village.
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As women interviewed suggested, the relationship between the bride and the mother in law 
depended on the stage in the life cycle that the latter has reached. An older mother in law may 
have passed the zenith of her powers and be more dependent on the support of her offspring. Just 
as young women complained about their mothers in law, so older women had grievances against 
their sons' wives. Some widows said that they had been left on their own without any support 
because their daughters in law prevented their sons from providing the resources that were theirs. 
After the death of a woman’s husband, and the inheritance of any land, there is little material 
incentive for sons to support their mothers. Elderly widows were dependent upon their son’s 
sense of duty and debt for past care and support as a lever on incoming cash.
Competition over resources often lay at the root of conflicts between a woman and the family of 
her husband. Disagreements were fought out through gossip and, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, accusations of witchcraft. Girls were supposed to be instructed before marriage that a 
good wife should stay quiet and never talk about family matters outside the home. Rosa said that, 
‘the wife is there to listen to her husband... A good wife must not complain. She must keep quiet 
every time.’ Women, then, were reluctant to discuss their marital problems with friends or 
neighbours for fear of being labelled as a bad wife. Many women claimed, however, that their 
mother in law scolded or used gossip as a means of punishing them for disobedience or perceived 
selfishness. Household tensions and conflicts often spread out into the village. Arguments were 
exacerbated that the fact that most households in the village were related in some way or another 
and so neighbours were usually bound to take a particular side in any family dispute.
While most women were cautious about voicing their own problems in front of other women, few
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were reluctant to join in when women were talking about someone else. Rumours of witchcraft 
and prostitution were used instead of direct confrontation. Women's position as outsiders in their 
husband's home made them particularly vulnerable to accusations of witchcraft. According to 
Shona belief, women derive their powers from spirits (mashave) that are alien to their husband's 
lineage and thereby threaten the power of their husbands' ancestral spirits (vadzimu) (Bourdillon 
1991; Schmidt 1992). While men were also vulnerable to accusations, witchcraft disputes usually 
appeared to be built upon rifts between a woman and her in laws. Accusations and counter 
accusations spread through the village, sometimes erupting in bouts of violence, but never 
seemingly resolved. One woman had fallen ill and had gone to see a diviner for an explanation. 
The nyanga’s (traditional healer’s) prognosis was that one of her relations by marriage was a 
witch, The ill woman confronted her daughter in law, who lived in the adjacent homestead, about 
this accusation. When the daughter in law refused to confess or name the guilty party, the woman 
attacked her with a machete.
As discussed in the previous chapter, these disputes sometimes touched on deeply rooted, 
unresolved conflicts which went back to the war years. In one case, a widow returned to Mabika 
after a period of residence in a nearby town. During the war years, her husband had been a 
policeman. When the guerrillas found out they came to their homestead and killed him. She fled 
the village. Agnes had returned, guided, she said, by the voice of her husband. She claimed access 
to land that was now occupied by her husband’s brother, Tom. When Tom’s son died from AIDs, 
the family accused Agnes of causing it through witchcraft 28. For a time, it looked as if Agnes
28 In Shona belief, every death requires explanation beyond the physical and, in many cases, the 
identification of the individual who has caused it.
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would have to flee the village again. But the family took the case to be judged by a nyanga. The 
nyanga accused Tom of the death. He said that it was Tom who had betrayed his brother to the 
guerrillas and now he was taking his revenge. Tom was subsequently severely beaten by other 
members of the family. But this dispute remained unresolved at the time I left Mabika.
5.11 Economic changes and numbers of children
For most women, claiming resources from their husband was a constant battle which caused them 
a great deal of anguish and hardship. The subject of remittances was one which women found 
particularly difficult to discuss. One informant came to ‘confess’, a week after I had interviewed 
her, that she had lied about her husband's cash contributions to the household because she did not 
want to slander him. Many women, when interviewed, said that their husband failed to provide 
cash on a regular basis for school fees or other necessities. Payment of remittances was not 
straightforwardly related to the man’s income. The husband of one woman, for example, had a 
regular wage from working as a handyman for the local Catholic Church. His wife stated, 
however, that her husband never gave her a penny. The husband of another woman, in contrast, 
earned an occasional wage as a casual worker dynamiting mines. She said that her husband gave 
her money whenever he could. The difference in the condition of these two women’s homesteads, 
and the apparent well-being of their children, stood as evidence of the importance to well being 
of remittances received.
174




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
15+ 2 3
20+ 5 11 7 4 3
30+ 2 3 6 4 6 5 1 1
40+ 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
50+ 5 3 1 2 1 1
60+ 1 4 2 3 1 1 1 2
While Ndau culture remains strongly pro natalist, then, the economic conditions to support large 
families are being rapidly undermined. With acute land shortage, the benefits of children's labour 
are becoming increasingly irrelevant and the possibility of long term economic gain from children 
entering the wage labour force is now outweighed by the short term misery of having to find cash 
for school fees and other daily essentials (Mazur and Mhloyi 1994; Muhwava 1994). In the past, 
as older women explained, you had as many children as God granted in the hope that some would 
survive to help you on the fields and in your old age. Both men and women interviewed agreed, 
however, that it is no longer economically feasible to have large numbers of children. As one fifty 
five year old woman explained, ‘when I thought of having eight children, the cost of living didn't 
worry me. As long as I could use my hands in the fields I was alright. In those days the cost of 
living wasn't so high. People want fewer children these days because they can't afford to keep 
them. It's not because they have been told that they should have fewer children. Even if people 
are being told, they wouldn't have listened unless they were experiencing problems.’ Another 
woman told me that it was obvious that, in the past, people wanted lots of children because they 
hoped that one might look after then when they grew old. These days, however, there was not 
much chance of your children finding a job and, even if they did, it was unlikely that they would
bother to care for their parents.
Male informants agreed with this view; ‘now that we are in the modem world, people should have 
smaller families because the costs of living are so high. In the time of our forefathers, they thought 
it was best to have as many children as possible. Then the costs were not so great.’ Another man 
claimed that ‘these days, at the beer halls or wherever, some men are saying that they only want 
three or four children. These are the civilized ones. There are some who are still not civilized and 
want to carry on having as many children as possible’.
Women, however, refused to believe men when they made these claims to want fewer children.
While the ‘civilized’ man might claim that he only wants four children because of their cost, some 
u>omen
women said that, as A , are the ones who bear the financial burden of child care, these men must 
be lying. ‘Men don’t worry so much about the costs of bringing up children. My husband can go 
for two or three months without seeing the children, whereas I have to make sure every day that 
they have food and clothes. So I can doubt my husband when he says that he only wants four 
children because he is worried about the costs of raising children’.
Yet, the evidence suggests that an increasing number of men did not want to father large numbers 
of children or, indeed, any children at all. One of the indicators of this trend was the number of 
single mothers living in the village who had been rejected by the biological father of the child. As 
comparison between tables two and three indicates, there were more women who defined 
themselves as single than women without a child. Joyce was twenty one with a seven month old 
baby. She was in love with a policeman, but when she saw that he was not going to ask her to
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marry him, she slept with a school teacher and found herself pregnant. Joyce could not tell her 
mother, who she was living with at the time, that she was pregnant because she wasn't married. 
So one night she eloped without telling anyone and went to stay at the home of the teacher's 
parents. His father, however, wanted his son to marry another girl who was richer. His parents 
said to Joyce that they didn't even want to pay damages for the baby, as recognition that their son 
was the biological father, because everyone knew that she had another boyfriend so they couldn't 
be sure that the child was related to them. When the baby was bom, however, everyone could tell 
from the way he looked that the baby was, indeed the son of the teacher. But this made no 
difference. The teacher's parents didn't want him to marry her and he, himself, did not protest 
against their decision. So, now Joyce was staying with an aunt and looking after the baby herself. 
Her mother didn't want to take her back unless damages were paid.
Patricia was twenty three years old. She had just given birth to a boy. ‘ When I got pregnant I 
didn't tell my parents. Then at five months I went to stay with the father of my husband29 in 
Bulawayo. But he said that if his son didn't love me, I couldn't stay. In Bulawayo it cost ZWD 
200 to register for maternity care. The husband refused to pay. So I didn't register until eight 
months when I returned to my parents' house. I planned the pregnancy with the husband. When 
he knew that I was pregnant, he told me to go home and said that he would send some money so 
that I could rejoin him. But he never sent the money. So I just stayed with my parents until I 
decided to go to his father's place. Then he said that he wanted to marry someone better than 
me...Men no longer want to marry. My parents didnt say anything because they know about these
29 The interview was conducted in English and husband was the term used by the informant.
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problems. Their eldest son has two children by two different women but he doesn't want to marry. 
Nowadays it's very difficult to marry. Men know that women want to get married. But men can 
have lots of girlfriends and marry any woman. If a man says that he'll marry you, you want to 
believe him. I thought that when I had child, he would marry me. Then you find out that it isn't 
true.’
The composition of households in the village mirrored these changes. Mrs Muchuro gave birth 
to eight children, all of whom are still alive. Six of these were the children of her husband, Peter. 
After her husband died, she left the area and her children stayed with her parents in law. After 
this, she had two more children with different men. But then she became ill, so she returned to 
Mabika and was better as soon as she entered the Muchuro compound. Her in laws said that her 
husband was calling her back to look after their children. So she became head of a household of 
eleven, including herself, but does not have any access to irrigated land. Five of her own children, 
the last of which was bom in 1984, were staying with her.Mrs Muchuro also looks after her 
sister's daughter, because her sister was not married when she gave birth, as well as four 
grandchildren from two of her daughters. They were also unmarried when they gave birth, and 
the fathers did not claim the children. Both have subsequently married and in neither case did the 
husband want to look after children that were not theirs. Mrs Muchuro was prepared to look after 
her grandchildren because she was afraid that otherwise her daughters might not be able to marry.
These shifting patterns of dependence and responsibility were also reacted in sex preferences in 
children. Older women generally stated that it was best to give birth to a boy. They would not 
have been happy without providing a boy to carry on the family name. Men, of all ages confirmed
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this view arguing that boys were required to carry on the family name. One male informant, 
however, with four boys said that, ‘I want a girl now, because a girl will bring a son in law into 
the family - and lobola. But these days, you can’t be too sure with girls - maybe they will run off 
into town and never get married. It is better to have one girl rather than two. If you have two, 
then they will talk to each other and run off together’. Some women also thought that it was 
better to give birth to girls. As one woman observed, ‘in the past, girls always left home to get 
married and the boys brought their wives in. But these days things are not so certain and maybe 
the girls go away, but then they come back. Nowadays, it is more likely that the girls will help you 
when you are old’. A number of younger women, then, thought that it was better to give birth to 
girls rather than boys.
A further indication of the effects of changing economic pressures on claims to marital rights 
could be found in patterns of child custody following divorce and death of the parents. While 
women stated that men always claimed their right to children from a marriage, in practice the 
issue of guardianship was not always clear cut. In reality economic rationality played as much part 
as either custom or formal legislation. In the cases of the two male divorcees, guardianship had 
followed the patrilineal rule and both men were living with their children. Of the two female 
divorcees who gave birth, the children of the oldest had gone with the father. The younger 
woman had a civil marriage and was able to claim guardianship of the children through the 
community court. Her husband, however, had not disputed the case because he did not want the 
financial responsibility of looking after them In one case where the father of two young children 
died suddenly, the paternal family wanted the parents of the mother to come and claim both the 
widow and her children. In another case, the paternal family were resisting the request of their
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widowed daughter in law to take responsibility for their grand-child. The grandmother explained 
that while her husband thought that they should become guardians to the child, he also felt that 
accepting this responsibility would lead to financial claims from both the daughter in law and the 
grandchild which they did not want to meet.
In Mabika, then, the right of the paternal clan to their offspring is strongly proclaimed by both 
men and women. But economic realities provide weak reason for men to see through those 
claims. Whereas in the past families might have been keen to claim the children of their sons in 
order to benefit from their labour and potential earnings, these days young women are keen to 
press men and their families to acknowledge paternity in order to make claims on their resources.
5.12 Conclusion
In Mabika, as women have few independent means of subsistence, they must find a husband in 
order to survive. The dominant understanding of the customary ‘conjugal contract’ is that 
marriage provides the groom with rights to a bride’s sexuality, labour and fertility. The corollary 
of men’s rights, however, is the duty to provide access to resources for their wife and children. 
Once a woman is married, then, she may bargain for resources within the terms of the marital 
agreement. Women’s primary tool in this bargaining process is children and their recognised 
needs to subsistence and education. Women’s claim to economic support exist as a corollary to 
men’s declaration of rights in fertility. Consequently, women cannot allow men to be anything 
other than traditionalists if they want to survive. Women must give up claims to rights over 
fertility in order to gain access to material well being and support. When women claim that ‘men
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always want more children to carry on the name of their clan’, this is as much a statement about 
the social order that women want as it is an indication of their perceptions of the concrete reality 
of gender relations. In Mabika, it was often women who were pushing men to acknowledge their 
rights to these children and, concomitantly, their obligation to provide for them. The evidence 
suggested, however, that in an increasing number of cases women’s reproductive strategies were 
no longer working. A number of women were left to shoulder the costs of child rearing by 
themselves. In the next three chapters I examine the values and reproductive rights supported in 
the policies of the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council and discuss the impact of this 
discourse on women’s reproductive strategies.
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Chapter 6
Family Planning Services: The Politics Of Reproductive Rights In Zimbabwe
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the historical development of concepts of reproductive rights and needs 
embedded in the policies and programmes of the Rhodesian Family Planning Association (FPA) 
and its successor, the Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council (ZNFPC). As I set out in 
chapter four, in general women are defined as the dependants of men by Zimbabwean institutions 
of citizenship. This, in turn, shapes gender relations in the household. In the last chapter, I argued 
that, in Mabika, men’s rights to fertility are central to understandings of the conjugal contract. 
In contrast, in the ZNFPC’s policies and programmes, the independent rights of women to 
control their own fertility are recognised. The concepts of reproductive rights adopted by the 
ZNFPC, however, are not straightforward. In this chapter the development of, and contradictions 
within, ZNFPC policies and programmes are examined.
I argue that, in its policies and programmes, the FPA interpreted definitions of reproductive rights 
to mean that public bodies should have authority over reproductive decision making through the 
supply of contraceptives to the female population. This interpretation was fiercely contested by 
nationalist groups and rural male elders alike and, ultimately, contributed both to the demise of 
Smith’s regime and the dismantlement of the FPA itself. The post Independence government, 
rather than dropping the issue of family planning, developed a more complex, if not contradictory, 
concept of reproductive rights. The ZNFPC has maintained the definition of reproductive rights
as being met by the state provision of contraceptives. But, in contrast to the FPA, the ZNFPC has 
adopted definitions of the standards of service provision set out in Cairo, as discussed in the 
theoretical chapter. These are defined as ‘client rights’ and displayed on posters in ZNFPC and 
Ministry of Health clinics. The ZNFPC, then, has incorporated ideas about women’s rights to 
reproductive self-determination in relation to state workers. It has not, however, clearly adopted 
concepts defined in Beijing about women’s right to reproductive and sexual self determination 
in all relationships. Policy and programme documentation indicates that the ZNFPC has reinforced 
the idea that, in the private sphere, it should be men who have authority over reproductive 
decision making. While women, then, are accorded reproductive rights and health needs in 
relation to the public sphere, it is men who are vested with reproductive rights in the private.
This chapter starts with a review of relevant discussion concerning development discourse, policy, 
bureaucracy and the state. I then provide an analysis of the policies, structures and programmes 
of first, the FPA and second the ZNFPC. In both cases, I discuss mechanisms for local level 
participation given in policies and programmes. In the next chapter, I will discuss how the 
ZNFPC’s definitions of reproductive rights are implemented through the practices of local level 
health workers in Mabika. I will further discuss the impact of local level participation on those 
practices.
6.2 Gender, policy and bureaucracy
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, Fraser argues that groups or individuals make claims for 
resources in terms of recognised idioms, or ‘talk’ including interests, needs and rights talk.
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Political contests are not just about the fulfilment of these claims, but are also concerned with 
their definition and interpretation (Fraser 1989). Policy making organisations, and policy 
processes, are central sites for rights and needs talk and, thus, for struggles over the definition, 
interpretation and implementation of rights and needs.
Analysis of the interpretation and implementation of rights, then, requires attention to debates 
about the nature of policy and policy making processes. Until recently, policy analysis has been 
dominated by rationalist approaches. From this perspective, policy is viewed as the top-down 
instrument of government. This conceptualisation is based on the assumption that the government 
can direct the action of individuals towards given ends (Shore and Wright 1997). Policy, then, 
is about the supposed efficient allocation of goods and services, with bureaucrats implementing 
and citizens responding to policy in regular and predictable ways. However, as Moser, among 
others, has observed, there is often a great deal of difference between policy and practice, 
particularly in the case of gender projects (Moser 1993). In reality, the outcomes of programmes 
and projects are rarely as predicted (Mosse and others 1998). Such observations have provided 
a challenge to the rationalist conception of policy and led to its replacement with approaches 
which analyse the complexity of policy processes. From this more recent perspective, policy can 
be understood as an evolving product of contests between different actors. As Wuyts et al 
suggest, policy can be conceptualised as a social process (Wuyts and others 1992).
Analyses of policy processes have defined policy in the broadest possible terms. Shore and Wright, 
for example, suggest that policy may be found in the written documents of an organisation, 
embedded in the institutional mechanisms or in processes of decision making and service delivery
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(Shore and Wright 1997). Wuyts et al define policy as ‘purposive actions undertaken by the state 
(governments and their employees), or by other institutions (such as voluntary organisations), 
with an avowedly public purpose* (Wuyts and others 1992:2). Their definition of policy 
incorporates all outputs of policy making organisations from policy documents to project plans 
and the actual practice of implementation. For the purposes of analysis, however, it is useful to 
distinguish a number of separate, but inter related, outputs of the policy process. Official 
definitions of policy usually exist in written form as strategic statements, regulations or laws. 
These are generally implemented in the form of particular programmes or projects (Holland and 
Blackburn 1998). Programme and project documents offer an insight into interpretation of 
policies and the proposed means by which policy objectives will be met. It is also necessary, 
however, to look at the practice and concrete reality of policy implementation. It is possible, then, 
to identify three outputs or ‘moments* in the policy process: policy, programmes and practice. 
For the purposes of analysis, these can be related to Fraser’s identification of definition, 
interpretation and implementation as three moments in struggles over rights and needs.
As Wuyts et al argue, if policy is conceptualised as a social process, then clearly the nature of 
policy making institutions is important (Wuyts and others 1992). Whereas the rationalist approach 
assumes that organisations implement policy as instructed, the social process concept of policy 
implies that the structure and practices of implementing organisations will shape outcomes. As 
Goetz argues, organisations are themselves embedded in the institutional context of the 
environment in which they operate 30. Individual organisations are not insulated from this
30Following North, a distinction is made here between institutions as rules and organisations as players 
(North, 1990).
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environment and may conform to the particular institutional constructions within which they 
evolve in terms of their structures, practices and agents. Apparently neutral, rational 
bureaucracies are, in reality, gendered. Gendered outcomes of state actions are not necessarily 
the products of directed intentional action but, as Goetz argues, the inadvertent products of 
organisations' historical embeddedness. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily possible to directly read 
off organisational structure and practice from the broader institutional context, as organisations 
have their own history and internally defined institutions. Policy definition, interpretation and 
implementation, then, are shaped both by the history of particular organisations and the broader 
institutional context in which they operate (Goetz 1995).
Examination of policy processes, then, raises questions about ‘development discourse’. Writers, 
such as Ferguson and Escobar, have suggested that ‘development’ takes place through the 
interpretive grid of a northern originating discourse which defines all southern peoples as one 
homogeneous ‘other’ (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994). As Grillo argues, the idea of a western 
‘development gaze’ assumes a monolithic, single voiced enterprise heavily controlled from the 
top. This, as Grillo suggests, is undermined by the reality of a multiplicity of development 
organisations, perspectives and discourses (Grillo and Stirrat 1998). As the discussion on policy 
processes above illustrates, however, the assumption of a unitary ‘development discourse’ also 
denies the agency of actors, and political process through which policy is formulated, interpreted 
and implemented at national levels and below. Indeed, much writing on development discourse 
appears to ignore the existence of the state altogether. As outlined above, discourses originating 
in the international arena are re-interpreted through national level political processes. The 
incorporation of international discourses into national policies and programmes, then, does not
transform the state into something other than the collection of competing organisations, interests 
and practices defined by Pringle and Watson (Pringle and Watson 1992).
6.3 FPA: Official policy
In this section I examine the historical origins of present day ZNFPC family planning programmes 
in the official policy content, structures of organisation and practice of the FPA. Analysis of 
policy content is based on official written documents, such as annual reports and information 
sheets, produced by the FPA. Further information has been obtained from unpublished historical 
accounts of the organisation. I argue that the programmes and practices of the FPA prioritised 
what was defined as the need of Rhodesian society to reduce fertility levels among the African 
population. Official policies used the language of rights but vested this right in the state rather 
than individuals. In practice the FPA challenged the ‘traditional* idea of male authority over 
reproductive decision making through the direct supply of contraceptives to women with or 
without their husband’s consent. The FPA justified their practice through reference to what they 
defined as women’s need for contraception.
The impetus for the initiation of a family planning organisation in Rhodesia came largely from 
international rather than national sources. In 1957, Edith Gates of the American Pathfinder Fund, 
an organisation concerned with the reduction of fertility in Third World, persuaded a number of 
white Rhodesians in Bulawayo to form a committee to promote family planning services for 
Africans. The personal account of Paddy Spilhaus, a founder member and leading figure in the 
FPA, illustrates the initial difference in values between Rhodesian colonials and international
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population campaigners. Spilhaus records that ‘the first time the committee met we were, with 
one exception, completely bewildered. Mr E. Whitaker, the very nice young man who had been 
elected chairman, vaguely believed that Family Planning was something to do with Marriage 
Guidance and when he heard what the proposed activities were, had to be practically chained to 
the Chair... The Treasurer of the committee, the only one who knew anything about the subject, 
was Sister Joyce Wickstead, who had just returned from a holiday in England during which she 
had done a nurse's course in Family Planning and obtained a diploma in the subject’ (Spilhaus 
1980:7).
The Bulawayo Committee, then, was initially shocked by the idea of the public promotion of 
family planning. This outrage, however, was as much to do with the fact that the Pathfinder Fund 
wanted to provide family planning services to the African population as with opposition to the 
idea of contraception per se. It is noted in official documents of the FPA that ‘many Europeans 
[in Rhodesia] already practised family planning - for Europeans have known about family planning 
for many years - and went to their own doctors’. (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 
1967:12). Further consternation was caused by the figure of Edith Gates herself. As Spilhaus 
records, the early European audiences of Ms Gates ‘wondered how an unmarried lady knew so 
much about such things’ (Spilhaus 1980:7). The Rhodesian reaction to the ideas of the Pathfinder 
Fund, then, was predicated upon a particular model of hierarchical gender and race relations. 
Opposition to the activities of the Bulawayo Committee came both from the general public and 
government health officials. The latter made it clear that municipal clinics could not be used for 
the distribution of contraceptives and information about family planning to Africans (Spilhaus 
1980).
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Spilhaus, however, inspired and informed by the Pathfinder Fund via Edith Gates, became 
convinced of the necessity for the introduction of family planning to the African population. The 
rationale for this was defined not in terms of the needs of Africans, but rather those of white 
Rhodesian society. ‘I realised that the rapidly increasing growth rate of the [African] population 
was creating serious problems for the future. It was the state which would have to provide the 
necessities of life if the parents could not. Among the information I found the frightening 
statement that the highest rates of increase in the rate of population growth was in the countries 
which could least afford it, particularly in Africa...I thought I must try and get more Europeans 
to take an active interest in the work of the Association and wrote a paper on Population and 
Land Planning* (Spilhaus 1980:35-36).
While Spilhaus came to agree with Gates’ view, and that of the international family planning 
movement, of the ‘need’ for the African population to use contraceptives, there was disagreement 
over the extent to which Africans themselves might recognise this need. Spilhaus notes that Gates 
was confident that ‘they [Africans] would be grateful to be taught family planning and everything 
would be easy’ (Spilhaus 1980:7). Spilhaus had a different view based on the colonial model of 
race and gender relations. ‘She [Gates] would not accept that there was antagonism among the 
African men and the women were afraid to do anything without the approval of their husbands. 
She would not believe that family planning was completely contrary to African customs which 
demanded that every good wife should have at least 6 healthy children, nor that a sterile wife 
could be discarded and sent back to her family. She just urged us to make more effort’ (Spilhaus 
1980:12).
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Gates’ view, then, was that contraceptive use among the African population could be increased 
simply by the provision of information on contraception and the appropriate technology. Spilhaus, 
however, believed the task was more complex. Training materials of the FPA indicate that, from 
the Rhodesian point of view, increased use of contraceptives among the African population 
required the inculcating of good ‘family values’. As the ‘Notebook for Field Workers’ explains, 
‘family planning means trying to be sure there is a balance between the size of the family and the 
amount of resources, by planning the number of children and the intervals between them. Children 
need: healthy parents; a happy family life; good training, including moral and religious training 
and education; tidy clean homes in neat communities’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 
1967:5). In the eyes of the FPA, the issue of family planning was inseparable from morality, 
cleanliness happiness and, most importantly, economic self sufficiency. A good family was one 
which did not burden the state. The policies of the FPA, then, can be seen as part of a set of 
discourses, discussed in chapter three, concerning relations between the state, colonial capital and 
the African labourer and who should bear the costs of the reproduction of the African labour 
force. The FPA policies were based firmly on the assumption that it should be African families.
The essence of this message was further embedded in the FPA’s use of the language of rights. 
The first FPA Hand book for fieldworkers contains the declaration that ‘it is basic right of every 
human being to have knowledge of Family Planning and access to supplies and medical help so 
that they can, if they wish, plan the size of their families according to the means they have to bring 
them up properly’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1967:5). The right to family 
planning, then, in the eyes of the FPA was not automatic but dependent upon economic self-
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sufficiency. In effect, the FPA’s interpretation of reproductive rights referred to the perceived 
needs of white Rhodesian society to be free of the costs of African labour, rather than any 
definition of the needs of African individuals. Read in this context, the FPA's use of the language 
of rights can be seen as an example of what Comaroff describes as the colonial manipulation of 
discourses of modernity in order to shape reality to its material advantage (Comaroff 1997). The 
FPA’s stated policy also provided a foretaste of the wording of the Teheran Declaration, 
discussed in the theoretical chapter, of the following year. Seen in this international context the 
FPA’s policy can also be read, as Freedman argues of the Teheran Declaration, as a declaration 
of intent to provide contraception regardless of people’s own wishes and wants (Freedman and 
Isaacs 1993).
on
Initially, the FPA’s model of gender relations was basedfthe ideal of the African family defined 
in colonial customary law. If economic self-sufficiency of African families was one of the 
founding principles of the FPA, then its official targets had to be the designated family head. As 
the Note Book for Field Workers explained, ‘the family is the basic unit of society. It usually 
consists of a father and mother and their children and others who are dependent on the earning 
capacity of the working members of the family. This is most often the father.’ As perceived 
breadwinner, then, it was the ultimately the father's responsibility to ensure that ‘there is a balance 
between the size of the family and the amount of resources, by planning the number of children 
and the intervals.’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1967:10). In terms of initial FPA 
policy, then, the main aim was not so much one of challenging perceived male authority over 
women's fertility but instead trying to ensure that men exercised that power in a supposedly 
responsible manner. Spilhaus notes that, from its early days, the FPA was aware of the necessity
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to ‘educate and motivate’ the male population ‘if any progress was to be made at all’. (Spilhaus 
1980:12). Consequently, the FPA directed a large part of its education programme at a male 
audience, presenting speakers and films to the workers at mines, farms and factories. Their aim 
was to instruct African men in the FPA's version of family economics and encourage them to 
allow their wives to use contraceptives. (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1967). In its 
early days, the official education programme of the FPA reinforced rather than challenged the 
dominant model of male authority generally promoted in state-backed programmes for the rural 
areas.
While ‘motivation’ programmes, however, addressed men’s rights and responsibilities, new 
contraceptive technologies were being developed to be taken by women. As one member 
observed in an account of the organisation, although it might be ‘unwise in Africa’ to ignore 
men’s role in reproductive decision making, ‘nevertheless, in medical circles the use of hormonal 
contraception by females is regarded as the best measure of family planning practice’ (Castle 
1978) (p44). The gendered nature of contraceptive technology required the FPA, in practice, to 
address women directly. During the latter part of the sixties, as the FPA moved from ‘motivation’ 
to distribution, a second strand of policy began to emerge. This focused on definitions of the 
needs of women. Spilhaus records a speech to the wives of some farm employees, during which 
she told them that women who had too many children and women who had children too quickly 
were faced with serious health problems (Spilhaus 1980:14). Moreover, healthy children ‘needed’ 
healthy mothers (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1967).The solution to these FPA- 
defined health needs of women and children, was to take contraception.
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While in Rhodesian institutions, as outlined in chapter three, women were generally identified as 
dependants of the male head of the household, the FPA’s evolving policies included the idea of 
women as having independent needs. This conceptualisation, in turn, necessitated the 
development of programmes which directly addressed the needs defined. If women’s ‘need’ for 
contraception was to be met, the FPA had to provide family planning services in the places where 
they assumed, or hoped, women resided - the Tribal Trust Lands. Here, then, was the rationale 
for the initiation of a community based distribution service. As a later account stated, ‘the need 
for wider diffusion of services is dictated by....the belief that the rural African woman may not 
travel more than 8-10kms to obtain preventive medicine’ (Castle 1978:48).
6.4 Organisational structures
As outlined above, initially the ‘motivation’ programme addressed the FPA’s interpretation of 
reproductive rights as being vested in men. The structure and practice of the organisation, 
however, reflected the FPA’s intention to directly target women as users of contraception. In 
addressing women directly rather than through male relatives, it embodied an alternative model 
of gender relations to that embedded in mainstream state programmes. Nonetheless,this was not 
a model of gender relations which, in practice, recognised African women’s autonomy. Rather, 
it was one which assumed that women’s reproductive decisions should be directed by 
organisations such as the FPA.
The Rhodesian general public, however, remained averse to the idea of African women using 
contraceptives. One woman interviewed in Mabika recalled that she used to get the contraceptive
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pill from the wife of the boss at the plantation where her husband worked. Once, when she ran 
out of pills and Mrs Stewart wasn’t there, she went to a chemist in town and asked whether she 
could have some more. But the European woman in the pharmacy refused to give them to her. 
She said it was illegal for African women to have the pill and that using the pill was against 
African traditions. Members of the public, then, perceived the FPA’s work to be contrary to the 
idea o f‘African custom’ on which the Rhodesian system of indirect rule, as discussed in chapter 
three, was constructed. Public disapproval, however, did not deter the organisation.
While the FPA was keen to promote the ‘community’ aspects of its programmes it was, in reality, 
dependent upon a pyramidical structure built on social rankings defined by gender, race and class. 
As already described, the original committee, set up in Bulawayo, was comprised entirely of white 
Rhodesians. Similar committees were soon formed in Salisbury, Umtali, Mazoe and Hartley. In 
1964 a national association was inaugurated and a governing Board appointed. Annual Reports 
indicate that, throughout the existence of the FPA, the majority of the Board members were white 
and male. Below the Board there were a number of middle management staff, clinical and 
non-clinical, most of whom were white women (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1974). 
Further expansion plans, however, were hampered by apartheid regulations which prevented 
Europeans from setting up clinics in the African areas and Africans from attending clinics in 
European areas (Spilhaus 1980). The FPA initially avoided these restrictions by identifying white -  
run commercial organisations, which employed large numbers of African migrant labourers, as 
locations for setting up clinics and distributing contraceptives. The FPA chose ‘organisations who 
allowed the Association to introduce itself and work within a community. Organisations such as 
Triangle Limited, Wankie Colliery, Hippo Valley Estates, Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation,
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Imperial Tobacco, the Chisambanje and Katiyo Estates’ (Family Planning Association of 
Rhodesia 1978:44). In the area in which Mabika was situated, the FPA also initiated a Farm 
Family Planning Scheme with the objective of using white farm owners as a distribution point for 
contraceptives to their employees (Umtali Post 1978).
When the use of local industries failed to gain the desired results in terms of numbers of new 
‘acceptors’, the FPA initiated the Field Educator programme as a means of spreading its message 
to the Tribal Trust Lands. An FPA member described the growth of the programme as follows: 
‘the move has been progressively towards establishing a work force that is part of the community 
it is to serve. It has been a methodical approach towards employing staff who can equate, in most 
of the social facets, with the people in the area in which they work’ (Family Planning Association 
of Rhodesia 1978:8). Whatever the FPA's intentions, however, their selection criteria ensured that 
their workers would have to come from the rural elite. The Field Educators had to be between 
the ages of 28 and 40. ‘Both men and women had to be married for obvious reasons, and with 
smallish families and prepared to accept the teaching of family planning and keep them small. The 
standard of education best suited to this work is between standard VI and Standard Vm  (8-10 
years' schooling)’ (Spilhaus 1980:101). The Field Educators were further symbolically marked 
out from the communities in which they worked by the accoutrements of their employment. ‘At 
the end of the month, a written examination was done, and if this was satisfactory, the trainee was 
accepted and a contract signed. They were fitted out with a bicycle, a white uniform, a brief-case 
containing literature of various levels and a record book and assigned to different areas’ (Spilhaus 
1980:104). The FPA's programme of community outreach and integration, then, utilized and 
accentuated social divisions.
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In the early years of the programme, the majority of the Field Educators were men. This can 
partly be seen as a product of the FPA’s early emphasis, outlined above, on promoting women’s 
uptake of contraceptives through their husbands. Nonetheless, it was also undoubtedly a 
reflection of the fact that, as discussed in chapter four, women were simply not considered 
employable on a formal basis. As the programme expanded, however, and the FPA moved from 
‘motivation’ to the distribution of contraceptives, the advantages of a ‘woman to woman’ 
approach were recognised. Gradually African women were allowed in at the bottom end of the 
hierarchy. Male employees, meanwhile, were shifted upwards to the newly created grade of Field 
Educator Supervisor (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1974). The FPA’s objective to 
reduce fertility, using female contraceptives, necessitated both the recognition of women 
independently from their male relatives, through the definition of women’s health ‘needs’, and the 
construction of an organisation which, in practice, could target women rather than their husbands.
6.5 Programmes and Practice
The change in the gendered patterns of the FPA’s employment practices thus marked their 
evolution away from simple ‘motivation’ to the distribution of contraceptives and, concomitantly, 
a shift in emphasis from definitions of the rights of men to the needs of women. This modification 
in the FPA’s approach to gender relations was precipitated, as indicated above, by the nature of 
new contraceptive technologies. The IUD and, more significantly, the pill, marked, in the eyes of 
the FPA, exciting possibilities in the arena of fertility reduction. By the early sixties, the 
predominant FPA view was that men could not be persuaded to use condoms and that the ‘safe 
period’ was too complicated for Africans.Male methods of contraception were, subsequently,
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only promoted as a means of STD prevention (Spilhaus 1980). Moreover, a number of chemical 
companies were keen to provide their latest products to the FPA for testing. The range of 
contraceptives made available by the FPA was determined by the intersection of the views of its 
Rhodesian management, international family planning experts and western pharmaceutical 
companies.
International condemnation of the Smith regime meant that, while a number of population 
organizations continued to provide the FPA with guidance, there was little open support or 
financial commitment. While members of the International Planned Parenthood Federation 
(IPPF), for example, made numerous support visits to Rhodesia, the FPA was not allowed to 
affiliate to the umbrella organisation. Organisations concerned with population issues and 
chemical companies, however, were willing to supply the FPA with newly produced 
contraceptives. In the early years, the FPA only supplied Volpor foaming tablets. Then in 1960 
the Pathfinder Fund asked the FPA to take part in a research project on the IUD. The technology 
was deemed to be suitable for an African population because it required little maintenance by the 
user: ‘this was a new method of birth control and it was hoped that it would be the answer in 
those countries where literacy was low. The necessary loops and inserters would be sent to us 
free of charge if we would agree to keep a record of each patient done’ (Spilhaus 1980:65). As 
Spilhaus observes, the IUD resulted in a number of side effects including rejection, pain and 
bleeding. Nonetheless, her interpretation of women’s reluctance to use the IUD is one which 
stresses their supposed irrationality. ‘We found that although many of our patients would have 
been delighted to have a method of family planning that did not cost them anything....it was in the 
shape of a double S and they said they did not want to have a “snake” inside them’ (Spilhaus
1980:57).
In 1961, the pill arrived on the scene.This was, according to Spilhaus, the turning point of the 
FPA’s fortunes. Chemical companies were keen to use Africa as a testing ground for their new 
technology and, in fact, the pill was made available in Rhodesia before it appeared in the UK. As 
Spilhaus recounts, ‘the pharmaceutical companies were endlessly helpful in supplying us with pills 
at very special clinic prices, sometimes paying for some of our literature to be printed, and not 
least of all, cheering us when we became despondent ‘ (Spilhaus 1980:30). ‘As each new pill 
appeared on the market, the agent would appear and offer a free supply of pills for a limited 
period, if a report was given on its effects and acceptance’ (Spilhaus 1980:161). Similarly, in 
1969 when Depo first appeared, the FPA received supplies to test. Spilhaus recalls that ‘a new 
method of injecting the contraceptive into the patient came onto the market...and we were given 
supplies to do a trial with it. The effect lasted 3 months and so was much easier than remembering 
to take pills.. It was called Depo-Provera’ (Spilhaus 1980:157).The FPA thus acted as a vehicle 
through which contraceptive manufacturers could test their products on a non Western 
population.
The pill was, increasingly, distributed through the community based programme. By 1980 the 
FPA employed a field force of two hundred and forty six. Of these, twenty eight supplied Depo 
and one hundred and eighty six distributed oral contraceptives while thirty two acted only as 
‘motivators’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia, 1979/80).. Information from the FPA’s 
own reports and manuals suggest that, while Educators were considered able to administer 
contraceptives, they were not seen as fit to disseminate information about those technologies.
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Those selected to be Field Educators were given a month's training, which was tailored to what 
the management of the FPA considered to be a sufficiently low level for both educators and those 
to be educated. A 1977 review of the FPA’s training notes that ‘the essential job of the Field 
Educators is to extend family planning. Training content must be based firmly on this policy, and 
other aspects such as nutrition and budgeting must be regarded as purely supportive to the main 
task. Considering the type of Field Educator which is appropriate for the extension of family 
planning, any additional burden of expertise is likely to prove detrimental.’ It is further observed 
that, 'handouts such as “menstrual cycle” and “ante-natal care” or “post-natal care” are likely to 
be confusing to Field Educators’ (Hancock 1977:7).
Detailed information about contraception was further minimised on the grounds that Africans 
would not be able to understand it. Field Educators were taught that, ‘it is important to realize 
that levels of intelligence vaiy a great deal from person to person. They (Field Educators) must 
make sure that they are talking in such a way that they can be understood, however low the level 
of intelligence’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1967:1). Spilhaus recounts that the first 
information film produced by the FPA, was called ‘Methods of Family Planning’ and explained 
contraception in a simple way. ‘We omitted the pill, thinking it was too difficult to explain...We 
added a postscript to this film which could be shown to more intelligent groups but stopped 
where it was not suitable. This explained male and female sterilization as a method of family 
planning’ (Spilhaus 1980:37-38). The community based programme, then, was primarily geared 
to the top-down distribution of contraceptives, and particularly the pill. The practices of the FPA 
suggested that concern with women’s health was minimal.
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The FPA reported that by 1980 they had encouraged two hundred and forty four thousand
women to ‘accept* contraceptives through its community based programme and clinics (Family
Planning Association of Rhodesia, 1979/80). Whatever the methods the FPA employed, these
s
figures suggest that there was a demand among African, as I will discuss in chapter eight, for
some means of controlling their own fertility. The disregard of the FPA, however, for women’s
of
health and safety meant that the organisation’s practices were depriving women of control their 
own bodies rather than enabling it.
6.6 The government take over the FPA
It was on the issue of the distribution of untested drugs to an ill-informed African population that 
the FPA, or at least its Rhodesian staff, met its downfall. The Rhodesian government had initially 
been opposed to the activities of the FPA In June 1960 the Minister of Social Welfare, Mr A  E. 
Abrahamson, announced that the Rhodesian government did not intend to make family planning 
available in all areas. He argued that Europeans already had access to information and services 
and that Africans either did not want or should not have family planning (Castle 1978). Following 
Smith's declaration of UDI in 1965, however, the government changed its stance on the matter. 
The FPA had originally raised money from a mixture of cake sales, donations from copper mining 
companies and the Rhodesian State Lotteries. Medical support had been harder to find as few 
doctors had any knowledge of family planning let alone willingness to supply contraceptives. As 
the government and Bulawayo municipality, the site of the first FPA committee, had refused use 
of their facilities, the organisers initially set up clinics in sympathisers' houses. But in 1965 the 
government agreed to provide the FPA with a grant of £150, and the Secretary of Health
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confirmed that Government Medical Officers would be given permission to insert IUDs31. By the 
1970s, contraceptives were available through most Local Government-run African clinics, where 
treatment was free but supplies, although subsidized, had to be bought. The FPA had also, by this 
time, set up a number of its own clinics (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1976).
The growing involvement of the government, however, placed the issue of family planning firmly 
in the highly charged arena of nationalist politics. Not surprisingly, nationalists questioned the 
motives of the Smith regime's interest in contraception. While, on the one hand, the government 
adopted a policy of financial incentives for white immigrants, on the other the Minister of Health 
suggested that there should be increased medical charges and school fees for those Africans who 
did not limit their family size (Spilhaus 1980). The government's backing and financial support 
for the FPA stood in marked contrast to its concern with African health services in general. The 
medical system in pre-independent Zimbabwe was designed to meet the needs of the privileged 
minority. While the state-subsidized health services for white Rhodesians matched anything 
available in the industrialized countries, provision for .the rural poor was minimal (Manga 1988). 
Inequalities in provision, among other disparities in resources, were reflected in mortality figures. 
At Independence the infant mortality rate for Rhodesians was 14 per 1000 in comparison to 120 
per 1000 for Africans (Loewenson and Sanders 1988). However, while such statistics may have 
provided more substantive evidence of the negative effects of Rhodesian policies on the black 
population, nationalist activists chose to focus its political fire on family planning.
31 Formal health care was, and still is, provided by a number of overlapping and uncoordinated 
organisations: the Ministry of Health, municipal and local governments, missions, industrial medical services and 
the private sector (Manga, 1988).
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Smith's support for contraception was interpreted as an attempt to contain a demographic threat 
to white political supremacy. This view was supported by reports that Smith was waging a 
coercive campaign to enforce family planning, with Africans being made to attend meetings where 
both psychological pressure and outright intimidation were used to make them accept the pill 
(Zimbabwe News 1967). Furthermore, there were suggestions that the FPA was using injectables 
and female tubal ligations without women’s knowledge or consent (Zinanga 1992). In response, 
ZAPU proclaimed that ‘our ultimate victory is assured by our political organization and ensured 
by our rising birthrates’ (Zimbabwe News 1970). During the war years, Field Educators and 
mobile clinics became a target for guerrilla attack (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 
1980:1). Moreover, traditional chiefs, generally relied upon to support the Smith regime, also 
joined in the public battle over contraception, claiming that they had lost control of their wives 
and daughters because the government had given them pills (Zinanga 1992). The primary bone 
of contention then, was whether the FPA or husbands and fathers should have control over 
reproductive decision making. There was little concern, in any camp, with women’s bodily 
integrity or self-determination.
By the time that Independence was declared family planning had, at least in the domain of public 
politics, been thoroughly discredited.Rather than dismantling the FPA and its family planning 
programme, however, the new Ministry of Health took the organisation on board. The take-over 
came after the mass resignation of the FPA's management as a result of a ban on Depo Provera. 
The ban was announced in July 1981 by the Minister of Health, Dr Herbert Ushewokonze. Dr 
Naomi Nhiwitiwa, the Deputy Minister of Community Development and Women's Affairs, 
explained that Zimbabwean women had been taking the drug without questioning the possible
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side effects and that, consequently, the ban was necessary to protect them (Umtali Post 1981). 
The FPA's Annual Report of 1980/81 records that ‘towards the end of June the Association 
received a letter from the Secretary for Health which stated: ‘My Minister has directed me that 
Depo-Provera will be discontinued and withdrawn from use for the time being.’ The Ministry may 
regulate what drugs are used within its own health services, but it may not arrogate to itself the 
function of the Drugs Control Council in determining what drugs may and may not be used in 
Zimbabwe outside these confines.’ (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1981:5). The 
subsequent resignation of the Board led to the Government taking control of the organisation 
under the new name of the Child Spacing and Family Planning Organisation (CSFPO) in 
September 1981.
6.7 ZNFPC - policies and programmes
The CSFPO, keen to disassociate itself from the activities of its predecessor, stressed its concern 
for the rights of its clients. In September 1981 it was announced that ‘the newly independent 
Government of Zimbabwe took control of the Family Planning Association, in order to have 
direct influence over the Association's policy, to better integrate family planning services into 
health and development and to give the services an African perspective. The Family Planning 
Association's activities were to be revamped so as to achieve maximum balance between respect 
for individual rights and needs and the overall good of society’ (ZNFPC 1983:1).
In the immediate post Independence days, the policy emphasis was primarily on needs rather than 
rights. As indicated above, the FPA drew upon, to a limited extent, definitions of women’s health
needs as a justification for contraceptive distribution in official documents. The CSFPO, however, 
made this their explicit and primary rationale for a family planning programme. It was used to 
explain both the integration of contraceptive delivery services with health care provision and the 
continuation of a separate family planning programme. It is stated in the first report of the 
organisation that, ‘the principal causes of morbidity and mortality in women are those related to 
malnutrition and child bearing...the Ministry of Health delivers Child Spacing Services as part of 
the health services that must be provided for the nation. However, due to the complexity, 
enormity and urgency of the problems, the Zimbabwe Government has established the Child 
Spacing and Family Planning Council under the Ministry of Health to concentrate on these 
issues... The Government sees child spacing as necessary for the improvement of maternal and 
child health’ (ZNFPC 1983:1). In contrast to the FPA, then, the CSFPO argued that women’s 
health ‘needs’ could be met by increasing the gap between children rather than reducing the total 
number. Moreover, whereas the FPA had defined the ‘needs’ of society as being met by the 
reduction of fertility, the CSPFO suggested that primary ‘need’ of society was for women to take 
part in social processes. This, in turn, provided a rationale for the support of child spacing. Thus, 
‘these services [‘child spacing services’] allow women to take advantage of the many 
opportunities now being made available, opportunities which will allow them to contribute more 
fully to the development of the nation’ (ZNFPC 1983:1). Nonetheless, both women’s health 
‘needs’ and the ‘good of society’, as defined by the CSFPO, were dependent upon a definition 
of women primarily as reproducers. Consequently, the means by which both these ‘needs’ could 
be met was given, as with the FPA, as being the use of contraceptives. In practice, then, whatever 
the Zimbabwean government’s emphasis on women’s health needs, these have been defined in the 
same narrow terms as under the Rhodesian government. Women’s reproductive health needs, and
consequently health service provision, have been defined in relation to fertility regulation. As I 
will discuss below, this narrow definition of reproductive health needs has shaped the definition 
of clients’ rights in relation to health workers.
In 1984 the organisation dropped Child Spacing from its title and took on its current name - the 
Zimbabwe National Family Planning Council. Its policy objectives, however, remained 
unchanged, with primary emphasis on the twin ‘needs’ for women’s health and participation in 
social processes and, consequently, child spacing rather than fertility reduction. Thus, ‘high 
fertility and closely spaced births are associated unmistakably with high rates of maternal and child 
morbidity and mortality... This reproductive pattern fragments the Sub-Saharan African woman’s 
time and greatly hinders her participation in development’ (ZNFPC 1984:2).
The passing of the 1985 Bill, however, which institutionalised the ZNFPC as a para-statal of the 
Ministry of Health, also marked a change in policy. Once established as a semi independent 
organisation, the ZNFPC introduced a fertility reduction objective. As outlined in the 1986 report, 
a demographic component was added to the health and welfare policy objectives of the family 
planning programme. The First Five Year Development Plan (1986-1990) states that 
‘programmes such as child spacing and health education that are underway are intended to reduce 
population growth and improve the quality of life of mother and child in particular’ (ZNFPC 
1986:1). But rather than justifying this objective in terms of society’s needs, the ZNFPC’s 
rationale was based on what was defined as the self identified need of families to improve their 
economic position. Thus, ‘family planning has been recognized in Zimbabwe as a felt need by the 
people and a strategy through which the living standard of the people can be raised’(ZNFPC
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1986:1).
The gender implications of this shift from health needs to fertility reduction objectives were also 
made clear. As one female ZNFPC worker explained to me, ‘we realised that we had ignored the 
fact that, in Zimbabwe, it is men who rule the bedroom’. Programmes revealed that the ZNFPC’s 
intention was not to change this ‘fact’, but, like its predecessor the FPA, to utilize it for its own 
purposes. Thus the ‘change in the major focus of the ZNFPC from promoting child spacing for 
maternal and health reasons, to encouraging people to plan their families and adopt a small family 
norm’ necessitated the recognition that ‘male dominance in the decision making process is still 
very much a reality - especially in the rural areas’. Therefore the need to target men with family 
planning information, education and communication (IEC) materials and activities became an 
important objective for 1987 as well (ZNFPC 1987:1). A series of campaigns was subsequently 
initiated with the aim of persuading men to allow their wives to use contraceptives. The first of 
these campaigns consisted of radio dramas with family planning messages and educational talks 
at football matches, in mines, farms and villages. Programme success was measured in terms of 
the number of new female acceptors or female method ‘switchers’ (West 1993; ZNFPC 1992).
The ZNFPC’s approach is perhaps most succinctly captured in the words of one of its educational 
posters which proclaims, ‘Depo Provera - keep your wife young and beautiful’. The adoption of 
fertility reduction objectives came at the point when, as outlined in chapter fou^the government 
abandoned any pretence of gender reform, and equal citizenship rights, in favour of policies which 
appeased rural traditional leaders. As the Director of the Harare-based Zimbabwe Women’s 
Action Group pointed out, the ZNFPC’s programmes are in keeping with this general approach
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and reinforce the principle that men have the right to let their wives use contraception. The 
ZNFPC defines reproductive rights in the private sphere as being vested in men.
One of the clearest indications of the ZNFPC’s, and the government’s, continuing support of male 
authority over reproductive decision making, at the expense of women’s autonomy and health, 
can perhaps be seen in the continued criminalisation of abortion. As I will discuss in chapter eight, 
abortion is regarded as an offence against Ndau custom and tradition. Yet, evidence suggests that 
local methods of abortion are commonplace. A doctor working at the main hospital said that he 
would estimate that the largest single cause of admission of women was, at the time, abortions 
that had gone wrong32.
Yet, in the public sphere of relations between health workers and clients, the ZNFPC has clearly 
defined women’s rights to a certain degree of reproductive self-determination. It is stated in 
ZNFPC service provision and standards manual that ‘the Zimbabwe National Family Planning 
Programme embraces the philosophy that individuals and couples have the basic human right to 
decide on the number and spacing of their children and are entitled to adequate information to 
enable them to discharge this responsibility effectively in the interest of the well being of the 
families and communities in which they live’ (ZNFPC 1992:5). The standards manual further 
states that this right applies to anyone over the age of 16, regardless of marital status (ZNFPC 
1992).
32 As information on abortion was difficult to gather systematically, the subject does not form a major 
part of the argument of this thesis.
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Echoing the standards set out at Cairo, the ZNFPC identifies a number o f ‘client rights’. These 
rights were displayed on posters in ZNFPC and Ministry of Health clinics where services were 
provided. These posters proclaimed that ‘the following client rights shall be ensured: Services 
shall be completely voluntary. No coercion whatsoever shall be used to enforce acceptance of 
family planning. The choice of a family planning method shall be according to the client’s 
preferences, within medically safe parameters. The client shall be treated with dignity and respect. 
The client shall be afforded privacy. The client’s medical records and the data systems shall be 
kept confidentially. The client shall receive care, regardless of financial or social status. The client 
shall receive high quality services’. The most important difference between the ZNFPC’s 
standards and those set out in the Cairo Platform for Action is the implicit definition of 
reproductive health on which the clients’ rights were based. As already indicated, the ZNFPC had 
maintained a narrow definition of reproductive health needs as being related to fertility regulation. 
The clients’ rights, then, referred solely to the provision of contraceptives. In contrast, the Cairo 
standards, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, are based on a broader definition of 
reproductive and sexual health. The Cairo standards thus refer to the provision o£ for example, 
services for the prevention and treatment of STDs (Hardon and Hayes 1997).
In relation to the provision of contraceptives, however, and fertility regulation, the ZNFPC had 
acknowledged women’s rights to reproductive self-determination and had promoted its 
commitment to these rights through the publication of a charter. While women, as clients, were 
vested with rights in the public sphere, however, men were accorded reproductive decision 
making rights in the private. These two different understandings of reproductive rights offer 
conflicting definitions of women’s reproductive self-determination. In the latter, women are
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vested with rights to use family planning if they chose to while in the former, they can only use 
contraceptives of their husband lets them. In the next chapter I will discuss how this contradiction 
is worked out through the actions of village level health workers in Mabika. In the following 
sections I give an overview of the ZNFPC’s programmes and decision making structures.
6.8 ZNFPC programmes
The ZNFPC now runs thirty seven family planning clinics throughout the country. These are 
staffed by medically trained personnel. They offer oral contraceptives, condoms, IUDs and 
injectables. Two family planning clinics in Harare and Bulawayo also offer voluntary surgical 
contraception. Most Ministry of Health run facilities from district level and above offer all 
methods available at ZNFPC clinics. Some also carry out voluntary surgical contraception. Below 
district level, rural health centres mainly offer oral contraceptives and condoms. Services offered 
at this level depend on the training of staff and equipment available. Training of Ministry of Health 
staff in family planning methods is carried out by the ZNFPC (ZNFPC 1992a).
The principal programme of the ZNFPC, however, is the community based distribution service. 
At the time that this was inherited from the FPA this consisted of two hundred and forty six Field 
Educators and Distributors, largely trained to ‘motivate’ the rural community and supply women 
with oral contraceptives (Family Planning Association of Rhodesia 1980). Under the ZNFPC this 
has greatly expanded. It now includes six hundred and sixty eight CBDs at community level and 
sixty eight group leaders at district level. The Community Based Distribution programme covers 
approximately 30 per cent of the rural population and supplies 42 per cent of all users with
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contraceptives (Zinanga 1992).
CBDs retain the primary functions of pill distributors and motivators. CBDs, once selected, 
undertake a six week training programme in family planning. Boohene and Dow suggest that the 
training programme has been considerably revamped since the days of the FPA (Boohene and 
Dow 1987). Documentation suggests, however, that the areas covered remain substantially 
unchanged. The training programme aims to impart:
• how to conduct motivational and educational talks;
• the use of a checklist before initial supply or resupply of Pills and taking of blood pressure 
(Zinanga 1990).
Until the early nineties, the emphasis largely remained on ‘motivation*. ‘In a sense the term 
Community Based Distributor is a misnomer since the workers do not merely distribute 
contraceptives. The job description, procedures manual and training stress in several ways that 
the CBD does not merely give supplies but actively encourages family planning in motivational 
and educational talks and in door-to-door contacts with the village women...the primary 
responsibility is to recruit new acceptors for Pills and to maintain them as continuing users. There 
are flexibly applied targets, to find ten new Pill acceptors and to resupply fifty continuing use each 
month’ (Zinanga 1990). The emphasis on motivation and the use of targets suggests standards 
of provision which reinforce the authority of health workers rather than safeguarding the rights 
of clients33. After training, CBDs are equipped with a bicycle, two types of oral contraceptives,
33 As indicated in the Cairo Platform for Action, the issue of targets or incentives in family planning
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condoms, record books and forms, a procedures manual, a screening checklist and a selection of 
IEC materials. Each CBD worker covers a geographical area of 15 - 20km in radius, on a bicycle 
where terrain permits, visiting clients at their homes or setting up a temporary base in a village 
for people to come and collect their contraceptive supplies (Zinanga 1992). The ZNFPC has also 
initiated the use o f ‘depot holders’ in some areas. Depot holders may resupply, but not initiate, 
clients (ZNFPC 1990).
In the early 1990s a change of direction in the ZNFPC’s programmes was considered. Evidence 
suggested that the number of new ‘acceptors’ had levelled out and that, despite relatively high 
levels of contraceptive prevalence, fertility rates were not declining. Indications that the 
programme had ‘stalled’ led to a proposed change of strategy (Zinanga 1992). A greater emphasis 
was to be placed on clinic based, rather than community based, services. The underlying objective 
was to diversify the method-mix provided by services and increase the number of users of long 
term methods including injectables and Norplant. Longer term methods were identified as being 
more cost effective and also more likely to have an impact on fertility levels (ZNFPC 1990); 
(ZNFPC 1992). Long term methods, at present, are only available through ZNFPC and some 
Ministry of Health clinics. I will discuss the use of long term methods, by women in Mabika, in 
chapter eight.
programmes, financial or otherwise, to client or provider is inimical to the practice of reproductive rights (Hardon, 
1997). As I will discuss in the next chapter, however, it was not clear that these targets still applied.
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6.9 Organisational structures and participatory mechanisms
Following the takeover of the FPA, the government announced its intention to increase women’s 
voice in the decision making processes of the new organisation. I argue here that, as with other 
state organisations, management and decision making remain top down rather than bottom up. 
I suggest that, rather than giving rural women a voice in service provision, this has allowed 
members of local powerful groups to act as gate-keepers of the services.
Dr Mugwaga, the first post Independence Director of the family planning services, argued that 
while the FPA’s programme of Field Educators allowed contraceptives to be supplied to the rural 
areas, ‘it did not allow for community participation in decision making, especially where it 
affected the village level. For a people's government, continuation of this was politically 
unacceptable’(Mugwagwa 1991:20). The idea of a participatory service, then, had its origins at 
two different levels. First, the post Independence government, as discussed in chapter four, 
initially promoted local level participation as part of its redefinition of citizenship. Second, 
additional impetus came from the enthusiasm among international health organisations for the 
Primary Health Care (PHC) approach promulgated at the 1978 Alma Ata WHO/UNICEF 
conference34.
Participation was seen as a central component of PHC. Not only, it was argued, would active 
involvement of individuals and communities ensure that health programmes developed in response to locally felt 
needs, it would also be a means of raising political consciousness and encouraging people to get involved in wider 
development processes. It was by this latter activity that community participation advocates differentiated 
themselves from the much criticised community development approach of the 50s and 60s (Asthana, 1994; 
Midgeley, 1986;Walt, 1990)
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In the early 1980s, international enthusiasm for PHC met with the idealism and socialist face of 
the newly independent Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government was keen to systematically 
introduce the PHC approach in order to address the inequalities in health provision set up under 
the colonial regime. Consequently, the government initiated a rural health centre building 
programme and a number of child health programmes as well as taking over the then FPA 
(Manga 1988). Participation in the planning and management of the family planning services, as 
with other state services, was to be facilitated through local government institutions - village 
development committees and ward development committees. Health matters were to be dealt with 
by a Health Committee, Village Health Workers (VHWs) and CBDs. The VHWs were to deal 
with all health issues including family planning education but, unlike the CBDs, were not trained 
distribute contraception. Both CBDs and VCWs were to be selected by the community.
CBDs and VHWs, then, were initially presented as a vector for both the top-down and bottom-up 
flow of information. The first Director of the post Independence ZNFPC pronounced that ‘by 
granting the women social recognition and participation at all levels of decision making, the 
government in effect enabled them to reset priorities’ (Mugwagwa 1991:21). Later statements, 
however, suggested a more instrumental approach to participation. Having adopted new fertility 
reduction objectives, the ZNFPC stated that moving ‘the programme into this new phase...places 
responsibility for promoting family planning at the local community level and encourages leaders 
and members to develop their own motivational activities’ (ZNFPC 1987:1). If, then, participation 
was initially seen as a means of allowing women’s voices to be heard, it was later presented as 
an instrument for ensuring the achievement of the ZNFPC’s objectives. This trend was also 
reflected in the changing role of the VHW. In 1988, a new community health worker cadre, the
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Village Community Worker (VCW) was created in accordance with the 1986 Presidential 
Directive. The role of the VCW was to ensure that women contributed to all local projects, 
including health. VCWs initially came under the Ministry of Community, Co-operative 
Development and Women's Affairs and then later became the responsibility of the Ministry of 
National Affairs. The change in job title from VHW to VCW thus marked a shift in emphasis from 
addressing the self-defined health needs of women to ensuring their co-operation in all 
government activities.
As discussed in chapter five, government proclamations notwithstanding, institutions of local 
government were, in practice, little more than the bottom rung in a top-down decision making 
process. With few resources and no real opportunities for input into policy, they quickly became 
vehicles for patronage rather than participation (Alexander 1995). Community based health 
services were no exception. As the ZNFPC Director observed, one of the early problems with 
the expanded community based distribution programme was difficulties with selection procedures 
as the result of rivalries between different factions involved in the process (Mugwagwa 1991). 
Although selection of health workers remained the goal of many PHC programmes, in practice 
community leaders and health service personnel retained a disproportionate say in the selection 
of community health workers(Walt 1990). Traditional leaders and their clients, dominant in 
institutions of local government, were able to influence selection processes. The ‘capture’ of 
health worker posts by local elites has been furthered by the seven year educational requirement 
for both CBDs and VCWs which, in practice, excludes a large proportion of the rural population 
(Sanders 1992; Tumwine 1989).
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One ZNFPC manager described the structure of the ZNFPC as, ‘bottom-up until the CBDs are 
selected and then its top-down management’. Given the reality of CBD selection, the ZNFPC is 
probably most accurately described as a top down decision making organisation. The 1985 Act 
which established the ZNFPC as a para statal also ensured that the Ministry of Health retained 
strong control. The Minister of Health acts as Chair of the Board, the policy making body of the 
ZNFPC. Other members of the Board are drawn from a cross section of government ministries 
and officially recognised non governmental organisations such as church groups and trade unions. 
Both the Ministry of Health and the ZNFPC are governed by the same policies and standards. The 
given objective of the Executive Committee is to translate policy into programme content. Below 
the Executive Committee, the Provincial Family Planning Committees have a limited degree of 
autonomy (ZNFPC 1991)(Govemment of Zimbabwe 1985)35.
Below the Provincial managers, a chain of educators and group leaders ensure top down 
supervision, rather than support of CBDs. ‘The group leader does unannounced spot checks to 
see whether the CBD is at the scheduled place on the weekly routes and may go to some homes 
to see whether the CBD’s records are valid and accurate. During these visits, technical and 
administrative changes are also transmitted to the CBD through the group leader’ (Zinanga 
1990:40).
Herbst argues that there has been greater decentralization in health than in other sectors. ‘The decentralization of 
the health-care system is an unusual instance in Zimbabwe where power has actually been devolved away from the 
national government..The government was able to proceed with decentralization in health care because the health 
bureaucracy serving the rural areas was, essentially, an entirely new creation’ (Herbst, 1990:177). It is not evident 
even if Herbst’s argument about health service management is correct that the ZNFPC mirrors the Ministry of 
Health in this respect.
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The lack of participation at local level, then, is replicated throughout the hierarchical structure 
of the organisation. CBDs interviewed had their own criticisms of the services provided. 
However, they were unable to voice comments within the organisation because, as one pointed 
out, they themselves were at the bottom of the heap. One CBD thought that she needed to spend 
more time on the plantations supplying migrant workers and their partners. When I asked her why 
she didn’t suggest this to the area supervisor, she replied ‘orders are orders’. The CBD’s position, 
then, is itself fixed within the organisational structure and culture. Those above them are either 
male or female but more educated and, in some cases, consider themselves to be more superior 
to those underneath them. One provincial-level female manager, for example, queried the value 
of the interviewing the CBDs as they were ‘uneducated’ and without intelligent comments to put 
forward. Lack of participation at the local level, then, is repeated at every stage of the hierarchy. 
The impact of this structure on the implementation of policies and programmes is discussed in the 
following chapter.
6.10 Conclusion
The development of concepts of reproductive rights in international discourse can be traced, at 
national level, through Zimbabwe’s policy and programme documents. The FPA incorporated 
the principles, adopted at Teheran, that couples had the right to decide freely, and responsibly, 
on numbers of children, and should be provided with the means to do so. This right was 
interpreted and implemented, however, to promote government-supported workers’ control over 
women’s reproductive decision making. While African women may have wanted contraceptives, 
the FPA responded to this demand in ways which undermined women’s reproductive
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self-determination. The FPA’s practice of providing contraceptives without fully informed consent 
led to its demise after the new Zimbabwean government came to power.
The ZNFPC also recognises that ‘individuals and couples have the basic human right to decide 
on the number and spacing of their children* (ZNFPC 1992) 5). But, in contrast to the FPA, the 
ZNFPC has adopted standards of service provision, based on those set out in the Cairo Platform 
for Action, which safeguard women's reproductive self determination in relation to health 
workers. These standards are defined as ‘client rights’ and displayed on posters in ZNFPC and 
Ministry of Health clinics.
The ZNFPC’s policies and programmes, however, do not address women’s rights to reproductive 
self-determination in the private sphere set out in Beijing. Programme documentation indicates 
that, through its information and education activities, the ZNFPC supports male authority over 
reproductive decision making. In one clinic, the charter setting out women’s rights as clients was 
pinned next to a poster encouraging men to let their wives use Depo Provera. ZNFPC 
programmes and policies incorporate two conflicting definitions of women’s reproductive rights. 
Women’s reproductive self-determination is recognised in relation to the public sphere, but not 
the private. The first of these definitions, based on the identification of women as independent, 
rights bearing individuals, can be contrasted with the identification of women, through institutions 
of citizenship, as the dependants of men. The second conforms to these dominant values. In the 
following chapter, I will discuss how local level workers interpret and resolve these contradictions 
through their everyday practices.
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Chapter 7
The Practice Of Family Planning Service Provision In Mabika
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine how the definitions of reproductive rights and needs embedded in the 
ZNFPC’s policies and programmes are implemented in Mabika. I argue that local level health 
workers, in their daily practices, have discretion to interpret official definitions. The outcome of 
health workers1 actions is the differential supply of contraceptives and other services to groups 
defined by marriage, age and finances. As mediators between the state and female clients, health 
workers police the distribution of information and contraceptive technologies. They are in a 
position to determine the realisation of women’s entitlements. As Lipsky and van Gunsteren 
argue, then, street-level bureaucrats hold the keys to certain dimensions of citizenship (Lipsky 
1980; van Gunsteren 1978).
As argued in the previous chapter, ZNFPC policies and programmes embody two interpretations
of reproductive rights. The first interpretation addresses women’s relations with state health
workers. The ZNFPC displays a charter o f ‘client rights’ in clinics providing contraceptives.The
second interpretation addresses reproductive rights in the private sphere. The ZNFPC supports,
through posters and the male motivation campaign of radio and work place talks, men’s authority
over reproductive decision making in the home. Whereas the first interpretation embodies the
notion that women have the right to make their own choices about contraceptive use, the second
implies that women’s access to and use of contraception is dependent upon male agreement.
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Where these two principles clearly conflicted and most obviously challenged male authority, 
health workers bowed to the second principle that women should not be able to obtain 
contraception without a husband’s permission. Thus, health workers did not provide 
contraceptives to those women defined as unmarried. Yet they went out of their way to provide 
contraceptives to married women whose husband’s were known to disagree with their 
contraceptive use. Workers justified their actions by drawing on the arguments of women, 
discussed in chapter five, about the terms of the conjugal contract. They argued that married 
women had the right to use contraceptives if they wished, whatever their husband said, because 
they are the ones who had to carry the burdens of having and raising children.
The clearest form of discrimination in the implementation of clients’ rights was on the basis of 
marital status. The failure of the health workers to systematically observe all the standards set 
out in the charter created barriers to services for other social groups. Those most vulnerable were 
younger women and the poor. While overt coercion was never used, women did not think that 
they were always treated with dignity and respect. Women were not always afforded privacy and 
they were not always given choices about family planning methods. As set out in the previous 
chapter, the ZNFPC’s charter of clients’ rights was defined in relation to the provision of 
contraceptives rather than the broader definition of reproductive and sexual health given in the 
Cairo Platform for Action. I further suggest, in this chapter, that the implementation of the 
ZNFPC’s narrow definition of reproductive health needs, in practice, creates further barriers of 
access to family planning services.
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the authority of health workers to interpret policy in
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practice is shaped by local structures of accountability. Local level structures of government in 
Mabika, as described in chapter four, have become the bottom rung in a top down decision 
making process. As with most government services, government posts and positions have largely 
been occupied by rural elites. The authority of health workers was, thus, magnified by virtue of 
the fact that they had a higher socio-economic status than most of their clients. On an individual 
basis, women felt unable to question their guidance or express their concerns. The lack of 
operational participatory mechanisms meant that there was no forum for collective demands to 
be made on health services. In particular, women were concerned that there was no effective 
means of redressing health workers who were seen to have abused clients’ rights. There was, 
then, no accountability between workers and villagers.
In the first part of this chapter, I will examine debates about the role and actions of local level 
workers. In particular, I will set out Lipsky’s arguments concerning the role of ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980). I will then discuss the local level provision of family planning services 
in the area of field work. I first discuss the practices of the health workers in relation to male 
authority over reproductive decision making. Secondly, I discuss the observance of the charter 
of clients’ rights in service provision. Thirdly, I will discuss broader issues of reproductive health 
service provision. Finally, I will examine structures of local level participation and accountability.
7.2 Street level bureaucrats
In the previous chapter, I examined the historical development of the ZNFPC’s policies, 
programmes and decision making structures. As Lipsky argues, however, public policy cannot
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be simply understood as ‘made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high ranking administrators 
because, in important ways, it is actually made in crowded offices and daily encounters of street 
level workers’ (Lipsky 1980:xii). Policy, then, as it is experienced by service users, is crucially 
shaped by ‘street level bureaucrats’. These are, according to Lipsky, the ‘public service workers 
who interact directly with citizens and who have substantial discretion in the execution of then- 
work’ (Lipsky 1980:3). The impact of street level bureaucrats on ordinary people’s lives may be 
considerable: ‘They socialize citizens to expectations of government services and a place in the 
political community. They determine the eligibility of citizens for government benefits and 
sanctions. They oversee the treatment (the service) citizens receive in those programs. Thus, in 
a sense street-level bureaucrats implicitly mediate aspects of the constitutional relationship of 
citizens to the state. In short, they hold the keys to a dimension of citizenship’ (Lipsky 1980: 4). 
Analysis of bureaucrats behaviour has, at least in the past decade, been dominated by theories of 
‘private interest’. From this point of view, state officials’ behaviour is not determined by the aim 
of providing a good service, but by the pursuit of their own interests. These interests may include 
salary, public reputation and power (Mackintosh 1992). As with all approaches rooted in 
methodological individualism, however, private interest theory fails to take into account issues 
of power and culture which shape the perspectives and practices of individual actors (Bourdieu 
1977). Building on the arguments of Goetz, I suggest that the actions of street level bureaucrats 
can be analysed in the context of the practices, structures and culture of both the organisation for 
which they work and the societies in which they operate (Goetz 1996;Goetz 1995). Furthermore, 
as Goetz argues, agents working within organisations have their own histories as individuals in 
particular societies (Goetz 1995). The social background of individuals not only shapes their 
perspectives, but also their relations with other workers and clients. These relations of power,
then, are not simply the product of organisational hierarchies but, additionally, the result of the 
interlocking of those structures with broader social relations of power. As Lipsky argues the 
degree of bureaucrats discriminatory power over citizens differs according to the status of the 
individual. Lipsky argues that, ‘the poorer people are, the greater the influence street-level 
bureaucrats tend to have over them’ (Lipsky 1980:6). Here I suggest that the degree of influence 
is related not just to individuals * economic status but to a range of interrelated factors including 
gender and age.
Recent work on relations between state workers and clients has focused on the issues of ‘social 
capital’ and the creation o f ‘synergy’ across the public-private divide. The central tenet of this 
approach is that trust, built up through networks and associations, may have positive social and 
economic outcomes. Evans suggests that, in some cases, government action has instilled a sense 
o f ‘calling’ in public servants. This has elicited public minded'behaviour in government workers 
and made them more willing to engage in the kind of diffuse public service that helped generate 
new relations of trust between them and the community. He suggests that one means of extending 
these relations of trust is to ensure that some of those who are part of the state apparatus are 
made more thoroughly part of the communities in which they work. Evans’ focus on the 
public-private divide challenges the over-simplified economic rationality of private interest 
theories and rightly places the analysis of public service provision in the context of the relationship 
between providers and clients. As Evans acknowledges, relations of trust may only operate in the 
context of equality (Evans 1996:1122; Tendler and Freedheim 1994). As argued above, however, 
in reality these conditions do not exist.
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I suggest here that trust between clients and service providers is not dependent upon equality of 
relations, but rather accountability. As Lonsdale and Sen argues, accountability has two aspects.
It includes both the identification of responsibility and the measuring of whether that responsibility 
has been met (Lonsdale 1986; Sen 1992). As Elson argues, then, the primary implication of rights -  
based policies is the requirement for accountability (Elson cited in Beall 1998). As Paul argues, 
in the absence of alternative sources of provision, accountability over public service providers can 
only be sustained when government’s ‘hierarchical control’ of workers is reinforced by the 
public’s willingness and ability to ‘voice’ and exert pressure on the providers to perform (Paul 
1991).
7.3 Services and workers
In Mabika, contraception could be obtained from two principal sources; the main clinic or the 
CBD. The clinic was situated 3km from the village. Family planning services were available 
during clinic opening hours from 9am to 5pm on a daily basis. The clinic provided basic medical 
treatment, including maternity delivery services and had provision for short term in-patients. More 
complicated, or chronic cases, requiring prolonged treatment or surgery were referred to the 
Mission Hospital situated approximately 100 km away. Mrs Maposa, the CBD could either be 
contacted at her home, which was located near to the clinic, or during her programme of visits 
which was organised on a three weekly cycle. CBDs supplied two types of pill, Ovarette and Lo 
Feminol for breast feeding and non breast feeding mothers respectively. The CBDs charged 
ZWD2.10 (25p) for one cycle of pills, although charges could be waived attbeir discretion. 
Condoms were free but rationed as supply did not meet demand. In addition to the pill and
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condoms, the hospital also provided Depo Provera, formally reintroduced in to the programme 
in the early nineties36. All hospital-provided contraception was free, but supplies often ran out. 
An IUD insertion service was provided by a mobile ZNFPC clinic which visited on a three- 
monthly basis. Sterilisation services were available at the Mission Hospital.
Family planning services, then, were provided by Mrs Maposa and the nursing staff. In addition, 
the Village Health Worker’s role included provision of information about contraception. All of 
these workers were identified by informants as part of the state. No distinction was made, in this 
respect, between nurses employed by the Ministry of Health and CBDs employed by the ZNFPC. 
As one informant explained ‘the CBDs and VCWs are part of the government, not part of the 
village.’ Equally, all health workers were seen as part of an inter-related elite. As outlined in 
chapter four, it has been argued that in Zimbabwe processes of community election have allowed 
local elites to dominate positions in all sectors including health (Alexander 1995; Cousins and 
others 1992; Tumwine 1989). The identity, in terms of kinship and socio-economic status, of 
health workers in the area of field work confirmed this argument. The CBD had, in fact, not been 
selected at all but had originally been employed by the FPA and carried on working after 
Independence37. The CBD was the wife of an ex councillor. The VCW in the village was the 
sister of the Headman. The Sister in Charge at the local hospital was the Headman's 
daughter-in-law which, despite the fact that this position was not selected at local level, fuelled 
villagers' perceptions that government positions circulated around an inter-related group of
^Interviews an documentation suggest that the ban on Depo supply was never, in practice, total
37 This was true of a number of CBDs that I spoke to.
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people.
Villagers thought that the health workers were not only related by ties of close kinship, but were 
also part of an economic elite, the ‘well-ups’. This was a label that appeared to fit the reality. The 
VCW lived next to her brother, the Headman, in one of the largest concrete built houses in the 
village. The supervisor of the VCWs also had a spacious, well-built house in the township. The 
CBD, whose husband had a successful business, also occupied a concrete and brick built house 
in the township. One of the non-health worker members of the health committee had one of the 
largest and most profitable shares of irrigated land in the village. He also worked for Agritex, the 
government ministry of agriculture, which provided him with cash for inputs. This pattern of 
dominance of health worker positions by a rural socio-economic elite appeared to be mirrored in 
other areas. All the CBDs I interviewed were the wives of councillors or professionals - 
headmasters, teachers and businessmen.
In the case of both nurses and CBDs, their differential status to clients increased their authority 
and effected the nature of individual relations between service users and providers. This relation 
of authority manifested itself however, through the different types of work undertaken by nurses 
and CBDs. Nurses were seen as having a lot more direct power than the CBDs. Women said that 
this was because of their role as providers of general health care. As there was no other clinic 
nearby, nurses held the monopoly on the provision of bio-medical services. Villagers, then, were 
dependent upon the nurses and, therefore, felt themselves to be in their power. CBDs were 
considered to be less directly powerful because they were avoidable, either through 
discontinuation of contraceptive use or through use of the alternative services at the clinic.
225
Nonetheless, CBDs were considered to have greater indirect, or more diffuse, power because of 
their role as house to house providers. This gave them both access to knowledge about 
individuals and the networks by which to spread gossip. A number of female informants suggested 
that health workers could be compared to the figure of the mother in law. But, as one informant 
suggested, while the nurse was like a mother in law at her zenith, the CBD was one whose 
powers were dwindling. These powers, then, shaped individual interactions between service users 
and providers and, consequently, the degree to which rights defined by the ZNFPC were realised. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, as I will discuss below, the differentially derived power of nurses and 
CBDs underpinned the rights over which they had greatest control. While it was the nurses who 
were least observant of client rights, it was the CBDs who acted as the firmer policemen of male 
authority over household reproductive decision making. Of the women interviewed who used 
the pill, there was a roughly equal division of numbers between those who obtained supplies from 
the clinic, those who went to the CBD and those who used a mixture of both. As I will discuss 
below, the reasons why women used one service rather than another were related to the 
differential implementation of client rights and ‘private sphere’ rights. Different groups of women, 
defined along the axes of marriage, age and financial status were accorded particular entitlements 
by the two services. Women used the services, then, where they were most likely to be able to 
obtain their entitlements.
7.4 Recognition of male authority
As discussed in the previous chapter, ZNFPC policy contains two conflicting interpretations of 
women’s rights to reproductive self determination. The ZNFPC standards manual indicates that
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anyone over the age of 16 is entitled to services regardless of social status (ZNFPC 1992). The 
ZNFPC also promotes the idea, through poster and other media campaigns, that men have 
authority over whether or not their wife should use contraception. Health workers have to 
mediate these two conflicting principles. On the ground, this contradiction was resolved through 
the refusal of services to women who were known to be unmarried. Women who were married, 
however, could obtain family planning services regardless of their husband’s wishes. As I will 
discuss below, it was the CBDs with their community based knowledge and work who more 
effectively policed these boundaries than the nurses.
As discussed in chapter five, according to the Ndau undertanding of the terms of the conjugal 
contract, a couple are not considered to be properly married until the woman has given birth . 
Women who were known to be unmarried, or who had not given birth, could not obtain any 
services from the CBD. Despite the ZNFPC's proclamation that anyone over the age of 16 has 
the right to family planning services, health workers refused to supply women who had not given 
birth, regardless of their age. One woman explained,’I heard of family planning before I had my 
first bom but wasn't allowed to use it. The CBD said that women without children were not 
allowed to use family planning. I couldn't even get condoms for STDs - 1 asked but I was refused. 
I also asked another CBD but she refused too. If you continue to pester the CBD she will report 
you to your parents.’ All of the unmarried women interviewed said that they were unable to 
openly obtain contraceptives of any kind. This group included one woman who was twenty five 
but single. This rule was applied to women regardless of their social status. One unmarried local 
government employee told me that she was unable to officially obtain contraceptives38. A
38 It is possible to buy oral contraceptives over the counter at some chemists m main towns. The prices
227
manager in the Ministry of Health confirmed that, indeed, if a woman who had not given birth 
asked a health worker for contraception they would probably ‘be chased away with a stick.’ The 
refusal of health workers to supply unmarried women was, then, a known fact both among service 
managers and the general population. As well as refusing to supply contraceptives to unmarried 
women, CBDs further refused to give single women information about family planning. Agnes 
recounted that, ‘our house at Chibuku was visited by the CBD. The CBD was teaching people 
about different kinds of contraception. I was eighteen at this time. The CBD was visiting my 
mother. The CBD wasn’t talking to me. But we used to hide behind the house and listen to what 
the CBD was saying. The CBD didn’t like this and chased us away. She only wanted to talk to 
those who had given birth.’
The general perception, then, that CBDs would not supply unmarried women acted as a deterrent 
to them trying to obtain services. As one woman said, ‘Before I gave birth, it was impossible to 
get condoms or contraception of any kind. I didn't try. If you are a woman and not married, what 
would they say?’ The CBD’s role in the community meant that they knew who lived where and 
with whom. CBDs, then, were perceived to have the knowledge to determine who was married 
and who was not, as well as the networks to inform on any unmarried woman who tried to obtain 
contraceptives.
Other categories of women were also reluctant to obtain services from the CBD for fear of the 
spread of gossip.Reluctance to use the CBD was, in all cases, a reflection of the CBD’s position
are unsubsidised and it is, therefore, a much more expensive option than purchasing supplies from the ZNFPC. 
While, officially, chemists are not supposed to supply oral contraceptives without a doctor’s prescription, in 
practice some do if you can name the brand you want.
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rather than a comment on the individual nature of the CBD. Women who were supposed to be 
celibate - if they were widowed, divorced, old or their husband was away working - said they 
might be reluctant to ask the CBD for contraception, advice or referral to a clinic for STD 
symptoms. As one divorced woman explained, ‘I once told the CBD that I didn’t want her to 
come, and she hasn’t been back since...if people see the CBD at my house they might think that 
I am wandering’. Another woman, whose husband had died, also worried that if she went to the 
CBD for supplies of the pill, there would be rumours going around the village that she was a 
prostitute.
Women who were prostitutes, however, said that they had no hesitation to ask, and no problem 
in obtaining, contraceptive supplies from the CBD. Bemadina, who was open about the fact that 
she was a commercial sex worker, said that the CBD did not come to her house, but that she had 
never had any problem obtaining condoms from CBDs when they were on their rounds. As one 
woman observed, ‘they give contraception to prostitutes but not to unmarried women’. One CBD 
I spoke to confirmed that she supplied prostitutes, but not women who were unmarried because, 
‘this might turn them into prostitutes’.
io&men
Post menopausafwere also reluctant to use the services of the CBD. While in Ndau culture, there 
is a taboo against post menopausal women having sexual relations, in practice the extent to which 
this taboo is observed is not evident. Agnes, who was over fifty, boasted about her sexual 
prowess. She said that she used special herbs to keep her skin soft and smooth, and was able to 
attract younger men. Another woman, also over 50, said that she had, on occasion, taken male
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partners in return for various favours. When I asked these women whether they could ask the 
CBD for advice on reproductive health matters, or condoms to prevent STDs, they were both 
shocked at this idea. Speaking to the CBD, they felt, would be tantamount to a public admission 
of sexual activity. Whether or not other post menopausal women were sexually active, they did 
not use CBDs as a source of information, advice or contraceptives for STD prevention.
There were few overt barriers to men using the services of the CBD, apart from the rule that they 
should be over the age of sixteen. I accompanied Mrs Maposa on her rounds of a nearby 
plantation, which employed a large number of male migrant workers. The workers appeared to 
have little hesitation in approaching her and asking for condoms despite the fact that this implied 
that they were having casual sex. Indeed, a number of men joked about the limited number of 
condoms they were given (twelve each), saying it would hardly last them a week let alone a 
month. Younger men were equally unabashed about asking for condoms. In some cases, when 
they appeared to be well under the age of sixteen, Mrs Maposa refused to supply on the grounds 
that they were too young. But, again, the situation was handled in a light hearted way and the 
boys told that they were too young to be out of school let alone asking for condoms. Some men, 
however, later told me that they might hesitate to approach the CBD for condoms on the grounds 
of her sex.
Those women who had difficulty in obtaining services from the CBD as a result of their social 
status, preferred to use the clinic because it was perceived to be more anonymous. Even though 
nurses were local and perceived to be part of the elite o f ‘well-ups\ it was felt that they did not 
have the same power to spread gossip that went with the CBD’s role. Moreover, a trip to the
clinic did not identify one so clearly as a contraceptive user as a visit from the CBD. As one 
woman explained, ‘in my case, it would be difficult for me to ask Mrs Maposa for the pill, 
because at the moment everyone knows that I am staying alone without my husband. She might 
ask me why I wanted to use the pill without a husband. It would be embarrassing going to the 
clinic because the nurses are local and maybe other people would be around. But it would be 
worse with the CBD because she moves house to house and she would remember you, whereas 
the nurses see so many people they might forget your particular case*. For those women, 
then,who fell between the ZNFPC’s conflicting interpretations of client and marital reproductive 
rights, the clinic was the best option.
7.5 The subversion of men’s reproductive authority
The consistent resolution of the ZNFPC’s conflicting principles concerning male authority over 
reproductive decision making, might have been insistence on proof of a husband’s consent. In 
practice, however, consent of the spouse to use contraceptives was neither a formal nor 
informally applied requirement. CBDs were keen to ensure that all married women were supplied 
with contraceptives, whatever the wishes of their husband. Indeed, stories about the clandestine 
supply of contraceptives to married women were an important part of CBD culture. Mrs Maposa 
recounted the following: ‘if the husband objected to his wife taking the pill, then the CBD would 
tell them to take the pills out of the packet, wrap them up and store them somewhere, in the grass 
or the thatch of the roof. If the husband asks about the pills they can say ,”I was given them for 
my blood pressure”...One woman had seven children and she wanted to be sterilized. So I referred 
her to Chibuku clinic and told her to pretend that she was ill. So she went for a day and told her
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husband that she was sick and had to go for treatment. Her husband was away for a couple of 
weeks so he didn't see the scars’.
Local knowledge and networks, seen as a threat to some women, were used to ensure other 
women’s contraceptive supply. Mrs Mhloyi, another CBD interviewed, said that, ‘sometimes the 
CBD will give the pill to a neighbour and tell her to give them to another woman so that the 
husband doesn't know that the wife is taking family planning. One time I knew that the husband 
had gone to look for work at Honde plantation. So I cycled over to see his wife that afternoon 
because she was due to stop breast feeding and I knew she would be desperate not to get 
pregnant.’ CBDs used their community based role, then, to police both the negative and the 
positive boundaries of contraceptive provision.
CBDs justified their actions through reference to local women’s discourses in household 
negotiations over the marital contract. Mrs Mhloyi explained that she thought that all married 
women should be able to have contraceptives, whatever the husband thought, because the woman 
was the one who suffers the pain and problems of childbirth. Mrs Maposa that she felt that as it 
was women who had to bear the daily costs of looking after and feeding the children, they should 
be the ones to choose when to have another child. CBDs justified their actions, then, through 
reference to understandings of the conjugal contract. As men failed to meet their responsibilities 
to support their wives and families, so they could not expect to claim their full entitlement to 
reproductive authority. This argument, however, as outlined above, was not applied to women 
who had not entered into the conjugal contract. In the eyes of the CBDs, women had to enter into 
the conjugal contract, and suffer the consequences of men’s disregard of its terms, before they
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could break their own side of the deal.
CBDs not only used these argument to promote contraceptive use among married women, but 
also to suggest what kind of contraception they should be using. Most of the women interviewed 
who had been visited by a CBD said they had not discussed STDs with them. Five women, 
however, said that Mrs Maposa had talked to them and told them to try and persuade their 
husband to use a condom. In all of these cases, the women indicated that the CBD had identified 
their husband as being a man who slept around a lot. One woman said, ‘the CBD told me that I 
should not trust my husband and should try to persuade him to use condoms’. Another woman 
reported, ‘It’s part of my husband’s way to be unfaithful. The CBD knows that he is so 
promiscuous, so she tells me to try to make him use condoms’. CBDs, then, shared local women’s 
views on the obligations of men and their perceived failure to play their part in marriage. They 
promoted contraceptive use against a husband’s wishes in terms of local women’s discourse about 
the relative contributions of men and women to the marriage.
7.6 Client rights: the CBD programme
As discussed in chapter six, the ZNFPC had a charter of standards of family planning provision. 
These ‘clients’ rights were defined as follows: ‘services shall be completely voluntary. No 
coercion whatsoever shall be used to enforce acceptance of family planning. The choice of a 
family planning method shall be according to the client’s preferences within medically safe 
parameters. The client shall be treated with dignity and respect. The client shall be afforded 
privacy. The client’s medical records and the data systems shall be kept confidentially. The client
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shall receive care, regardless of financial or social status. The client shall receive high quality 
services’.
As indicated above, while the nurses were seen as the best source of contraceptive supply for 
single women, the CBDs were preferred for their regard of the given clients’ rights.CBDs were 
trained to supply two types of oral contraceptive pill and condoms.Each CBD has a set outreach 
programme based on a three weekly cycle. While area supervisors emphasised the systematic 
organisation of the CBD programme, observation of the practice suggested that reality did not 
always match up to plans. Villages included in the programme were often difficult to access, 
particularly in the rainy season and, inevitably, the CBD did not always succeed in keeping to her 
schedule of visits °9 The CBDs did not always move from house to house, but rather set up shop 
in a fixed location in each village. Women could then come to the CBD to collect their supplies 
of the pill.
All women interviewed supplied by the CBD said that they were always treated with respect. The 
CBDs were always ‘polite’, never mocking and never scornful. CBDs, then, observed clients’ 
basic entitlements to be treated with dignity and respect. Women liked this aspect of the CBD 
service. Indeed, a number of women said that this was why they got their contraceptive supplies 
from the CBD rather than the clinic. Dignity and respect came above considerations of 
convenience. The phrase that was most often used to describe the CBDs was that they were ‘free
39 Having been given the programme of one CBD by the area supervisor, I set off with my research 
assistant to try and locate her. The village was 10km away from the main road but almost inaccessible because of 
the number of seemingly near-vertical hill sides that had to be negotiated in order to get there. The CBD did not, in 
fact, turn up. But, having spent half a day trying to walk 10km, I do not want to make light of the difficulties of then- 
work or, indeed, of the problems of the villagers in accessing other services.
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with their information’. By this women, and men, meant that they always had lots to say and were 
always willing to talk. It did not necessarily mean, however, as I will discuss below, that clients 
always got the information they wanted.
While CBDs, as indicated in the previous chapter, were given ‘flexible targets’ of supplying ten 
new acceptors and resupplying fifty clients per month, these supply goals did not appear to 
encourage any form of either overt or covert pressure to use contraceptives. CBDs, then, were 
still encouraged and trained to ‘motivate’ new acceptors to take the pill. But, as one supervisor 
explained, the high contraceptive prevalence rates in the area meant that targets for finding new 
acceptors, then, were no longer strictly monitored. The largest group of non contraceptive users 
in the area were those belonging to strict Apostolic religious groups, who objected to any form 
of western medicine including contraceptive pills 40. The CBDs sometimes tried to ‘educate’ 
Apostolics about family planning. Mrs Mhloyi told me, ‘religious people often object and quote 
verses from the bible to show that God doesn’t approve of contraception. Using contraception 
makes you a sinner - they say. But our training is very good, and in our training we were given 
verses in the bible which we can use back, which shows that there is nothing wrong with family 
planning’. In general, however, persuading people to use family planning was no longer a core 
part of the CBDs routine.
40 There were numerous different Apostolic sects in the area. The common belief of these groups was in 
the power of the Holy Spirit which manifested itself through chosen prophets. The prophets, like traditional healers, 
could divine and cure illnesses. Different groups maintained varying degrees of antipathy to western medicine and 
culture. Only two women interviewed in Mabika belonged to groups which strictly banned all attendance at hospital 
and any use of biomedicine including vaccinations. Not all the groups strongly objected to the use of all, or any, 
forms of contraception. Apostolic women in some groups said that condoms were acceptable as a means of fertility 
regulation because they were not in the form of medicine.
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This function had been replaced by the duty to educate women to use the pill correctly and to 
carry on taking it. As Mrs Maposa explained, ‘CBDs motivate people to take pills correctly. The 
CBDs are very strong on instructions. They tell women how they should take the pill. Then, 
before they go, they make women repeat the instructions to them’. This function, however, 
impinged on the observance of clients’ entitlement to contraceptive method of their choice. CBDs 
were primarily concerned to instruct women to take one type of contraception properly, rather 
than presenting the various method options available. Although the policy emphasis of the 
ZNFPC, as discussed in the previous chapter, has shifted towards longer term methods, in 
practice the CBDs still primarily focused on the pill. All but four of women interviewed who had 
talked to a CBD about family planning said that they had only been told about the pill. Their recall 
was confirmed by my observation of interactions between CBDs and clients. It was only the 
group supervisor who made a point of discussing and informing women about different types of 
contraception.
In addition, CBDs did not always check that contraceptive supply was within ‘medically safe 
parameters’. CBDs were able to supply new users with three months’ supply of the pill and repeat 
users with six cycles. In the case of new users, the CBD had a check list of basic questions for 
determining whether the client should be taking the pill and, if so, which type of pill was the most 
suitable. The questions included social issues, whether or not the individual was over 16 and 
married, as well as health indicators such as the presence of varicose veins and breathlessness 
after carrying out work. New clients were referred to the nearest clinic for a check up. The CBD 
was supposed to take the blood pressure of both new and repeat clients.In practice, however, it 
was not evident from observation that these procedures were systematically followed. The
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ZNFPC standards manual indicates that the checklist of question should be used with repeat 
clients. They should also have their blood pressure taken, inquiries about problems or possible 
danger signs should be made and they should be reminded of the availability of other methods 
(ZNFPC 1992). Accompanying CBDs on their daily rounds, I observed a number of repeat clients 
being given the pill without questions asked or blood pressure taken41. Indeed, one CBD did not 
have the necessary equipment for measuring blood pressure. Some of the practices of 
contraceptive provision, then, indicated a subordination of women’s entitlements to medically safe 
provision to the objective of distributing contraceptives.
As the CBDs were not medically trained, all problems which required investigation had to be 
referred to the nearest clinic. Some women said, however, that if they mentioned problems of side 
effects to the CBD they did not always get a satisfactory response. Mrs Mhloyi explained that in 
training they were taught to deal with common questions about side effects as ‘myths and 
misconceptions.’ Side effects were one of the primary issues on which women interviewed said 
they would like more information. As will be discussed in the next chapter, irregular periods, 
heavy periods, period pains are taken, in local understandings, as indications of problems with 
fertility. Some women said, however, that when they had asked the CBD about such side effects, 
they had been told, ‘that’s normal’. Given the local view of these issues, this was not a response 
that easily satisfied women or eased their fears about contraceptive use.
I asked some women why it was that, as CBDs were ‘free with their information’, they could
41 A situational analysis conducted by the ZNFPC confinns this observation (ZNFPC, 1992a)
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not ask for more when they felt they needed a fuller response. Women replied that they were not 
supposed to directly challenge people in a position of authority. As Mrs Muchuro explained, she 
would like more and different kinds of information from the CBDs, but it would not be 
‘respectful5 to ask these questions of someone who was older and more educated than herself. 
To ask would have been to imply criticism. ‘In most cases, women are supposed to accept what 
[service provision] is there. We wouldn't ask too many questions.They might think we were not 
happy with their information5. ZNFPC criteria, then, that CBDs should be a ‘respected5 member 
of the community furthered the downward flow of information, but impeded upward dialogue. 
Despite CBDs ‘freedom with their information5, some women thought that it was better to go to 
the clinic if there were problems with contraceptive use as they thought that at least the nurses 
had the necessary medical information even if, as I will discuss below, it was not always given. 
Use of the clinic, rather than the CBD, was further determined by cost factors.The client rights 
charter included the right to services regardless of financial status and the right to high quality 
services. The ZNFPC5s own definition o f ‘high quality5 included services which were affordable 
(ZNFPC 1992). As indicated above, the CBD charged ZWD 2.10 (25p) for one cycle of pills, 
but charges could be waived at her discretion. Officially, CBDs were not supposed to charge 
women for contraceptives if the household was receiving less than ZWD 450 per month. The 
majority of rural households fall below this income level (Potts and Mutambirwa 1998). Most of 
the women questioned, however, paid for contraceptive supplies from the CBD.Not all women 
were aware that the CBD could waive charges. Four women, all under the age of thirty with one 
or more children, in households with no land and no regular income, said that they would not go 
to the CBD because they couldn't afford to pay for contraception. Only two women who went 
to the CBD for their contraceptives said that they did not pay. One of these said it was because
her husband did not work. The other said that she always got one packet free when she paid for 
two. For women with low household income, then, the clinic was the only option. The lack of 
consistency in application of prices for contraception thus violated the client’s right to high quality 
services, as defined by the ZNFPC. It further meant that women from some of the poorest 
households were excluded from use of the CBD’s service and could only obtain contraceptive 
supplies from the clinic42. Given the clinic’s lack of observance of client’s rights, as outlined 
below, this represented further bias in the distribution of entitlements according to economic 
status.
7.7 Client rights: the clinic
As indicated above, a number of women preferred the services of the CBD because of their 
respect for clients but, nonetheless, went to the clinic for family planning services either because 
they could not afford to use the CBD or because they hoped that they might get better ‘medical’ 
treatment. Some women, then, had to use the clinic despite the fact that many felt they were not 
treated with dignity and respect. Over half of the semi-structured interviews I carried out 
contained some complaint about nurses. Interviewees most commonly said that the nurses were 
‘rough’, both physically and verbally. Female nurses, in particular, were renowned for their 
scornful and mocking behaviour. Nurses were, as already discussed, likened to a mother in law 
who abused her power.
42 As indicated in the introduction, in addition to information given about land and remittances, I further 
judged the economic status of household according to observable criteria: the construction of the household, 
possession of livestock, ownership of a radio. I considered the poorest households to be those with no access to 
land, either through inheritance or rent, no regular remittances, poorly constructed living structures, no livestock or 
radio.
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Reports of ‘roughness’ mainly concentrated on verbal exchanges. Women commonly said that 
the nurses would shout at them if they turned up late or if they had forgotten their medical card. 
They ordered people around and put them down in public. Women said they were accused of 
stupidity for attending the clinic with what turned out to be non-serious complaints, or for 
returning with complaints which hadn’t gone away. A few people suggested that the nurses* 
behaviour was the result of work pressures. Complaints, indeed, indicated that behaviour could 
be related to the poor conditions - the lack of time and resources - that clinic staff have to 
contend with. Agnes voiced the common complaint, for example, that nurses often said that there 
were no drugs; ‘they tell you that they are out of drugs so you should go to the chemist. Or they 
refer you to Chibuku clinic. Of course they know that people cannot afford to buy the drugs from 
the chemist or the bus fere to Mutambara. Then when you go back with the same complaint they 
will scold you and say “well did you go to the chemist? Do you want me to give you the key to 
the drug store so that you can see whether there are any drugs there?”’
Informants’ responses suggested, however, that nurses’ treatment of individuals differed 
according to their social status. While some people were mocked, scorned and told there were 
no drugs, others were given favourable services. Chipo suggested that, ‘with the hospital you can 
see that some people are getting better treatment than others. If you go into one of the wards, 
then you will see that in one bed there will be a patient who maybe gets one panadol in the 
morning and in another there will be someone that the nurses are always running to attend, even 
if he isn't seriously ill. The nurses are good to their relatives and friends and the well-ups. With 
others they are rough.’ These reports were, at least partially, confirmed by the pattern of positive
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accounts of clinic treatment. One woman said that she never had any problem getting treatment 
because she was related to a nurse. Women were more likely to complain in interviews of bad 
treatment than men. Tobius said that he never had bad treatment at the clinic, but he knew that 
his wife often did.Treatment of both men and women, however, was also related to their 
socio-economic standing. Mr Muchuri, who had worked on and off at the clinic, declared that he 
always got good treatment at the clinic; ‘the last time I went to the clinic was in April. I went 
because I had flu. ( didn’t wait very long and I was given some pills. With me, the nurses are 
always ok. I am well known at the clinic. I am responsible for building the toilets there’. 
However, some men also suffered from ‘rough’ treatment. One of the divorced men living in the 
village with his children said that the nurses always insulted him when he went to the clinic to get 
tablets for his heart condition.
The general attitude of the nurses, then, and women’s perceptions of their behaviour, shaped the 
provision of family planning services at the clinic. The ‘roughness’ of the nurses, as reported by 
women, sometimes appeared to verge upon verbally coercive behaviour. It certainly breached 
women’s own views of what they considered to be treatment with respect and dignity. Interviews 
indicated that young women under the age of thirty were particularly vulnerable to bullying. While 
in the majority of cases, women said that they had been given information and choice about 
contraceptive methods, twelve women reported that as young, first time mothers women that they 
had been given the pill to take without choice, advice or medical checks.
Margaret was nineteen years old. There were three people in her household, herself her husband 
and her eight month old daughter. They had lived there for three months. She moved to the
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village when she married. Her mother in law lived in the township. They had no irrigated or dry 
land. Margaret got all her money through her husband. Her husband worked dynamiting mines. 
But the work was irregular and sometimes when he had to go far away, she didn’t get any money 
for months. The following is an extract from an interview with Margaret:
‘When I gave birth I was given some pills.
Did you ask fo r these pills?
They just gave me the pills. The nurses give these pills to young mothers. I was given 
them when I took my baby to the clinic for her six week check-up. Some women object 
to the pill because they think they will have side effects.
Did the nurses explain to you how the pill worked?
The nurses explained that you have to take it every day, either in the morning or in the 
evening.
Did the nurse ask whether you wanted to take the pill?
They didn't ask. They didn't give me any choice. They just said these are for women who 
are breast feeding.
Did the nurse ask whether you had used family planning before?
No, she didn't. I was really disturbed.!)/^you say anything to the nurse?
The nurses can be too rough, so I just found it better to be quiet.’
Problems with the attitude of the nurses were exacerbated by the lack of privacy. Family planning 
services at the clinic were either provided on the verandah or in the immunization room. In both 
cases, provision was in public although there were less likely to be men in the immunization room. 
None of the women interviewed said that this public provision made it difficult for them to ask 
for contraceptives. Some women, however, said that it did make it difficult for them to ask about 
side effects. Talking about blood or one’s reproductive organs in public, particularly in front of 
men, is embarrassing for women of all ages: ‘I always go to the clinic to get the pill. I don’t wait 
in the queue with those who are ill. It is usually very quick. There isn’t one particular nurse who 
deals with family planning. It’s whoever is on duty. I get the pill from the room where people go 
for immunization. There are usually other people inside waiting for immunization. I don’t find it
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difficult taking the pill in front of them. But I would be worried about asking about side effects 
with other people there. Its embarrassing to ask these things in public’. While the CBD service 
was also sometimes unavoidably public, given the nature o f‘door to door’ provision, women said 
that this was not generally a problem because there were usually no men present.
The combination of the attitude of the nurses and provision in a public space meant that women 
did not always report side effects. The teenage woman in this interview has been taking the pill 
for eight months:
‘Have you had any side effects?
I have been having continuous belly and back ache.
Have you been to see anyone about this?
No.
How long have you had the side effects?
Since January (six months)
So when you go to get resupplies o f the p ill (from the clinic) did you mention the side 
effects?
I haven't mentioned the side effects because the nurses will just say - oh its normal, go 
away, keep using that pill.’
Women were, for the same reasons, reluctant to ask for a change of method. While, then, one of 
the reasons that the clinic was preferred was because nurses were seen as being more ‘medically’ 
able to deal with side effects and problems, the reality of their attitudes meant that particular 
social groups, defined by gender, age and socio-economic standing, were more likely to receive 
this than others.Entitlements to certain standards of treatment, then, were differentially realised.
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7.8 Reproductive health issues
As already discussed, the ZNFPC had not incorporated the broader definition of reproductive 
health, set out in the Cairo Platform for Action, into their policies. Family planning services, and 
clients’ rights to those services, were defined in relation to the narrower goal of contraceptive 
provision. This meant that a number of women’s self-defined needs to reproductive health 
services were unmet.
The basic health education message promulgated by the CBDs was that of the ‘four toos’. As 
one CBD recited, ‘too early, too close together, too many, too late’. These ‘toos’, it is argued, 
are bad for the mother’s health. Mrs Mhloyi explained that, ‘CBDs never tell people how many 
children to have. Instead they explain to people that they should not have babies before the age 
of eighteen or after the age of thirty five because it could be dangerous. And they should leave 
a gap of three years between each child’. The best way to improve women’s health, according to 
the ZNFPC, is spacing through the use of contraception.
While individual CBDs might have acquired a vast amount of knowledge on a range of 
reproductive health issues through their daily practice, they were not systematically trained or 
encouraged to advise on these areas (Zinanga 1990). Women were sceptical about the possibility 
that the CBDs might be able to provide information on a broader range of issues. Patricia 
suggested that, ‘the CBD is always polite. But she’s only interested in giving out pills and those 
who are taking the pill. In my case, I’ve stopped taking the pill for a while because my husband 
is away. I have a pain in my womb, but it’s not something that the CBD will deal with because
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she is only interested in those taking the pill*. Both of the women interviewed who said that they 
had problems conceiving were astounded by the suggestion that they might discuss this with the 
CBD. As far as they were concerned, CBDs were in the business of pregnancy prevention not 
conception assistance.
Some CBDs did use meetings with groups of women as an opportunity to talk about broader 
health issues. These sessions, however, were carried out on a teacher -pupil basis. The CBD gave 
a small lecture on a particular subject and asked the gathered women questions to test whether 
they had understood her message. Health education sessions, then, were based around issues that 
the ZNFPC thought that rural women needed to be told about. They were not an opportunity for 
women to discuss their own health concerns. Topics that the CBDs addressed overlapped with 
the Village Health Workers’ agenda and included hygiene issues - the importance of washing your 
hands, having a clean Blair toilet and a drying rack for dishes - as well as basic information about 
child care. While some women said that this kind of information was ‘useful’, a couple pointed 
out that solving hygiene problems required resources rather than education. Concrete was needed 
to build Blair toilets, hand washing necessitated an easily accessible source of water.
Some women interviewed suggested that it was also difficult to get treatment for reproductive 
health problems, other than those obviously related to contraceptive use, at the clinic. One woman 
said that the nurses were simply not prepared to deal with any reproductive health issue, ‘if you 
have some kind of problem with your chibereko (women’s reproductive organs) and you go to 
the clinic then they will say “oh that's family planning go and see the CBD’” . Even when 
reproductive health problems were directly related to contraceptive use, they were not, as already
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indicated, adequately addressed. Problems with pill usage or other methods often went unvoiced 
because women did not think that CBDs had the requisite knowledge to deal with them or 
because they were scared to voice their concerns to the nurses.
Women, then, had a number of concerns about reproductive health issues which were not 
adequately met by the services provided. Women excluded from service provision, because they 
were not supposed to be sexually active, had the least access to reproductive health services. Post 
menopausal women, for example, although most at risk of problems such as cervical cancer, had 
no regular contact with health workers who specialised in reproductive issues. All women 
interviewed said that they were really worried about HIV, but didn’t know enough about it. 
There was a commonly voiced need, then, for more information on this subject. As I will discuss 
in the next chapter, this lack of information and advice on broader reproductive health issues had 
a negative impact on continuous, effective use of oral contraceptives.I argue below that the non- 
functioning of local level participatory mechanisms meant that women had no collective means 
of voicing these needs or of holding health workers accountable for neglect of given entitlements.
7.9 Participation and identification of needs
As discussed in previous chapters, post- Independence health services were supposed to be 
controlled by local level, participatory institutions. In keeping with general accounts of citizenship 
participation in Zimbabwe, however, the evidence in the area of fieldwork suggested that 
participatory mechanisms were not in operation (Alexander 1995; Munro 1995; Sanders 1992)
246
As outlined in the theoretical chapter, two critical aspects of citizen participation can be identified.
Firstly, participatory mechanisms are necessary in order to enable service users to express their
needs and hence identify claims which have not yet been legitimised. Secondly, participatory 
s
mechanism are required as a means of holding service providers to account (Sen 1992). In the 
area of fieldwork, neither of these functions were operational.
The local clinic was directly controlled by the ministry of health. Local residents were supposed 
to have input into the provision of clinic based, as well as community based health services, via 
the Ward Health Committee. The village where field-work was carried out was one of five which 
comprised the local government defined Ward. Each village had one VCW with a ward level 
supervisor. One CBD served the whole ward and was, in turn, supervised at district level. The 
Ward Health Committee was composed of the supervisor of the VCWs, the CBD, the councillor, 
representatives from the five VIDCOs which make up the ward, headmasters, headmen, local 
‘influential leaders and businessmen’.
In its operation,the Health Committee did not provide a means for the bottom up flow of 
information about villagers’ needs but rather, in keeping with Alexander’s general argument, 
served as the lowest rung in a top-down decision making process (Alexander 1995). One member 
of the committee explained its operation, or non-operation, as follows: ‘the committee hasn't been 
functioning for some time. It used to meet on a regular basis, but there didn’t seem to be any point 
in this. Now it meets to plan certain events such as World AIDs Day, Family Planning Day or to 
inform members about projects like water and sanitation projects. It is a vehicle for informing 
members of the community about health projects. It meets whenever necessary.’
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The use of the Ward Health Committee as a vehicle for the downward flow of information was 
mirrored beneath this in the interactions between health workers and villagers. Health meetings, 
usually called by the VCW, happened on an irregular basis, perhaps once or twice a year. 
Participation, in terms of contributing ideas and views about the services, was described as 
non-existent. A number of informants pointed out that ‘the VCWs and the CBDs don't ask for 
your opinions - they just give you information.’ Chipo commented that ‘the CBDs and VCWs 
never ask these kind of questions about what people think of the services. If they did then people 
might have a chance to give their opinions.’ Mrs Muchuro said that even when suggestions had 
been made to the VCW, they had been ignored; ‘the VCWs here are just seated. In other areas 
they give courses. The women asked for these courses long back but nothing has been done. They 
want courses to train them to be midwives or Red Cross courses. The VCWs agreed but then they 
did nothing. So many women wanted these courses.’
As already discussed, government organised meetings were, as a rule, seen as a waste of time. 
As one informant explained, ‘I don’t go to many meetings. In general, meetings are a waste of 
time. I don’t want to spend the whole day listening to other people talking’. While all government 
organised meetings, however, were seen as non-productive, health meetings were described as 
particularly useless. As one informant explained, ‘meetings about health are usually educational. 
People generally ignore these meetings. If a meeting is educational, no one has any interest in 
going.’ Ladbury and Eyben suggest that there is often far less participation in the provision of 
health than in other sector services because there are few issues in the provision of health, and 
even less in family planning services, that generate conflict and, consequently provoke
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participation (Eyben and Ladbury 1995). The evidence from the area of fieldwork, however, 
suggests that the lack of participation in health meetings was a product of the construction of 
supposed participatory mechanisms.
Two interconnected factors of gender and technocratisation can be used to explain why health 
meetings were even less participatory than village level decision making structures in other 
sectors. As already discussed, in contrast to other public provision, health services and 
concomitantly meetings, were primarily targeted at women. As Joshua explained, ‘health meetings 
are more for women. I listen to the radio to get my knowledge about health rather than going to 
meetings. Generally it is women who are called to health meetings’. Descriptions of health 
meetings, then, suggest that supposed participatory processes were structured around the 
assumption that women had less to say than their husbands. Women were not invited to speak. 
They were given information. As a number of informants pointed out, in contrast to the household 
there are no ‘rules’ prohibiting women’s participation in the public sphere. Nonetheless, women’s 
participation in the public realm has been structured on the basis of the norms that govern their 
role in the private sphere. As mothers and wives women are not expected to voice their own 
opinions either in the household or in village meetings. As one female informant explained, 
‘women are not supposed to say what they think. Women are expected to accept things as they 
are’.
The second factor that contributed to total non-participation in health meetings was the 
construction of health services as the domain of superior western technology and, concomitantly, 
trained ‘experts’. As Nyamwaya suggests of community health projects in Kenya, ‘perhaps more
than in any other sector, modernization strategies in health have been extended to include not only 
pharmaceutical drugs but also management, financing and communication aspects’ (Nyamwaya 
1997:183). Despite, then, the interest in community health and participation encouraged by the 
Alma Ata Declaration in 1978, the general reality of health service provision has been top down 
technocratic inputs and management. Some women agreed that, indeed, they were lacking in 
expertise and that this could explain the lack of participation at health meetings: ‘I have been to 
meetings about health. It is usually women who go to these meetings. They are generally 
educational. At irrigation meetings, people are also advised. But people tend to be more active 
in irrigation meetings. In irrigation they are talking about issues that people deal with everyday. 
People have more experience of these things and so they can ask more questions and say more 
things’. Patricia said that, ‘I have never been to a meeting about health. But my husband goes to 
meetings about agriculture. I have been to some of these. They make decisions at these meetings 
- do you want to build a dam here or whatever. Meetings about health are just educational. 
Farmers have more freedom to say what they want. At agricultural meetings you can say this or 
that and a decision is taken. Agriculture is not complicated. People here know a lot about 
agriculture. But if it was about contraception - people don’t really know anything about 
contraception. They are not educated. People can be very good farmers, but they are not experts 
on health’.
Some women, however, disputed the health workers ‘expertise’ and their definition of women 
as ^  in need of educatioa As Chipo explained, ‘agricultural meetings are slightly better than 
health meetings. People aren’t too interested in going to meetings about health. They don’t want 
to be told things about sweeping the floor and looking after the toilet that they already know. A
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number of women thought that health workers should be asking them for their opinions about 
service provision. As Mrs Muchuro argued, ‘health workers are usually the ones who make 
decisions about the way the clinic is run and how the CBDs work. It would be better if women 
had more say in these decisions because they are the ones who use these facilities’. Some women, 
then, were not happy to leave health service provision entirely to the ‘experts’. Women’s views, 
then, suggest that lack of participation in the health sector was as much a product of the 
construction of participatory mechanisms as it was about the lack of endogenous motivational 
forces.
7.10 Participation and accountability
While the lack of effective participatory mechanisms prevented women from collectively defining 
and voicing their health needs, women’s primary concern was with the lack of accountability. The 
perception that health providers formed an inter related group of ‘well ups’ made women wary 
of voicing their opinions to individual workers. Chipo explained that, ‘ you couldn't discuss these 
things (problems with the health services) with the VCWs or CBDs because they might be friends 
with the nurses... Both the CBDs and the VCWs are local, so if you make complaints to them, 
they might mark your name down and then you would get bad treatment next time you went to 
the hospital.’ One woman suggested that the health services were better before they introduced 
ideas about local participation because then, at least, there was someone to * tell the nurses off 
when they did something wrong. Women felt, then, that there was no mechanism by which health 
workers could be held to account. There was a sense among village women that service providers 
could get away with murder. A couple of women recalled how, at one time, there were so many
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complaints about services at the hospital that the chief gathered together some of the head men 
and formed a deputation which demanded that changes were made. In extreme cases, then, there 
were local mechanisms for ensuring accountability. But on an everyday basis, no such mechanisms 
existed. All the women I asked about what they would do if they felt that they had been treated 
badly by the health workers agreed that there was no one person to go to or means of voicing 
complaints about poor treatment.
It was this lack of accountability which made women sceptical about the charter of clients’ rights 
pinned to the clinic wall. When I asked women what they thought of this list, the usual response 
was one of laughter. As Chipo said, ‘these rights are not for us village women. Maybe for people 
living in towns. But not for us’. Their derision was not related to the content of the list. Indeed, 
many of the concerns that women expressed about the services, as outlined in the case material, 
were complaints about the lack o f ‘client rights’. Women wanted, above all, to be treated with 
dignity and respect by health workers. They also wanted privacy, affordable services, 
confidentiality and informed choice within medically safe parameters, as set out in the ZNFPC’s 
guidelines. But there was means of ensuring that health workers systematically respected the 
responsibilities outlined. If women laughed at the charter of client rights, it was because they 
knew that they had no means of demanding that the nurses respected their entitlements in relation 
to clinic services and not because they thought that those rights should not be observed.
7.11 Conclusion
As outlined in the introduction, ZNFPC policies contained two conflicting definitions of women’s
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right to reproductive self determination.The ZNFPC recognised women’s client rights in relation 
to health workers in the clinic, but not rights of reproductive self determination in relation to men. 
These conflicting principles were worked out through the daily practices of street level 
bureaucrats. Local level health workers refused to provide contraceptives to single women. 
Married women were given contraceptives with or without their husband’s approval. Married 
women who could obtain contraceptives, however, were treated differentially along axes of age 
and economic status. Women under the age of thirty, or women from the poorest households, 
were less likely to be treated with dignity and respect at the clinic than older, wealthier women 
and, consequently, were less able to demand the information and services they required. While 
service delivery standards, defined in Cairo, were recognised in policy and programmes, they were 
not systematically realised. Women’s comments about service provision indicated that they 
wanted the entitlements set out in the charter of clients’ rights. The lack of mechanisms of 
accountability meant that there was no means of ensuring that rural women could demand their 
given rights. As Plant argues, if individuals do not have mechanisms for enforcing their rights, and 
the distribution of services is at the discretion of professional providers, then street level 
bureaucrats have no necessary reason to respond to service users’ entitlements to particular 
resources or standards of provision (Plant 1998). While women in Mabika might have wanted the 
client rights, however, women’s reproductive strategies generally depended, as discussed in 
chapter five, on recognition of male authority in reproductive decision making. The ZNFPC’s 
policy reinforcement of male reproductive authority in the private sphere was thus in keeping with 
the strategies of some women. In the following chapter, I examine how the practices of local level 
health workers, outlined above, impact upon the reproductive strategies of different groups of 
women in Mabika.
Chapter 8
Contraceptive Use And Reproductive Strategies
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the impact of the ZNFPC’s policies and practices on women’s 
reproductive self determination in the private sphere. In Mabika, customary means of regulating 
fertility were controlled by a woman’s mother in law through enforcement of periods of 
abstinence and by the husband through withdrawal. These means of fertility regulation contributed 
to women’s lack of reproductive self-determination. The introduction of a family planning 
programme provided the possibility of methods of fertility regulation independent of kinship 
control. The technology of contraception, then, offered the potential for women to assert a 
greater degree of autonomy in reproductive decision making in the private sphere. However, as 
outlined in the theoretical chapter, the extent to which this potential can be realised is limited both 
by the context of contraceptive provision and the environment in which women negotiate 
household relations. In chapter five I discussed the socio-economic context of household 
negotiations and reproductive decision making. I argued that women in Mabika had to trade 
rights over fertility for resources and support through marriage. In the last two chapters, I 
discussed concepts of reproductive rights in the policies and provision of family planning 
services. I suggested that the practices of local level health workers resulted in the differential 
realisation of women’s entitlements. In this chapter I examine how this discourse impacts upon 
women’s reproductive self-determination in the private sphere.
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In Mabika, as discussed in chapter five, women’s reproductive strategies were based upon the 
negotiation of a better position in the household through reference to the terms of the conjugal 
contract. Women wanted men to recognise rights over their fertility so that they could claim 
material resources. The pursuit of this strategy, however, required a degree of control over 
fertility regulation. Women’s ability to pursue this strategy, consequently, was partially shaped 
by the degree to which they realised their clients’ rights. Those women who were not treated with 
dignity and respect sometimes failed to obtain the information they required on contraceptive use 
and side effects. They consequently used the pill ineffectively. Women who were better able to 
negotiate entitlements pursued two patterns of contraceptive use. Some women used the pill 
purely as a replacement for the customary period of abstinence. These women removed the means 
of fertility regulation from the control of their mother in law and thereby obtained a degree of 
reproductive self determination. Other women used the pill secretly to extend the gaps between 
children - or stopped using it in order to conceive against their husband’s wishes.
There were indications, however, that women’s reproductive strategies were failing in 
deteriorating economic conditions. The evidence suggested that men, and their families, were 
increasingly reluctant to claim their rights over women’s fertility and its progeny. These women, 
then, were forced into different strategies. Women who were considering, or who used, longer 
term methods of contraception, were generally those who had given up hope of their husband 
providing them with a reliable means of support. Sometimes in violent marital relations, these 
women wanted to be certain that they did not get pregnant again. This, then, was a strategy of 
desperation. Unmarried women, keen to avoid the fate of their unsupported single mother peer 
group, used subterfuge to obtain contraceptive supplies. These latter groups highlight the extent
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to which the ZNFPC’s programmes, supporting male authority over reproductive decision making 
in the household, no longer match the reality of women’s lives and reproductive strategies.
In the first part of the chapter, relevant work concerning adaptation and resistance to policy is 
examined. This is followed by a discussion of traditional fertility regulation practices and attitudes 
to modem methods in Mabika. Patterns of contraceptive use will then be discussed. This will 
be followed by analysis of the different ways in which women employed the family planning 
programme, its discourses and practices, in the pursuit of their reproductive strategies.
8.2 Resistance and adaptation
The issue of women’s responses to, and uses of, family planning programmes highlights the 
question of the relevance of western-derived discourses and policies to rural populations in 
developing countries. As discussed in chapter six, analyses written from a post-modernist 
approach, have highlighted a supposed opposition between ‘development discourses’ and local 
perspectives (Ferguson 1994). While accepting the validity of the notion of the ‘development 
gaze’, it can be argued that such analyses create a monolithic myth of western development 
discourses (Grillo and Stirrat 1998). Moreover, this work ignores the political agency of national 
and local policy making organisations and actors. As illustrated in chapters six and seven, policy 
and concomitant practice are the product of contestations among a number of actors and not 
simply a replication of western discourses at local level. The post-modernist perspective, as used 
in debates about the ‘development gaze’, tends to ignore political conflict at both national and 
local levels. It is an oversimplification to conceptualise the linkages between macro and micro
256
levels as a conflict between western and local ideologies. In reality, the practice of policy 
implementation and local level responses to particular programmes are the product of multiple, 
intersecting and conflicting power structures which are local but tied to non local systems (Shore 
and Wright 1997).
Analyses of family planning programmes have rarely taken into account these complexities in the 
analysis of women’s responses to and uses of contraception. As discussed in chapter five, 
demographic analyses of the use of modem contraceptives are built upon the assumption that 
fertility conduct is governed by some form of active decision-making process involving utility 
maximisation. Contraceptive use, from this perspective, is the direct product of rational decision 
making about the costs and benefits of having another child (Carter 1995). Demographic 
perspectives can be contrasted with feminist analyses which have emphasised the lack of control 
that women have in relation to service providers and, concomitantly, over contraceptive use 
(Hartmann 1987). Both these perspectives are premised upon the separation of agency and 
culture which is, itself, deeply embedded in Western social thought. Women are, consequently, 
either perceived as totally in control of their fertility or as passive receptacles of external forces. 
This dichotomy shapes analysis of women’s reproductive behaviour in relation to both public and 
private spheres (Carter 1995). As Greenhalgh suggests, one way out of this dilemma in 
demographic analyses, is through the use of Bourdieu’s concepts of everyday practice or ‘habitus’ 
(Greenhalgh 1990a).
Nonetheless, while Bourdieu’s conceptual framework helps to illuminate the routine and habit of 
everyday practice, it fails to provide adequate explanation of individual behaviour that opposes
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the historical and social conditions of actors’ situations. One response to this gap in Bourdieu’s 
framework has been has been the focus on actions of ‘resistance’. Scott defines resistance as any 
act ( that is intended either to mitigate or deny claims made on that class by superordinate classes 
or to advance peasant claims vis-a-vis the superordinate classes’ (Scott 1987:419). The concept 
of resistance has been further developed by Moore, who links Scott's ideas to theoretical 
perspectives outlined by Bourdieu. If everyday behaviour is constrained by the dominant cultural 
system, then equally, resistance to that system may operate at the level of practice, rather than 
articulated protest. ‘Behaviour, sets of activities, conducted in structured space, can be used to 
“read against the grain” of dominant discourses, to expose the arbitrary nature of their 
construction...If one cannot resist by placing oneself outside dominant structures and discourses 
one can none the less displace oneself within them’ (Moore and Rogow 1994:82).
Critics of the concept of resistance have argued that it ‘not only romanticizes the creativity of the 
human spirit in refusing to be dominated by large systems of power, it also treats such power as 
exterior to the local polity which is seen as the source of residual freedoms’ (Shore and Wright 
1997:13). This criticism is perhaps more correctly directed at the ways in which the idea of 
resistance has been employed, rather than the concept itself. As the work of Carney and Watts 
again illustrates, peasant strategies can only be comprehensively analysed if the complexities of 
intersecting local and non-local power structures are understood. In particular, linkages between 
inter-household gender conflicts and broader conflicts over state interventions need to be analysed 
(Carney and Watts 1990). Within a more subtle conceptual framework of power relations, 
strategies of resistance which draw on state-originating resources in inter-household gender 
conflicts are of equal importance to the more commonly conceptualised everyday protests of
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peasants against supposedly external forces.
Women’s responses to family planning programmes, then, have to be seen within the broad 
framework of the intersection of local and non-local power structures. Analysis of women’s 
strategies within this broader framework serves as a reminder that ‘the strategies that women 
adopt to express or act on their sense of entitlement almost always exist in the context of 
domination, subordination and limited power or resources’ (Petchesky and Judd 1998:19). 
Discourses and practices of reproductive rights and needs, implemented by local level health 
workers, provide both constraints upon, and resources for, women’s reproductive strategies.
As Carney and Watts observe, everyday resistance can be ‘Janus-faced’. Local forms of 
contention may result in adaptation and acceptance, but reading against the grain also always 
offers the possibility of challenge to social structures (Carney and Watts 1990). Nonetheless, 
many actions cannot be easily defined as either adaptation or challenge. As Petchesky and Judd 
argue in relation to women’s reproductive strategies, ‘the two extremes of outright resistance and 
passive accommodation are much rarer than the kinds of complicated, subtle reproductive 
strategies that most of our respondents adopt in order to achieve some degree of autonomy and 
at the same time maintain their place in family and community’ (Petchesky and Judd 1998:17). 
In many cases, then, a successful strategy may be one which moves a women from a position of 
victim to that of survivor (Petchesky and Judd 1998).
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8.3 Fertility regulation practices: traditional versus modern
In Mabika, contraception was often discussed in terms o f‘traditional’ versus ‘modem’; the ways 
of the Ndau versus those of the Europeans. These were the terms, as described in chapter six, 
through which contraception was introduced into Zimbabwe by the ZNFPC. This was not a 
debate confined to the issue of family planning alone. As set out in chapter three, this was a 
discourse which has been interwoven in people’s lives, and used in conflicts and negotiations, 
since the beginning of the colonial era (Bourdillon 1993). In this section, I examine this debate 
in relation to fertility regulation and attitudes towards contraception.
Traditional methods of fertility regulation
Women in Mabika said that, according to Ndau custom, it was the mother in law who was in 
charge of fertility regulation and child birth. As outlined in chapter five, the Ndau have both a 
physical and spiritual explanation of fertility. It is thought that the woman is like a sack in which 
the man plants his seed. Conception, however, and the creation of life is dependent upon the will 
of the gods just as illness or death, whatever its recognized physical cause, always requires a 
spiritual explanation (Bourdillon 1991). The physical aspects of reproduction then, were 
traditionally managed within the secular framework of household relations. It was only when 
conception failed to occur that spiritual explanations were sought through consultation with a 
nyanga or other traditional healer.
It was the mother in law who, traditionally, prepared the young girl for birth, delivered the child, 
regulated the period of abstinence after the birth and told her daughter in law about herbs to be
used to prevent pregnancy. ‘It was my mother in law who told me how to space children. The 
only method of spacing used was withdrawal. Also abstinence. You were supposed to stay with 
your mother in law for six months after you had given birth while the husband stayed with his 
father*. Becoming pregnant while breast feeding was considered dangerous as the breast milk 
was thought to become contaminated with blood from the womb thereby poisoning the suckling 
child. Breast feeding, traditionally, continued for a period of two to three years. One older female 
informant explained that, in the past, this regulation of child birth was not thought of as ‘spacing*. 
‘In my time, you didn’t limit the number of children you had - you just had as many as God 
granted. And we didn’t “space”. We just made sure that we didn’t get pregnant while 
breastfeeding. This was usually two years. If you became pregnant while breastfeeding, the one 
who is suckling would die. Lots of women would criticize you if you became pregnant before you 
had weaned the child. It was the mother-in -law who told you when to have another child. 
Nothing would be said directly, but she might comment, ‘are you having problems? This child is 
two years old and you are not pregnant again.’
Traditionally, then, a gap of two years was left in between each child. According to the local 
herbalist, in the case of stillbirth or miscarriage, ‘the woman needs to be cured before she 
conceives again. Stillbirths and miscarriages are caused when the chibereko is angry. In most 
cases, if a child dies soon after birth, it has a spiritual cause. With .stillbirths and miscarriages, the 
woman should wait one agricultural season before conceiving again. If a child dies after birth, 
then the mother should conceive again quickly to fill the gap’.
The taboo on conception while breast feeding meant that the resumption of sexual relations after
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six months was seen as being closely linked to the health of the recently bom child. Agnes 
explained that, ‘in my day, we used to wait for six months after the baby was bom before meeting 
again with the husband. Then you tie a string around the baby’s waist. The string is made from 
the bark of a tree. The string stops the baby from losing weight from shock when you first meet 
your husband5. This set of practices was known as kusungira (to tie).
The most common traditional technology of conception prevention, apart from abstinence and 
withdrawal, was tying a string, with a pouch of heibs attached, around the mother’s waist. As one 
woman explained, when you first started menstruating, you went to the father’s sister who would 
tie a string around your waist. The string was, ‘to remind you that you were grown up and 
couldn’t have sex with men’. The string was removed when the girl married and then another was 
tied after pregnancy. A herbalist explained that this method worked like withdrawal by preventing 
the sperm from entering the womb. The herbalist, like many women in Mabika, thought that 
traditional methods were healthier than modem contraceptives: ‘herbs are tied outside the womb, 
so nothing is disturbed. Family planning (the pill) can cause problems because it is taken 
internally, so it disturbs the womb. With the string, a woman’s periods are not disturbed, unlike 
the pill’.
Far from being seen as ineffectual, a number of women suggested that traditional methods of 
regulation were, in fact, too powerful. Winnie said that, ‘some women use traditional methods 
- tying strings around their waists. After my first bom I used this method. I tied the string around 
my waist after I gave birth and removed the string when I had weaned the baby. But a year after 
removing the string I had still failed to conceive and I thought the string had made me infertile.
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Angelina still used traditional methods. She explained that, “after you give birth, you put some 
blood from the first menstruation in a bottle and you close the bottle. You open it again when you 
want to get pregnant. That’s what I’ve always done with all my children. The last one is in Grade 
1, so that proves it works. I don’t know how it works. If you forget where you put the bottle, 
then you’ll never have another child again. It’s similar to when you have a baby that dies. Then 
you should put it in the grave facing the correct way. If you put it in the grave facing the wrong 
way, you won’t be able to give birth. If you don’t know the correct way to put him, then you 
should put him facing upwards. You have to be very careful with your menstrual blood. You have 
to bury the bottle. You have to do this alone with no one watching, because even a child can be 
jealous and do something to the bottle. You mustn’t even tell your husband where you have 
buried it. If you lose the bottle you will never get pregnant again’” .
As outlined above, the mother in law’s reproductive duties included preparation for birth. 
Informants explained that the mother in law repeatedly inserted her fist into the daughter in law’s 
vagina in order, it was said, to make birth easier. The mother in law was also expected to act as 
midwife. At the first indication of pain, the expectant mother was told to squat on the ground with 
her arms in the air. As informants pointed out, women could spend several hours in this position 
before delivery. After the birth of the child, the mother in law cut the umbilical cord. The 
midwife’s duties, however, did not end with the safe delivery of the child, but extended into the 
first few years of the infant’s life. Agnes explained that, ‘ in most cases it was the mother in law 
who delivered your children. If you were fit, then you were allowed to bury your own placenta. 
But the umbilical cord was more important. This had to be buried under the verandah where you 
couldn’t step on it, otherwise you would get cracks on your feet. The mother in law had to cut
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the baby’s nails the first time. It was also her duty to make the baby sit and give the baby its first 
porridge. If the baby refuses, then you can’t continue to feed it. When the baby shows its first 
teeth, then the mother has to pound some mealie-meal to give to the mother in law. If the mother 
cuts the baby’s nails before the mother in law, then she would have to pay a fine’. ‘Failure to 
follow these customs was thought to have deleterious effects on mother and baby: ‘The rules say 
that it is the one who delivers the baby who should cut the nails. It’s a rule. But if you don’t 
follow it, then maybe the baby or the mother would be bewitched’.
In terms of customary reproductive health care, then, fertility regulation, antenatal care and 
delivery were all delivered within a package built around the mother/daughter in law relationship. 
It was only in cases of infertility or problems during pregnancy that traditional healers were 
consulted. Problems with reproduction were taken extremely seriously by both women and 
healers alike. As conception was seen as having both a physical and spiritual element, so infertility 
could be caused by either. In Mabika, there were two traditional healers, one a herbalist and the 
other a nyanga who both specialised in fertility problems. The herbalist dealt with period pains, 
which she said were related to infertility, and provided herbs for women who were having 
problems conceiving. The nyanga explained her fertility treatments as follows; ‘I treat infertility 
as a nyanga. Infertility can be caused by possession, bewitchment or bad spirits. In order to treat 
these problems, I have to become possessed. There is one spirit, a woman, who possesses me if 
there is a problem with the chibereko. As this spirit, I can enter the patient and replace the 
chibereko . With chibereko problems, the spirit helps, but then she has to recommend herbs 
which are also needed’.
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As in Zimbabwean civil law, according dominant understandings of Ndau living law, abortion is 
strictly prohibited . Both the herbalist and the nyanga insisted that, although they knew about 
particular herbs and potions which could induce abortion, they never gave these to women. The 
nyanga said, ‘I cannot kill my grandchildren’. Among women in Mabika, abortion was a taboo 
subject. Nonetheless, female informants said that there were two women in the village who were 
known to help with abortions. Women described a number of different methods of abortion. One 
involved inserting a chili into the cervix and leaving it there until abortion occurred. Another 
method which, according to the informant, could be used up to two weeks after sex, required the 
daily drinking of a jug of water with lots of salt, bicarbonate of soda and soot from the roof of 
the hut. It was difficult to ascertain, however, how often women resorted to such methods.
Modem methods of fertility regulation
Many of the women interviewed under fifty said that they > had never used traditional 
methods of fertility regulation, including withdrawal. Some married women under the age of 
thirty said that they didn’t even know how to use traditional methods. These responses can be 
contrasted with answers to questions about use of traditional healers in the case of illness. Out 
of all those interviewed, only five said that they never went to a traditional healer or prophet. In 
three of these cases, women said that it was their Christian beliefs which prohibited consultation 
of traditional healers. Two women said that they never consulted them because they overcharged 
and generally failed to provide effective cures. Against this background of general health 
treatment behaviour, then, the rejection of traditional fertility regulation practices stands as an 
exception.
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Female informants suggested that another reason for the increased use of contraceptives was its 
association with a modem and better way of life. Some women shared the perspective of health 
workers, outlined in the previous chapter, that contraceptive use was an indicator o f‘civilization’. 
Women suggested that the ‘civilized’ were in favour, and the ‘uneducated’ and ‘ignorant’ were 
against, contraception. One woman elaborated on this distinction and tied it to issues of social 
differentiation. Winnie recounted that, ‘when the women explained to the nurses about the 
traditional methods they used, the nurses said that they didn’t want to hear about these things. 
They told them that they could min their intestines if they used these things and endanger their 
fertility. But the women were sitting next to each other, laughing and poking each other in the 
leg. We whispered “don’t believe these things that the nurses are saying.” When the nurses told 
the women about the pill, some believed it and others didn’t. The ones who believed were the 
women who are well up. The others, the poor ones, didn’t believe. The well up ones go to the 
clinic and the doctors so they know about these things and believe them. The poor ones go to 
nyangas, because this is what they know. The poor women see themselves as different - inferior 
- to those wealthy ones. Those poor ones who are strict stay by the traditional methods. They 
want to say that their methods are as good as the pill. They want to maintain the difference 
between themselves and the wealthy people...When I started taking the pill, I felt that I was a 
different kind of person, because I had left those traditional methods. Then I saw myself as being 
as good as those wealthy ones’.
As described in chapter five, men also discussed contraception in these terms. While some men 
remained opposed to contraception, others said that, these days, ‘modem men’ saw that family 
planning wasn’t all bad. It was only the ‘traditional’ or the ‘uneducated’ who opposed it outright.
The ‘civilised’ ones recognised its usefulness.
The association of contraceptive technology with ‘modem’ life, however, also had a negative 
side. Contraception, the white person’s science, was sometimes seen as alien and, consequently, 
potentially dangerous to Ndau people. Some women thought that this was why contraception 
produced side effects. They were surprised to hear that European women also suffered from the 
side effects of contraceptive use.
While for older women, then, the issue of contraception symbolised a choice between traditional 
and modem ways of life, among women under thirty contraception had more or less become the 
norm. One twenty six year old explained, ‘I was told about traditional methods - tying a string 
around your waist when you don’t want to get pregnant, then removing it when you want to 
conceive. I never thought of using traditional methods. I just didn’t want to. Those things are for 
old fashioned people. People of my age should use modem methods’. Some women in this age 
group simply didn’t understand questions about why they used contraception instead of traditional 
methods of fertility regulation. For these women, it was no longer a question or a choice. They 
used modem methods.
Different methods, however, were viewed with varying degrees of acceptance. The pill, known 
locally as ‘family planning’, was the least feared of contraceptive methods among women. 
Reasons given for preference for the pill were that women knew that they could get pregnant 
again after using it; you could stop taking it when you wanted to; it did give you side effects but 
they were not too bad. Not all women knew about other methods. Those that did had generally
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only heard of Depo, or ‘the injection’ as it was known. Those women who knew about Depo 
thought that it was much more likely to be harmful than the pill. Women’s biggest fear about 
Depo was that it made you infertile. A number of women said they had heard stories about people 
who had used Depo once and never conceived again. Women thought this was why it wasn’t 
recommended for younger women - you had to have a few children before you took it just in case 
something went wrong. Women thought that the side effects of Depo were very bad. Women 
commonly said that it made you bleed continuously or it made you bleed in lumps. Women also 
said that they had heard that taking Depo made you very ‘stout’. Women knew about the condom 
but associated it with STD prevention rather than family planning. In general, women did not 
have any objection to the condom itself. The association with STDs, however, meant that it was 
difficult for a woman to broach the subject of condom use without her husband taking this as an 
indication of adultery43.
All men interviewed had some knowledge of ‘family planning’. Most men had heard about 
contraception through ZNFPC broadcasts on the radio. There was general agreement among men 
that the technical aspects of contraception were a woman’s concern. It was not their business to 
find out about different methods. Some men, however, were interested and a couple said they 
thought it was important that men should know more. Most of the men spoken to, however, 
knew about the pill and the injection. Two men interviewed said that they thought it was wrong 
that nurses could give a women the injection without consulting her husband first. Men also 
associated condoms with STD prevention. All men spoken to on this issue agreed that condoms
43Ray et al argue that the female condom might offer one means of enabling women to use a 
contraceptive technology which protects them against HIV infection (Ray, 1995).
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were not for use in marriage. Men commonly said that using a condom was like ‘eating a sweet 
with the wrapper on’ 44 Nonetheless, men were prepared to use condoms in what they defined 
as casual relationships. These were usually relationships where they only had sex with a woman 
on one or two occasions. The views of men and women towards contraception in general, and 
particular types of method, were reflected in patterns of contraceptive use recorded in Mabika.
8.4 Patterns of Contraceptive use
Table 5: Methods of fertility regulation by women’s age
QO
method







20+ 4 1 19 3 1 2
30+ 2 5 16 1 1 2 1
40+ 7 1 1
50+ 10 3
60+ 1 13 1
Total 9 29 49 4 3 5 1
Data from semi-structured interviews indicated the increasing use of contraceptives in successive 
generations of women. While among women over the age of fifty, the majority had only ever used
44 Meursing and Sibindi provide more detailed discussion of men’s attitudes towards 
condoms (Meursing, 1995).
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traditional methods, the reverse was the case in the under fifty age group. Four of the women 
under fifty who only used traditional methods did so because of their Apostolic beliefs. Of these 
women, two said that it was their husband’s insistence that prevented them from using 
contraceptives. The two remaining women under fifty who had only ever used traditional 
methods, said that they were worried about the side effects of contraception and the possibility 
of being made infertile. The two women under twenty who used no method were unmarried, 
although sexually active. Two of the four women between twenty and thirty who said they used 
no method were unmarried but sexually active. The two others were married but had not yet 
conceived. Both of the women over thirty who said they used no method were married but 
thought they were infertile.
In all age groups, the pill was the predominant method used. All the women who had used depo, 
and the one woman who had a tubal ligation, had first used the pill. Two of the women who had 
used condoms as well as the pill had used them as a backstop method when they first started 
taking the pill45. Two of the women in their twenties who said that they had used condoms but 
had never used the pill were unmarried and had used condoms with boyfriends. The third of these 
women was the only woman interviewed who defined herself as a commercial sex worker. The 
one woman in her thirties who said that she had only ever used condoms said that she did this 
both for religious and health reasons. This woman said that condoms were more acceptable to 
her husband’s Apostolic faith than other forms of contraception. She also said that her husband 
was a policeman and they were given condoms free at work and encouraged to used them in
45 Health workers are supposed to instruct women to use condoms during the first weeks of 
oral contraceptive use when the woman remains susceptible to pregnancy
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Figures on ‘ever use’ of contraceptives hide the complexity and patterns of actual use over time 
in women’s reproductive strategies. Individual histories of contraceptive use were often difficult 
to collect from informants. Many women did not have regular patterns of use and, consequently, 
found it difficult to recall when, and for how long, they had used the pill.
The cessation of contraceptive use because of side effects was a common theme of many 
women’s reproductive histories. Out of a total of fifty seven women who stated that they had 
used the pill, fifteen - or just over one quarter - said that they had stopped, at some point, because 
of side effects. One thirty two year old with four children explained that she used the ‘string’ after 
her first bom. But she had problems conceiving after she had stopped breastfeeding. So after her 
second child she switched to oral contraceptives, ‘the yellow one for breastfeeding’46. However, 
she gave this up because of stomach problems and got pregnant before she had finished
46 As described in chapter seven, CBDs distributed two different dosage types of oral
contraceptive; Ovarette and Lo Feminol for breast feeding and non-breast feeding mothers. These were yellow and 
white respectively.
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breastfeeding. After the third child she started taking the pill again and, although she had the same 
stomach problem, carried on taking it while she was breastfeeding. Then stopped and became 
pregnant again. She had started using the pill after the fourth child, but gave up because of 
stomach problems and thought that she might be pregnant again. Portia was twenty three with 
two children. She started using the ‘yellow pill’ six weeks after the birth of her first child, then 
stopped after a further three months because o f‘stomach problems’. She became pregnant again 
eight months after the birth of her first child. Francisca was thirty two and had five children. She 
used withdrawal after the first three children. After the fourth child she started taking the pill at 
six weeks, but stopped when she got stomach problems, and then became pregnant again.
As some of these women explained, their cessation of contraceptive use was the result of failure 
to obtain adequate information or responses from health workers. Either women did not 
completely understand how to use the pill, and were afraid to ask, or they had side effects which 
they were reluctant to discuss with clinic staff. Rather than facing the health workers, they 
stopped taking the pill, or used it incorrectly and became pregnant accidentally. As discussed in 
chapter seven, women who were least able to obtain information and advice about family planning 
were often in their early thirties or younger and from the poorest households47. Lacking the means 
to pay for contraceptives from the CBD, they were in a greater position of vulnerability in relation 
to health workers at the clinic. Save was twenty four years old and married. They had no access 
to irrigated land, only a small amount of dry land in the compound. They grew food for
47As discussed in chapter five, the relative economic status of households was estimated on the 
basis of responses to questions and observable indicators. The poorest households were those where there was no 
access to land, either through inheritance or renting and no regular source of off farm income. Such households 
were poorly constructed, with no livestock and few possessions such as a radio.
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consumption only and frequently failed to manage this. Her husband worked casually in the area, 
doing whatever jobs he could find. But income was little and irregular. She had three children and 
was pregnant again. ‘I do use pills - yellow ones. I have used them since the birth of my third 
child. I always get the pill from the clinic because it is free. Sometimes I don't take the pills 
because I'm not menstruating, so I thought I couldn't get pregnant. I became pregnant while I was 
breast feeding. I knew that I was pregnant because the baby who was breast feeding got a runny 
stomach. I got pregnant eight months after the third child. I didn't ask the nurse when I should 
start taking the pill again. I was just slightly hesitant to ask.’ Bemadina was thirty and had five 
children; ‘I started taking the pill after the fourth bom. But I had side effects. I told the nurses but 
they just said “it happens”. So I stopped taking the pill and I got pregnant again.’ Anna was 
twenty seven years old. She had no access to irrigated land. Her husband worked in the 
plantations but didn’t always send money back. She earned a little cash from working on other 
people’s fields. She had four children, her first bom in 1986; ‘I was given pills when I had my first 
bom. I didn't ask for them, I was just given them. The nurses just told me to take one pill every 
day. They didn't tell me about any other methods. I was happy to take them because I didn't want 
to get pregnant...I have been taking the pill since 1986. I always get the pill from the clinic 
because I don’t have to pay for it. Before the birth of the twins (in 1993) I had continuous 
bleeding,. When I started bleeding I stopped using the pill and I became pregnant. Now I have the 
same problem again. I have had continuous bleeding for one month. But I haven't been to the 
clinic about it. I'm just waiting to see if the problem goes. I go to the clinic to pick up the pills, 
but I don't mention the side effects. I'm just delaying saying anything. I'm not ready to say 
anything outright at the clinic yet. I don't think I could change pill. If the problem doesn’t go, 
maybe I’ll just stop taking the pill. But I don’t really want another child.’ The reproductive
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strategies of these women, then, were hampered by their inability to obtain adequate and 
appropriate information about contraceptive use from the clinic.
Pill use while breast feeding
Patterns of contraceptive use among women in the village confirmed the view that, in many cases, 
the pill was used as a substitute for customary means of fertility regulation.
Discussions with women indicated that part of the appeal of contraception lay in its promise of 
escape from the social relations which governed traditional fertility regulation and childbirth 
practices. Women wanted to avoid the demands of their mother in law as midwife and, in so 
doing, also broke the mother in law’s control over fertility regulation. As Agnes explained, ‘I only 
had the first bom with a midwife. It was a family midwife - my mother in law. For all the others 
I went to hospital. I changed to the hospital because the demands from the midwife were too 
high. With the hospital you don’t have to go back and say the teeth are growing or any of those 
other things’. This was a trend that was opposed by the husband’s relatives. One woman 
explained that, ‘I gave birth to four children in hospital: the first, sixth, eighth and tenth. With the 
others, my mother in law was the midwife. If I was very far away from the clinic, I would have 
to give birth at home if it happened suddenly. It was the mother in law who cut the nails of all the 
children. But there were more demands for those children that she helped to give birth to. With 
every development of the child, you had to pay the mother in law something. If you didn’t make 
these payments she would be very angry. The mother in law was very angry when I gave birth in 
hospital. But her anger couldn’t do anything. The mother in law was always interested to see how
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the child suckled48. After the birth of the first child, I had to sleep in the home of my mother in 
law for six months. My mother in law wanted to see that I was taking care of the child properly, 
making sure that I didn’t go to sleep with my nipple in the baby’s mouth. So after that I went to 
the hospital to deliver. If you deliver in hospital, then you hear about family planning’. Using 
hospital delivery services, then, broke the control of the mother in law over birth and child care. 
In turning to the hospital, women were also introduced to the idea of contraceptives.
One informant suggested, however, women may have consciously started using the pill 
specifically as a means of evading the mother in law’s control over fertility regulation. Mrs 
Muchuro argued that, ‘women started using the pill because it helped them get away from their 
mother in law. Who wants their mother in law telling them when they can sleep with their 
husband?’. The pill, then, allowed women to break away from their mother in law’s grip on 
fertility regulation. It also, meant, however, that a woman no longer had a reason to refuse sex 
with her husband. Patricia said that, ‘it was my sister in law who told me about spacing 
children...She advised me to spend six months without meeting my husband after birth. Then, 
when you do meet, you should be restrained. I don’t follow this advice, because it wouldn’t be 
an acceptable excuse not to have sex with my husband. I use the pill instead’.
Seventeen women below the age of fifty said that they used the pill either during breastfeeding 
or for the customary two year period in between giving birth in order to space their children. In 
a number of these cases, women said that the timing of the decision to stop taking the pill was
48 Failure of the baby to suckle could be taken as an indication that the mother had been unfaithful.
275
usually prompted by their husband, or mother and sister in law. Family members would start to 
make comments about the length of time since the last child was bom or would question whether 
the woman was having problems conceiving. The woman would then know that it was time to 
get pregnant again.
In cases where women did manage to pursue this strategy, systematic use of the pill did not 
necessarily equate with having fewer children 49. Mildred was bom in 1950. The household had 
access to two and a half acres of irrigated land inherited from her father in law. Her husband 
worked locally as a carpenter in the township. They grew food for both consumption and sale. 
Mildred also wove hats from boabab bark. In one month, she could make six hats and sell them 
at ZWD 7 each. She kept this money for herself. She had eight children, the first bom in 1967 and 
the last bom in 1987. She gave birth to three more children who died, including twins. She had 
five girls and three boys. Mildred has used the pill after the birth of each of her children apart 
from the first bom. She first heard about contraception from the CBD who was walking house 
to house. Mildred liked and respected the CBD and never had any problem obtaining advice and 
information from her. The CBD told her to use the yellow pill when she was breastfeeding and the 
white one when she was not. She generally started taking the yellow pill about six to eight weeks 
after the birth of a child and carried on until she finished breast feeding usually at about one and 
a half years. Then she switched to the white pill until it was time to conceive again.Mildred said 
that she liked to use the pill because it meant that you didn’t have to bother with the period of 
abstinence. Only one other woman interviewed in her age group had more children. Mildred had
49 This observation is confirmed by recent World Bank research into contraceptive prevalence 
and fertility levels in Zimbabwe (Thomas and Maluccio 1995)
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used the pill more consistently between each child than all of her peers and many of her juniors. 
Mildred, then, was an example of a woman who has successfully managed to claim entitlements 
from health workers which had enabled her to pursue a ‘traditional’ reproductive strategy. She 
has gained a limited amount of sexual and reproductive self determination through use of state 
provided, rather than kinship controlled, means of fertility regulation. This had enabled her to 
sustain her marriage and manage her household resources.
Secret use of the pill
As already discussed, the majority of women pursued reproductive strategies which enabled them 
to negotiate for resources within the terms of the marital contract. Women who used the pill did 
not necessarily want to challenge their husband’s authority over reproductive decision making. Yet 
women also wanted to retain some degree of control both over the means of fertility regulation 
and fertility itself because, as discussed below, they wanted to space births. Men had mixed views 
about whether or not contraception represented a threat to their decision making authority. 
Surveys of men’s views on family planning carried out in the early eighties recorded high levels 
of outright male opposition to the use of contraceptives. Arguments were as much about the 
control of wives as they were about fertility regulation. The introduction of the pill was seen as 
encouraging loose behaviour and prostitution among women (Government of Zimbabwe 1982). 
Similar views were expressed by men Mabika. Mr Nenowhe said that, ‘most men are against 
family planning. Even now, most men would discourage their wives from taking family planning. 
I am one of them. How can you know what your wife is doing if she is taking the pill?’. Another 
man explained, ‘men aren’t for family planning. Men think that if she stays for three years without
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having a child - then she might wander off. So men think it’s better to fix their wives and make 
sure they are pregnant or breast feeding - then they can’t get into too much trouble’.
Other men, however, disagreed with these views and suggested that the pill had little impact on 
their authority. Tobius argued that, ‘ family planning is women's concern. But it's men who decide 
when to have a child.’ Tom explained that; ‘before pills were available, then it was the man who 
was in charge of when they should have children. It was his actions that could decide when there 
were children. But now, with family planning it doesn't mean that women are in charge. Because 
the man may still decide. Men will say - this is how many children I want and this is when I want 
them. Then the woman has to stop taking the pill.’
As indicated above, in a number of cases women did use the pill as instructed by husbands and 
family. Some women said, however, that they tried to openly negotiate with their husbands over 
decisions about the timing of conception. They did this through reference to the ZNFPC’s 
discourse about reproductive health needs. Women were, indeed, concerned about the effects of 
childbirth on their own health. As one woman explained, ‘the main reason that I started taking 
the pill was to space children...The main reason that I wanted to space was for my own health. 
It wasn’t to do with finances. I was just concerned about my health’. Women often talked about 
the pain and exhaustion of pregnancy, birth and having children. While, as discussed in chapter 
five, such conversations were sometimes used as a means of claiming a greater stake in household 
resources, these claims were rooted in women’s experience. Discussions about pain and suffering 
in the delivery room were a common topic of conversation among women. There was unanimous 
agreement among younger women that long spaces between children were necessary to allow
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them time to recover from childbirth and breast feeding. In keeping with the ZNFPC’s teaching, 
a number of women said that four years was the ideal gap. Others wanted longer and said that 
they needed five, six or even eight years between children. Older women, however, were quite 
dismissive of these arguments. ‘In my time,’ according to one fifty year old woman, ‘people didn't 
worry about the health of the mother.’
While talk of women’s reproductive health needs and spacing were permissible, in contrast to 
declarations of women’s rights to control their own fertility, men disputed women’s claims in 
these terms. Men dismissed ideas about health needs as women's talk. Men claimed that they were 
not convinced by women's concerns about labour pains. Tobius suggested that, ‘ women aren't 
really concerned about the pain of bearing children. The first child might be painful. But the 
second and third are easy.’ Another male informant argued that all the talk about women’s health 
really just showed how weak women were, ‘in the past, women were able to have twelve or 
thirteen children. Now they say they have to have rest and leave spaces in between. What is 
wrong with women these days?’ For men, the issue was not one of spacing but of absolute 
numbers. ‘Women think that it is good to space, but men dont. If you space a lot, then maybe you 
will be dead before the next child arrives.’ Another male informant suggested that ‘it's ok to use 
family planning , but it's not very important. Once you reach the number of children that you 
want, then it's good to use family planning.’
While, then, some women could discuss the issue of spacing for health reasons with their 
husband, in many cases it was to no avail. One twenty three year old expressed a common 
grievance; ‘my husband decides when we should have another child. I do mind about this because
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I would like time to rest between having children. I have discussed this with some close relatives 
- but they have the same problem.’ Some women interviewed said that when their open 
negotiations on the basis of arguments about their health needs failed, they resorted to the secret 
use of the pill. As one woman said; ‘with the pill I can have more control than withdrawal. My 
husband wouldn't agree by discussing. He has to be the one who decides when to have children. 
The only solution is to take the pill secretly.’ As discussed in the previous chapter, such action 
was often actively encouraged by the health workers. Women’s strategies in manipulation of the 
pill further indicated a degree of control in relation to health workers.
Mrs Dhliwayo was thirty year old and had four children. They had no access to irrigated land, but 
did have some dry land. They grew food for consumption only. They also kept some goats and 
poultry. Mr Dhliwayo worked for Agritex in the nearby town and returned home every weekend. 
Mrs Dhilwayo explained her pill use as follows; ‘it is my husband who decides when to have 
another child. He has never said how many children he wants. I want to carry on having children 
up to menopause, But I would like to leave three years between each child. Every time, after 
weaning, I use the pill secretly because my husband wants me to get pregnant straight away. 
When I first take the pill after giving birth, my husband knows that I am using it. But then I tell 
him that I have stopped taking it and carry on using it.’ Other women followed similar strategies. 
Golden Munhero was twenty five years old and married, with two children. They had access to 
dry land around the compound and grew food for consumption only. Golden grew vegetables in 
her garden for sale. Her husband was a soldier and sent money back on a regular basis. She said 
that her husband decided when she should have another child; ‘in both cases, he said that it was 
time to have another child. But, now, maybe I haven't rested for long enough, so I will carry on
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taking the pill without telling him. Then when he says a second time - it's time to have another 
child, then I willrfop taking the pill.’ The secret use of the pill in between children enabled women 
to gain a limited amount of time to rest or to delay the costs of additional offspring.
Some women, however, pursued the counter ploy and stopped taking the pill without telling their 
husband in order to conceive again. In these cases, as one women explained, even though her 
husband had said he didn’t want another child, she was afraid that if she failed to carry on 
producing children, her husband might leave. Secret non-use of the pill, then, was used as a means 
of maintaining a marriage through child birth. Mrs Gowo was twenty seven and had three 
children. ‘My husband didn't want another child because he said with the drought things are too 
difficult. He always says this. He wanted to wait until he had permanent employment before he 
had another child. But then I thought it was better to have another child straight away. So I just 
stopped taking the pill without telling him.’
Mrs Mhloyi was thirty three and had six children, the first bom in 1982 and the last in 1996.They 
didn’t own any land, but her father in law allowed them to use three boons of his irrigated plot. 
Mr Mhloyi worked in the town and came home every two weeks. He sent money back every two 
months. Mrs Mhloyi explained, ‘I started using family planning after my first bom. I was given 
it at the hospital. I wanted to use the pill, but my husband didn't approve. So when I first started 
using the pill in 1983,1 was doing it secretly. Then my husband found out and objected, so I 
stopped using it and got pregnant. I started using it again after the second bom. But I didn't use 
it after the third. The third bom was a boy and I found that when I was breast feeding a boy, I 
didn't menstruate and so I didn't get pregnant. My husband was against family planning at first 
because we only had a few children. Then when we had four, he said that he didn't want any
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more. So then he said that the pill was a good thing. Both the fifth and the sixth children were 
accidents. I was using the pill. With both the fifth and the sixth child, I finished a packet and then 
delayed going to get a new packet. Somehow, I wanted to get pregnant again. When my husband 
said that he only wanted four children, I didn't quite believe him. I thought that four wasn't 
enough. I told him that I had gone to the CBD to get some pills. It was the same with the fifth 
bom. I told him that I had got another packet of pills, but I delayed and so I got pregnant’. Mrs 
Mhloyi said that she had always had good relations with the CBD, ‘it’s easier to talk to the CBD. 
The CBD is always free and ready to explain. At times the nurses might be busy. It’s better to talk 
to the CBD about side effects because the nurses are off doing other things. I don’t worry about 
the cost of going to the CBD*.
Some men were aware of their wife’s secret use of the pill. Tobius had a house in Mabika, but 
ran a successful hairdressing booth in the township. He explained his wife's reproductive history 
as follows; ‘with me, I was the one who first went to get the pill from the CBD. After the first 
child I was worried about our finances. I wanted to make sure that we had a solid base before we 
had another child. But sometimes with women they say to the man that they are taking the pill 
and then the husband finds that the wife is pregnant and he says what happened? Then the wife 
says something about how she had to stop taking it because of side effects and how difficult it 
was to go and get treated at the clinic. Sometimes the wife thinks that she has to keep on bearing 
children otherwise her husband will divorce her. In my case, I thought that my wife was taking 
the pill. But then I found that she kept having children. At first she said it was because of stomach 
problems, side effects and whatever. Really it was because she wanted a girl and all the time she 
kept having boys - so she kept wanting to try again. Then after the twins, I confronted her and
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said this is enough. We could end up having ten or twelve boys. With the twins she was 
disappointed because she went to a prophet and he said that one was a boy and one was a girl. 
So she was veiy disappointed when she gave birth to two boys. After that, she signed a piece of 
paper and she had a tubal ligation - so no more children for us.’ His wife later confirmed that this 
story was true - she had stopped taking the pill and then later told her husband that she had to do 
this because of side effects. Margaret had wanted a girl, but she also wanted to carry on having 
children to keep her husband tied to the marriage. In fact, since she had the tubal ligation her 
husband had made his girlfriend pregnant and Margaret was very worried that he would leave her. 
As Margaret’s case illustrates, even when women were successfully able to negotiate entitlements 
from the health workers, and use contraceptives to obtain a limited degree of reproductive self 
determination, their strategies did not always work. As discussed in chapter five, there was 
evidence of an increasing reluctance among some men to claim their rights over women’s fertility. 
Without men’s acknowledgement of their rights, women could not claim resources and support.
8.5.2 New strategies?
Long term methods
As discussed in chapter five, the success of women's reproductive strategies was dependent on 
the recognition of customary patrilineal, pro-natalist concepts and rights. Children could only be 
used as a means of prolonging and institutionalizing relationships, and thereby claiming economic 
support from husband and his kin, if men were willing to claim children as their own and 
consequently recognize a relationship with the biological mother. When women said that men
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wanted lots of children to carry on the name of their clan, they were not only making a comment 
about their perception of gender relations, but also about the social order that they wanted. A 
number of women in Mabika, however, had found that men were no longer conforming to their 
interpretation of traditional society. Changing economic conditions meant that, in some cases, the 
benefits to men of claiming their customary rights no longer outweighed the costs. As Guyer 
observes, in many cases men’s support of children has attenuated to recognition alone, 
recognition has attenuated still further into selectivity and selectivity into neglect (Guyer 1994).
It was generally those women who had given up hope of obtaining economic support from their 
husband who were thinking, or were using, long term methods of contraception. Pamayi was 
twenty seven, with ten years' education and had three children. Her husband was working as an 
emergency taxi driver and had been coming home every two weeks, but had recently broken this 
pattern. Pamayi told us about a neighbour who got pregnant by a policeman. The policeman went 
to stay with her even though he was already married to someone else. She said that she was 
worried that her husband was doing the same thing to her - he had made another woman pregnant 
and maybe he would leave her. ‘I discussed family planning with my husband. He wanted four 
children. I wanted two. But the first two were both boys. So I had a third and it was a girl. Now 
my husband wants a fourth. I named the last child Takanaka (that's good enough). Generally men 
want more children than women. Men don't have to worry about the welfare of the children. Even 
if they provide some financial support, it usually isn't enough. It is the woman who has to provide 
for the children on a daily basis. When my husband said he wanted four children, I believed him, 
but I didn't know what to do. Maybe if I don't have a fourth he will go off with another woman. 
If I do have another one, he can still go off with another woman. I resent the fact that it should
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be my husband who decides when to have children. Now I am using depo. I have had two three 
month injections. I started using it when my last child was three. I have heard rumours about 
depo. People say that you might fail to conceive and it makes you very stout. I'm not scared. If 
I stop conceiving I don't care and if I get stout I don't care. If my husband wants another wife, 
there is nothing that I can do about it. I have to look after myself and my children. I don’t care 
what he thinks of me any more’
Violet was twenty seven and had four children; ‘there are five people living in this household; 
myself and my four children. The father is working in Harare where he is a butcher. He visits 
maybe once every three months. He doesn't send money back. I have lived in the house for less 
than a year. I built and thatched the house myself (this is usually done by the man). Before this 
I was living with my in laws. I don't have access to land. Sometimes I rent. The in laws don't have 
access to land. I get a little cash from pieces of work in other people's fields...I don't get any cash 
from my parents in law as they don't have any money either. They are also struggling. I generally 
have to pay the school fees myself. If I want the children's father to pay, I have to write a letter 
to his brothers. If they can find him, then they can sometimes force him to send me some money. 
My in laws tried to persuade him to pay up but he is too involved with prostitutes. The problems 
started when I had the twins. Up until then I was living with him. But then he sent me away. He 
started going out with this woman that I know, but I don't know whether he intends to marry this 
other woman. It is my husband who decided when to have the children. But now I think that I 
should be the one to decide because I am the one who bears the children. I have to feed them and 
send them to school. I was given the pill at the clinic. When I came home and told my husband 
about it, he accepted. Sometimes I have taken the pill secretly when he has said that it's time to
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have another child and I have wanted to wait a bit. For me, eight years is the ideal gap between 
children. I think I have enough children already. He has said that he wants five children. I think 
maybe he should give me a bit more money if he wants another child. Now I think I might switch 
to depo to make sure I don’t get pregnant again. I don’t care about the side effects. I want to be 
sure I don’t have another child’
In some cases, as discussed in chapter five, violence and poverty went hand in hand. Sara was 
thirty six and had three children; ‘ I used to be a Roman Catholic, but I have changed to 
Apostolic. I changed my church because I was having problems with my husband. When he was 
paid, he wouldn’t come home. When he does come back he is often drunk and he beats me. I 
thought that because the Apostolics can heal, they might be able to help me. My husband doesn't 
attend to the house and he doesn't give me any money. It is up to me to buy fruits and sell them 
to raise money for the school fees. I do have access to irrigated land, but I only grow food for 
consumption. Neither my husband nor the children help in the fields. My mother in law gave us 
the land. At first we lived with the mother in law. But she told us we had to go because our 
arguments were causing a disturbance.... I have been using the pill since I had my first bom. But 
after the last one I changed to depo. I am thinking of sterilization because I don't want any more 
children. I didn't discuss when to have another child with my husband. I just found myself 
pregnant. Only the first bom was intentional. All the others were mistakes. Sometimes I missed 
a day or two [of taking the pill]. But it's not possible to tell my husband that I've not taken the 
pill. If he is drunk then I can't stop him. I don’t want any more mistakes’.
Use of long term methods, then, to ensure certainty in the face of irregular visits and no support,
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was the strategy of the desperate. Ruby was thirty and had five children. Her husband had two 
wives. ‘There are ten in the household, myself and my children, the second wife and her child and 
two children from our husband's previous marriage. The first wife left before he married me. We 
have no access to irrigated land and no dry land. At times we don't have enough food to eat. We 
weave baskets and sell them. Sometimes we exchange baskets for clothes. Our husband gives us 
money but it's never enough for all of the children. Generally, one wife stays with the husband. 
But sometimes he doesn't send money to the one who remains here. He works as a school hand 
in Harare. Our mother in law says that if he shouts then we have to stay quiet. But we have to run 
very fast if he starts to beat us. Once when one child was four months old, the husband came 
home and was so violent that I ran away and told the headmaster. I was covered with cuts and 
bruises. He [the headmaster] called the police and I had to be accompanied to get the child. I 
don't leave because he is always promising money. I have to think of the children....My first child 
was with a different husband. I eloped when I was sixteen, but he wouldn't take me, so I went 
back to my parents. All the other children are from the same father. I started taking the pill after 
the fourth bom. I didn't discuss this with my husband. One day he found them and he didn't know 
how they worked. He looked at the empty packet and accused me of sleeping around because I 
had been taking them while he wasn’t there. So then I changed to depo. I have heard that if you 
take depo you may never conceive again. But I am happy with this. Some people have told me 
that when you stop taking depo you can bleed so much that you faint. I am afraid that this might 
happen, but I take it anyway. There has never been a decision to have children - they have all been 
a mistake. My husband doesn't know that I don't want any more. I will make sure that he doesn't 
hear.’ The resort to long term methods, then, was generally the product of a breakdown in 
women’s marital relations. When it was no longer possible to negotiate for economic resources
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through fertility, women were prepared to use methods which they thought, as discussed earlier 
in the chapter, might make them permanently infertile.
Unmarried mothers
As discussed in chapter five, another of the indicators of men’s abandonment of their traditional 
rights was the number of young, single mothers in the village who have been rejected by the 
biological father of their child. Discussions with women between the ages of fifteen and twenty 
indicated that it was common for women of this age to be sexually active. These women were 
unable to officially obtain contraceptives. One teenage boy told me that he was reluctant to sleep 
with teenage girls without using a condom. He thought it was a common practice for girls to 
sleep with a number of boys and then, when they got pregnant, to name the one with the best 
prospects as the father. As a couple of teenage girls admitted, even if they weren’t quite as 
manipulative as this boy had suggested, they were quite happy not to use contraceptives. They 
used the fact that they were unable to obtain contraceptives to their perceived advantage and 
were happy to rely on either no contraception or their partner’s intermittent use of condoms in 
the hope that they would get pregnant. Their stated objective was to get pregnant in order to 
promote marriage. As discussed in chapter five, elopement was a recognised means of achieving 
that end. In Mabika, however, elopement among women under thirty had led to rejection more 
often than marriage. In such cases, women were left with a child but no support from the father 
or his family.
For some single women under thirty, the prospect of single motherhood had prompted them to
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obtain contraceptives by illicit means. One teenage girl said that her older married sister obtained 
the pill on her behalf either from the clinic or from a CBD. This girl declared that she wasn’t 
going to get pregnant until she found a man who she was sure would look after her. The price of 
this determination was the risk to her health of non-medically supervised contraceptive use. 
Another girl also said that she had sent an older, married friend to obtain contraception for her 
from the CBD. She had only done this once, however, because the friend had become worried 
that the CBD would guess what she was doing. One woman in her twenties said that she went 
to the clinic in the next town along the road in order to obtain the pill. She wanted a boyfriend 
but she didn’t want to get pregnant. These women, then, had to resort to subterfuge with the 
health workers in ordered to assert any degree of reproductive self-determination and thereby 
prevent themselves from entering into the struggle of raising children without resources or 
support. They did not want to pursue the customary reproductive strategy of trading rights over 
fertility for economic support because they knew that such strategies could no longer be 
guaranteed to work. The policies and practices of the ZNFPC, however, in asserting male 
authority over reproductive decision making in the private sphere, did not allow them to pursue 
this new strategy easily or without risk to their health.
8.6  Conclusion
As Petchesky and Judd argue, a successful reproductive strategy may be one that moves a woman 
from a position of victim to that of survivor. The different strategies that women adopt, in 
general, fall between the two extremes of outright resistance and passive accommodation. Most 
women are searching for some degree of autonomy while trying to maintain their place in family
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and community (Petchesky and Judd 1998). As discussion of women’s strategies illustrates, most 
tried to negotiate the best deal within customary understandings of marriage rather than directly 
challenging the terms of the marital contract by claiming reproductive autonomy . As outlined 
above, the extent to which women were able to do this depended on their relations with family 
planning providers. Those who were able to claim entitlements to advice and information on 
contraceptive use, were more likely to be able to successfully pursue their reproductive strategies 
and negotiate a better position for themselves within the household. The actions of health 
workers, then, reinforced socio-economic differences between women. Those who were 
vulnerable because of their age or lack of socio-economic status, were less able to realise their 
entitlements to certain standards of family planning provision. As a consequence, they were less 
able to better their position within the household. As discussed in the previous chapter, women 
wanted the entitlements set out in the charter of clients’ rights. Those who received their given 
entitlements to certain standards of service provision were able to assert a greater degree of 
reproductive self-determination within private sphere gender relations.
The evidence suggests, however, that some women's reproductive strategies were failing in the 
present climate of economic change, regardless of their ability to manipulate contraceptive use. 
The benefits to men of claiming their traditional rights no longer outweighed the costs. The 
traditional construction of gender relations upon which institutions of Zimbabwean citizenship 
have been built was being undermined by men’s actions. Men's support of their children had 
dwindled. In some cases, the strategies of women, geared towards cementing relations with men 
through producing children, had turned out to be ‘illusory hopes based on the projected 
persistence of old patterns into a more radically new age than they imagined’ (Guyer 1994:233).
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Some women had been forced into new strategies to deal with this situation. Their strategies, 
however, were those of a desperation which has been left inadequately addressed by government 
provision. Women whose husband’s had materially abandoned them, had turned to depo. Young 
girls who did not want to follow this path were resorting to subterfuge to obtain contraceptives. 
Their actions indicated that the ZNFPC, in reinforcing men’s reproductive decision making 
authority in the private sphere, was no longer in keeping with the reality of women’s lives or their 
reproductive strategies. Some women had been forced into asserting self determination over their 
reproductive lives because men were increasingly reluctant to meet the obligations which formed 




In the Introduction I contrasted the values of the Zimbabwean family planning policy, built on 
respect for women’s rights, with the identification of women as dependants in dominant 
discourses of citizenship. I suggested that this contrast raised two sets of questions. The first 
related to the interpretation and implementation of family planning policies. Given the general 
context of Zimbabwean gendered relations of citizenship, how are the policies and programmes 
of the ZNFPC interpreted and implemented in practice? The second set of questions related to 
whether women valued the rights offered in policy and practice by the ZNFPC and were able to 
utilise these in order to obtain a greater degree of reproductive self-determination in the 
household. I examined these questions using field work data from Mabika, a village in a 
communal area of rural Zimbabwe. The body of the thesis fell into three different sections; the 
first on citizenship, the second on the policies and practices of the ZNFPC and the third examining 
the extent to which discourses of reproductive rights allowed women greater reproductive 
self-determination in household gender relations.
In chapter three I discussed the historical construction of citizenship institutions upon divisions oj-
race and gender under the colonial regime. I examined the official identification of women as
dependant mothers and wives through the codification of customary law. I suggested, however,
that this process was never total or complete. Women were able to use colonial discourses of
individual rights and justice to negotiate a stronger position for themselves within customary
structures and organisations. In chapter four I examined the years of the Liberation War and the
292
subsequent policies of the Independent government. Recent analyses have suggested that feminist 
aspirations for gender equality under the new Zimbabwean government have not been realised. 
Critics argue that the present day government has failed to dismantle the institutions of the 
colonial regime and women remain defined by state policies and institutions as dependant mothers 
and wives. As under the colonial regime, the government has reinforced institutions of male 
authority as compensation for men’s own lack of full political and social citizenship. Local 
government structures, proclaimed as the basis for an inclusive participatory citizenship, have 
become the vehicles for patronage by traditional rural elites.
In chapter five, I examined how the context of state policies and institutions shaped women’s 
reproductive strategies in household gender relations. Given their lack of rights to material 
resources, women thought that they had to marry in order to survive. Living law understandings 
of the terms of the conjugal contract provided the groom’s family with rights over the fertility, 
sexuality and labour of the incoming wife. The converse side of this contract was the groom’s 
obligation to provide economic support and security for his wife and children. Thus, women 
traded rights in fertility through marriage in exchange for material and social resources. Within 
marriage, women negotiated more support through reference to the terms of the conjugal contract 
and manipulation of their fertility. Many rural women thus aimed to obtain maximum 
reproductive self determination within the confines of the traditionally understood terms of the 
conjugal contract. I further argued, however, that women’s strategies of claiming resources 
through marriage were being undermined by economic factors. The evidence suggests that the 
reality of changing economic conditions in Zimbabwe, as in other Sub Saharan African countries, 
has meant that men are increasingly reluctant to meet their ‘customary’ obligations to provide
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support and security for women (Guyer 1994; Lockwood 1997; Potts and Mutambirwa 1998).
In the second section of the thesis, I examined the policies and practices of the ZNFPC. In chapter 
six I discussed the historical development of concepts of reproductive rights from the policies of 
Rhodesian Family Planning Association (FPA) to those of its present day successor, the ZNFPC. 
The FPA used concepts of human rights and the obligation of the state to provide family planning 
services to, in practice, claim greater authority over the reproductive decision making processes 
of African couples. Despite war time nationalist objections to the programme, the Independent 
government took on the organisation rather than disbanding it. Present day ZNFPC policies and 
programmes indicate two conflicting definitions of reproductive rights. The first definition defined 
the parameters of relations between service users and health workers through the identification 
of a number of client rights. This charter drew upon the quality of care conditions, set out at 
Cairo, necessary for the realisation of women’s self-determination in relation to health workers. 
In contrast to Cairo, however, these rights were based upon a narrow understanding of 
reproductive health relating largely to fertility regulation. Posters listing these rights were pinned 
up in ZNFPC and Ministry of Health clinics. The ZNFPC also, in its policies and programmes, 
identified men as having ultimate authority over reproductive decision making in the private 
sphere. Thus the ZNFPC recognised women’s rights of reproductive self-determination in relation 
to health workers, but not in relation to their male kin.
In chapter seven I discussed how local level health workers interpret these conflicting policies in 
their daily practices. Community Based Distributors refused to provide contraceptives to women 
who were known to be single. Women who were married, however, could obtain services with
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or without their husband’s consent. The groups of women who could not obtain contraceptives 
from the CBD had to visit the local Ministry of Health clinic for supplies. At the clinic, realisation 
of client rights was linked to the socio-economic status of individuals. Younger women and 
others of lower socio-economic standing were less likely to be able to obtain the information and 
services identified as client rights. The lack of a credible system of local government worker 
accountability meant that villagers were unable to collectively ensure that client rights were 
always observed.
In the third section, I examined the impact of this discourse of reproductive rights on women’s 
strategies in the household. In chapter eight, I argued that within marriage those women who 
were less able to claim services had more difficulty in negotiating a degree of reproductive 
self-determination within the household. These tended to use contraceptives intermittently and 
ineffectively. They were, consequently, less able to regulate their fertility as a means of 
negotiation for household resources. Those women who successfully obtained services often used 
contraceptives as a straightforward replacement for kinship-controlled means of fertility 
regulation. Switching from kinship regulated to state-supplied means of contraception allowed 
these women a marginal degree of reproductive self-determination within the household. Some 
of these women used contraceptives secretly to ensure that the timing of child birth was geared 
to their greatest possible material advantage and well being. Those women who were able to 
realise their ‘clients’ rights’, then, were able to obtain a greater degree of reproductive 
self-determination within the household.
As discussed in chapter five, however, changing economic circumstances meant that customary
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reproductive strategies were no longer always a successful option. Some women within the 
village had given up all hope of gaining any economic support from their husbands. There were 
also number of young unmarried women in the village who, learning from the mistakes of their 
single mother peers, did not want to risk pregnancy as a means of entering into marriage. These 
women were searching for greater reproductive self determination, as there was no longer any 
point of trying to trade rights over fertility for economic support. The strategies of these women 
highlighted the shortcomings of the ZNFPC’s dual definition of reproductive rights. While all 
women wanted rights over reproductive self determination in relation to the health workers, some 
women also wanted some degree of autonomy in relation to men. While, in the past, the ZNFPC’s 
conceptual separation of public sphere and private sphere rights could be seen as matching 
women’s own strategies and values, changing economic circumstances meant that this was no 
longer the case.
Rather than questioning whether internationally defined reproductive rights are relevant to rural 
women in Zimbabwe, the question perhaps should be one of how the ZNFPC can interpret and 
implement those rights to the best advantage of diverse groups of women with different and 
changing reproductive strategies. While posters declaring women’s rights to reproductive self 
determination within the household would alienate men and women, it would be possible at least 
to ensure that programmes and practice do not reinforce men’s customaiy reproductive authority. 
Thus, it might be worth considering separating out the functions of reproductive health advice 
and contraceptive provision. CBDs, with specific health training, could provide information and 
advice to all village women regardless of status. Contraceptive provision is, perhaps, better 
situated in local depots and Ministry of Health clinics where anonymity allows more access to
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different groups of women. Clinic provision, however, has to conform to the standards set out 
by the ZNFPC itself in accordance with the Cairo declaration. This latter condition is dependent 
upon an increase in accountability between health workers and villagers.
In the introduction, I suggested that the contrasting sets of values that this thesis explored could 
be conceptualised through reference to political science debates about contract theory. As 
Lemarchand and Werbner suggest, a distinction can be made between the Lockean notion of 
social contract and the Burkean notion of moral partnerships. While in the former, relations 
between states and individuals are defined in terms of citizens’ rights, in the latter those relations 
are regarded as being rooted in an enduring partnership between those who are living, those who 
are dead and those who are yet to be bom (Lemarchand 1992; Werbner 1995). As I suggested 
in the introduction and in the theoretical chapter, which set out the ideals of relations between 
state and society are predicated upon particular constructions of gendered relations in the private 
sphere. Both are realised through different forms of gender domination. As outlined above, the 
evidence of fieldwork suggests many women have, historically and currently, tried to use the 
resources offered by the Lockean model of rights and equal citizenship to increase their benefits 
within a social system based on the values of moral partnership. They were searching for a 
maximum degree of self determination without loss of security and support. For all women, this 
meant they wanted the client rights defined by the ZNFPC. For some women, it meant that they 
required a broader definition of reproductive rights to call upon in order to pursue their 
reproductive strategies. Women, then, could use discourses of reproductive rights and the 
entitlements they legitimated through interpretation and implementation, as resources to be drawn 
upon in pursuit of their different strategies. If women rejected the charter of clients’ rights, it was
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not necessarily because they did not like the values, or could not utilise the resources legitimated 
by reproductive rights discourses. It was, in practice, as much a product of the relationship 
between state and society. As discussed in chapter four, there was no accountability between local 
level workers and villagers. While women might have wanted the rights enshrined in ZNFPC 
policies they had no faith in the system which legitimised them.
As I suggested in the introduction, the gendered construction of citizenship can be seen as having 
a dual impact on the value and realisation of women’s reproductive rights. First, the institutions 
of citizenship shape the social and economic ‘enabling conditions’ which underpin the reality of 
women’s choices about their fertility. Second, the nature of women’s participation in political 
processes influences the practices of street level bureaucrats and, consequently, the realisation of 
rights. Feminist analyses of reproductive rights have tended to focus on the first of these issues. 
Field work for this thesis suggests that the second is equally as important. As Plant argues, rights 
provide a means of empowering citizens in relation to public service providers (Plant 1998). But, 
if rights are to be more than rhetorical, then participation in political processes has to allow means 
for citizens to hold local level workers to account.
The recognition of rights, then, may provide women with a means of making claims on the state 
and its agents. As Petchesky and Judd suggest, whatever the inequalities in relations between 
health workers and services users, it may be easier for women to assert their views and wants in 
the public sphere rather than the private world of household relations(Petchesky and Judd 1998). 
As I have suggested in this thesis, however, increasing entitlements in relation to health workers 
enables women to more successfully achieve a degree of self-determination in household
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negotiations. Ensuring women’s increased realisation of rights in the public sphere through 
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